Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment by Lupu, Ira C.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 4 
1979 
Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Ira C. Lupu 
Boston University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss4/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
UNTANGLING THE STRANDS OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Ira C. Lupu*t-
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 
II. STRANDS THAT PASSED.IN THE NIGHT-AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1879-1977) . . . . . . . . . 986 
A. 1879-1937 - The Dominance of Due Process 
("Liberty") Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 
B. 1937-1953 - The Era of Qualified Passivity . . 989 
C. 1954-1969 -The Warren Court and the 
Emergence of Equal Protection Activism . . . . . 991 
D. The Burger Decade - A Preliminary Look at 
the Strand,s Recrossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 
III. THREE SNAPSHOTS OF THE STRANDS - Maher v. 
Roe, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, AND Zablocki 
v. Redhail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 
A. Maher v. Roe ............................ 1003 
1. Wealth Plus Fundamental Rights - The 
Flowering of "Monopoly Doctrine" ....... 1006 
2. Press·ures on the Liberty System -
Payment and Preference for Childbirth . . . 1011 
B. Moore v. City of East Cleveland ............. 1015 
C. Zablocki v. Redhail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 
JV. UNTANGLING THE STRANDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 
A. The Multiple Meaning of Liberty ........... 1027 
1. Substantive Rights - The Sources of 
Pref erred Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 
a. Sources Within the Document - Text 
and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 
b. Moving Outside the Document -
Fundamental Value Discovery ........ 1032 
(i) Historical Recognition .......... 1043 
• Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B. 1968, Cornell University; J.D. 
1971, Harvard University. - Ed. 
t I wish to thank my colleagues Eric Green, Mary Joe Frug, and Henry P. Monaghan 
for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to thank my student assistants 
Clifford Rones and Laurie Becker for hard work, dedication to this enterprise, and a 




Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:981 
(ii) ContemporarzJ Values .......... . 
2. The Standard Applied - Moore 
Reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
B. The Single Meaning of Equality ........... . 
1. The Limited Choice of Imperatives ...... . 
2. Reanalyzing Substantive Equal Protection . . 
a. Durational Residency Requirements 
and the Right to Travel ............. . 
b. Rights of Political Participation ...... . 
C. The Consequences of Untangling - A Broad 
Look ................................... . 
SEPARATE STRANDS- SOME CONCLUDING 











The ideals of liberty and equality have animated revolutions, 
both armed and otherwise. Constitutional revolutions are not 
immune from such forces; indeed the twentieth century's most 
adventurous constitutional interpretation has revolved around 
those sibling stars. The first section of the fourteenth amendment 
may be seen as a shorthand endorsement of the two ideals - the 
due process clause has been a textual referent for the imposition 
of libertarian values, and the equal protection clause has served 
as the textual commitment to an evolving vision of constitutional 
egalitarianism.1 
This fourteenth amendment companionship of liberty and 
equality has, however, created opportunities for misunderstand-
ing as well as for creative linkage. In particular, the judicial selec-
tion of values 'for special protection against the majoritarian pro-
1. The "privileges or immunities" clause of section one of the fourteenth amendment 
barely survived the infanticide attempt upon it in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36 (1873). Its growth has remained stunted ever since. See Benoit, The Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be Life After Death? 11 
SUFFOLK L. REv. 6 (1976); Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come 
Round at Last?" 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405; see also L. TRmE,.AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 415-26 (1978). Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) accepts the construction of 
the Slaughter-House Cases and represents the modern view. In contrast to the enormous 
volume of modern equal protection and due process litigation, "privileges or immunities" 
claims have become exceedingly rare. But cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (state 
constitutional provision requiring that low-rent housing projects proposed by state author-
ity be approved by majority of those voting in community election held not violative of 
privileges and immunities clause); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 
152 (1969) (use of streets to communicate thoughts between citizens one of the privileges. 
and immunities of citizens of United States). 
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cesses has wavered throughout the century between a liberty base 
arid an equality base. In the end, the partnership of liberty and 
equality in the fourteenth amendment - and their parallel 
though textually incomplete partnership in the fifth amendment 
- has led the Court into a tangle. Because the Court has uncriti-
cally substituted one for the other, and because historical circum-
stance and the value commitments of different generations have 
combined in twisted patterns, liberty and equality have become 
blurred as constitutional ideals. 
The tangling is most apparent and most serious when viewed 
in its relationship to the so-called "fundamental rights" develop-
ments in both equal protection and due process clause interpreta-
tion. In the sense used here, fundamental rights include all the 
claims of individual rights, drawn from sources outside of the first 
eight amendments, that the Supreme Court has elevated to pre-
ferred status (that is, rights which the government niay infringe 
only when it demonstrates extraordinary justification). Included 
in this category are rights of interstate travel, 2 exercising the fran-
chise, 3 access to certain judicial forums, 4 and procreative choice. 5 
The controversy over this body of doctrine has taken a variety ·of 
forms, but well-educated students of constitutional law can de-
liver a somniloquy containing the most frequently recurring ques-
tions: What are the sources of these rights? Are the sources ade-
quate to overcome the presumption against insulating substan-
tive matters from the exercise of political power? Do the rights 
have "principled" content? Are the rights wholly "judge-made"? 
If so, what legitimate authority sanctions their creation? How are 
judges, once cut loose from the framework of the Constitution, to 
know which claims of right to recognize and which to ignore? The 
list could be expanded, but the questions, no matter how they are 
recast, seem tantalizingly to elude final answers. 
2. The travel right antedates the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, see Crandall 
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), but has been carried forward behind an equal 
protection banner, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating one-year dura-
tional residence requirement for welfare benefits). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 
(1974) (upholding Iowa's one-year residence requirement for divorce). 
3. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding scheme limiting vote to land-
owners, in proportion to the assessed value of their land, in water storage district election). 
See generally Developments in the Law - Elections, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1111 (1975). 
4. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fee for divorce petition 
invalid); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appointed and state-paid 
counsel in criminal appeals of statutory right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
5. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Despite this abundant supply of grist for the mill of judge or 
scholar, the developments of the past twenty-five years highlight 
a further question: Which new rights properly derive from the 
liberty strand, and which from the equality strand?0 Sometimes 
the Court tells us; other times it does not. Often, members of the 
Court agree upon the preferred status of an interest but disagree 
about its textual source.7 On occasion, members of the Court 
concede that an interest has no textual source, yet battle still over 
which strand of the fourteenth amendment protects it from state 
interference. 8 
Although doctrinal disagreement persists, one may still de-
tect some general trends in the recent Supreme Court combat 
over fundamental rights questions. The Burger Court has not 
attempted to suppress, on either institutional or substantive prin-
ciple, inclinations toward fourteenth amendment intervention. It 
has, however, significantly rechanneled the activism of its prede-
cessors, particularly that of the Warren Court.9 It has resurrected 
substantive due process intervention (whose death certificate had 
supposedly been signed in 196310) on behalf of values to which the 
Constitution does not explicitly refer. 11 Simultaneously, the 
6. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113 (1973) (due process), with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (analogous interests protected by the equal protection clause), and 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (analogous interests protected by the due process 
clause) (alternative ground). 
7. The reference is to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which Bill of 
Rights' penumbras, the ninth amendment, and "pure" substantive due process compete 
for attention. 
8. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the majority held that the equal 
protection clause protected the right to travel, while Justice Harlan in dissent believed 
that the due process clause was the relevant shield, 394 U.S. at 659. A similar doctrinal 
dispute split the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), where the majority 
held that the equal protection clause protected the right to marry. Justice Powell, in a 
concurring opinion, felt the right found its source in the due process clause. 434 U.S. at 
397. 
9. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering Funda• 
mental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5, 5-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ely, Foreword]. See 
generally A. BICKEL, THE WARREN COURT AND THE IDEA or PROGRESS (1970); A. Cox, THE 
WARREN COURT (1968). See also Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judi• 
cial Review, 37 Mo. L. REv. 451, 451-54 (1978). 
10. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
11. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This theme will be elaborated in detail throughout the re• 
mainder of this Article. I am not the only one to notice the miracle. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, 
CASES AND MATERIAUI ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 616-656 (9th ed. 1975); Dixon, The "New" 
Substantive Due Process and Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV, 
43; Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417 (1976); Perry, 
Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive 
Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Perry, Ethical Function]; 
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 
1975 SUP. CT. REv. 261. 
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Court has considerably curtailed its willingness to rely on the 
equal protection clause for the advancement of values newly rec-
ognized as constitutionally important. 
This Article explores such trends in the context of several 
recent cases and in the broader context of established patterns of 
constitutional law. Section II shows how the different strains of 
fourteenth amendment activism over the past century have tan-
gled the strands of the fourteenth amendment in a thick, almost 
impenetrable knot. Section ill studies the tangle's reflection in 
three cases raising fundamental rights problems - Maher v. 
Roe, 12 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 13 and Zablocki v. Red-
hail.14 Finally, Section N offers what Sections II and III sug-
gest is missing from fourteenth amendment case faw- a theory, 
abstract but functional, of the separate strands. It suggests that 
the only proper sources for judicial discovery of fundamental lib-
ertarian values outside the constitutional text and structure are 
those which demonstrate that the values are "deeply embedd~d" 
within American society. Further, Section N contends that the 
equality strand cannot and should not bear a substantive content 
- that equal protection, whether viewed in moral terms or pro-
cess terms, should remain substantially rooted in the pure anti-
discrimination concerns that sparked the textual embrace with 
equality. 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment has, at different times, recognized both its liber-
tarian and egalitarian dimensions. Unfortunately, the Court has 
failed to maintain a clear distinction between them. This doc-
trinal imprecision has bred unpredictability, disrespect, and 
charges of outcome-orientation. The first of these phenomena is 
perhaps an inescapable fact of judicial life. The latter two may 
be minimized by judicial articulation of a clear and principled 
theory of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. The equal pro-
tection clause and the due process clause are complementary -
not interchangeable - safeguards against oppressive govern-
ment; they can carry out their missions most effectively when 
their separate roles are respected. Whether the fourteenth 
amendment remains a credible source of protection for the indi-
vidual depends upon the process of untangling. 
12. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
13. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
14. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
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II. STRANDS THAT PASSED IN THE NIGHT - AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1879-1977) 
A. 1879-1937 - The Dominance of Due Process ("Liberty") 
Activism 
One need not possess an acute sense of constitutional history 
to realize that at the same time the Supreme Court was relying 
on the due process clause to actively oppose governmental regula-
tion of economic activity, 15 it characterized the equal protection 
clause as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."18 
From its genesis in the Slaughter-House Cases dissents17 through 
its flowering in Lochner v. New York, 18 substantive due process 
doctrine first threatened and then worked a reign of terror on 
attempted regulation of wages, hours of labor, and unionization. 19 
Rooted in laissez faire ideology, both social and economic, the 
doctrine confined both the objectives and the resources of the 
police power.20 Although economic libertarian ideology found ex-
pression in other constitutional settings, 21 the due process clauses 
of the fifth22 and fourteen1,11 amendments carried the brunt of the 
load. This judicial infusion of values of economic freedom into the 
due process clauses dominated the constitutional law of the first 
third of the twentieth century. 23 
15. See generally L. TiuBE, supra note 1, at 427-55. 
16. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1926). 
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), at 95-96 (Field, J., dissenting), 114-16 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
19. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 737-39 (1975). 
20. Lochner explicitly confined police power objectives by holding that equalization 
of bargaining power between employees and employers is not a legitimate goal of govern-
ment, and police power resources by holding that a maximum hour law was insufficiently 
necessary to preserve the health of bakers to justify the law's infringement on liberty of 
contract. 
21. The scope of national power in the federal system was the most prominent. See, 
e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating taxing and spending scheme 
designed to control agricultural production); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) 
(invalidating tax on employers who used child labor because its prohibitory effect and 
purpose were not within Congress's taxing power); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 
(1918) (invalidating prohibition on interstate shipment of goods produced with the aid of 
child labor); cf. United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878) (Congress exceeded its bank-
ruptcy power). The contract clause served as a vehicle for similar expression. See, e.g., 
Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923). 
22. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal law against "yellow 
dog" contracts on interstate railroads held to violate due process clause of fifth amend-
ment). 
23. Objections to that line of doctrines are, of course, quite massive: (1) The Court 
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It is instructive to note that the activism of the Lochner era 
might have been channeled through the equal protection clause. 
Given the infancy of protective labor legislation, most if not all 
such statutes covered limited classes of workers' hazards, and 
hence were underinclusive in their coverage of employment risks~ 
Despite the apparent judicial distaste for legislative activity in 
this field, the Court might have invalidated labor legislation for 
failure to extend coverage to all similarly situated workers.24 The 
ostensible reasons for not adopting such an approach illuminate 
the Cou'rt's contemporary struggle with these companion provi-
sions. 
First, and perhaps foremost, a premise of legal analysis dur-
ing the Lochner period was the inviolability of the naturally un-
equal distribution of ability and fortune among persons.25 Given 
lacked justification for protecting liberty of contract by way of the due process clause, 
because the liberty protected by the clause is limited to freedom from physical restraint, 
see, e.g., Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the . 
Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARv. L. 
REv. 365 (1890); (2) The Court lacked textual warrant for the entire notion of "substantive 
due process" because the concern of the due process clause is limited to "process" (i.e., 
procedural regularity); (3) The nature of the Court's methodology required it to exercise 
judgments of a legislative (nonjudicial) character, thereby involving it in decisions belong-
ing exclusively to another branch of government, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); (4) The Court's resort to "natural law" as the source 
of substantive constitutional rights was vague, open-ended and inescapably subjective, 
and it imperiled the notion that, absent a clear mistake, the democratic process is the sole 
repository of power to sort out the important choices of policy and value, see Thayer, The 
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 
144 (1893). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). See generally Ely, Foreword, supra note 9; Dixon, supra note 11. 
Interestingly enough, although each of those objections has been influential in the 
evolution of post-Lochner doctrine, none has systematically prevailed on the Court. In-
deed, the only prevailing objection to Lochnerism is extraordinarily narrow; it is, simply, 
that liberty of contract is of insufficient constitutional significance to support the rela-
tively stringent review standard imposed in Lochner. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 
15. The plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), traces 
its lineage to Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). Justice 
Harlan argued that substantive due process protects against arbitrary impositions upon 
liberty, citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Because the result of Allgeyer 
has clearly been discredited, Justice Harlan's citation can only be read as approving of 
the flexibility and expansive coverage of substantive due process enshrined in the Lochner 
era, while disapproving of the intensity of protection given economic values at that time. 
24. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting): 
Men whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold [the New 
York hours regulation for bakers] as a first installment of a general regulation of 
the hours of work. Whether in [that] aspect it would be open to the charge of 
inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss. 
(emphasis added.) 
25. See R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINIS~ IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 143-56 (1944). 
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that premise, it would have been absurd for the Court to de-
nounce statutes designed to remedy that inequality with a theory 
that the states had not gone far enough in doing so. Such a pos-
ture would have risked provoking legislation that even-handedly 
and systematically protected all wage laborers. Second, the equal 
protection clause had been limited by the Slaughter-House Cases 
to a particular concern with racial discrimination.28 At the turn 
of the century, the Court did not have so much as a dissenting 
opinion for authority to invigorate the equal protection clause 
with economic libertarianism. Finally (and most instructively for 
students of recent developments), the Court's approach to eco-
nomic regulation retained a flexibility, a capability for ad hoc 
assessment of competing interests, that an equality-centered doc-
trine could not accommodate. 'Z1 
Contemporaneously with the flowering of economic due pro-
cess, the Court infused that clause with a noneconomic substan-
tive content that has survived subsequent pruning.28 Modern first 
amendment doctrine takes as given what Gitlow u. New York29 
first announced - free expression is a substantive liberty pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment against state intrusion.30 
More fundamentally for this Article's purposes, parental preroga-
tives in childrearing found constitutional solicitude in Meyer u. 
Nebraska31 and Pierce u. Society of Sisters. 32 Those cases can be, 
and at times have been, rerationalized as attempts to protect 
values derived from the first amendment, 33 rendering them of a 
piece with Gitlow as early signals of full-blown incorporation of 
first amendment liberties into the fourteenth. The most recent 
reliances on Meyer and Pierce, however, have stressed their non-
textual underpinnings of protected interests in family auton-
26. "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of 
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held 
to come within the purview of the provision [equal protection clause]," Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). 
27. If underinclusion had been the asserted vice, drawing lines between bakers and 
mine workers as the Court did would have been nonsense. 
28. The pruning began in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Its 
effects are discussed more fully below, see text at notes 36-52 infra. 
29. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
30. There is apparently little modem controversy regarding the coextensiveness of' 
free expression guarantees against state and federal agencies of government. But see Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), 
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
33. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83 (1965); Thomas v. Collins, 
323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). 
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omy. 34 The survival of those two cases in that form suggests that 
the only durable objection to the Lochner era's handiwork is that 
it generally selected the "wrong" values for protection.35 Whether 
the chaff that stripped bakers of the protection of hours regula-
tion can be alchemically transformed into the wheat that protects 
parental choice of schools or curricula was a question that would 
agitate the second half of the twentieth century more than·the 
first. 
B. 1937-1953 - The Era of Qualified Passivity 
The "switch in time, "38 marked in part by the Court's retreat 
from boundless intervention in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 37 
did more than"save the Nine." The Court, by 1937, had ex-
hausted its interventionist capital, and had thoroughly discred-
ited itself as a sensitive and responsible institution of govern-
ment. Observers viewed the dramatic shift away from fourteenth 
amendment activism as a restoration of the Court's appropriately 
limited role in the process of government.38 Throughout this pe-
riod, the equal protection clause remained largely dormant, ex-
cept in occasional matters of race39 and the extraordinary case of 
34. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
35. See note 23 supra. 
36. See B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CoNBmtmONAL LAw 202 (1942). 
37. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
38. The heavy criticism to which the Court was subjected is outlined in L; TRIBE, 
supra note 1, § 8-6. Before the West Coast Hotel decision, the Court was faced not only 
with the possibility of Roosevelt's Court packing plan, but also with emerging criticism 
of the legitimacy of judicial review itself. See, e.g., Representative Maverick Says Su-
preme Court Must be Deprived of Power to Declare Laws Unconstitutional, New York 
Times, Feb. 1, 1937, at 5, col. 6. 
The New York Times editorial, A Historic Session, which appeared June 2, 1937, at 
22, col. 1, exemplifies the public reaction to West Coast Hotel. The editorial applauded 
several recent course-changing decisions, and emphasized that the Constitution must be 
living law, responsive to change. It contended further that these apparently revolutionary 
decisions were actually not sharp breaks with the past (pointing to decisions by Justices 
Marshall and Field). 
39. It was during this period that the seeds of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) were sown. See McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam); 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The Court demonstrated a greater 
receptivity to racial claims during this period than previously. Compare Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" train accommodation law), with 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73· (1932), and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (both 
cases invalidating laws that either directly or indirectly denied blacks the right to vote iI 
primary elections). It is interesting to speculate on whether the Cow:t's passivity in sub-
stantive due process matters was in any way related to the moderate racial activism that 
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Skinner u. Oklahoma. 40 The substantive side of the due process 
clause underwent elaborate extractive dental work. The newly 
restrained due process required no more than j~dicial identifica-
tion of a public good that might arguably be served by a chal-
lenged statute;41 at times, the Court hinted that economic due 
process was utterly fictional. 42 
The only stirrings of judicial activism in the direction of 
libertarian forms of protection consisted of two related move-
ments: one towards a "preferred position"43 for expressive inter-
ests, a development that built on earlier theories of linkage be-
tween the first and fourteenth amendments, 44 and another to-
wards partial and selective absorption in the due process clause 
of various Bill of Rights safeguards. Dicta in Palko u. Con-
necticut, 45 decided in the first year of the era, fused the two move-
ments by concluding that the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause imposed upon the states an irreducible minimum of 
individual rights safeguards, of which expressive freedom consti-
tuted the clearest example. Despite the restraint with which the 
Court employed Palko's "ordered liberty" theory, the case was a 
dominant force during this period, and its reasoning undergirded 
subsequent claims of judicial authority to imbue the due process 
· clause with substantive values from both within and without the 
Bill of Rights. 48 
the Court displayed - whether the Court was consciously choosing to ride elevators in 
opposite directions. Conscious or not, serious strand-tangling began here. 
40. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, the Court struck down on equal protection 
grounds an Oklahoma statute prescribing sterilization for certain habitual criminal of-
fenders. 
41. "We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of 
the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which 'should be left 
where ... it was left by the Constitution - to the States and to Congress.'" Olsen v, 
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). See also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern 
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). Nevertheless, the Court never formally abandoned 
the notion that legislative regulation must be in furtherance of the public interest. See L. 
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 451 n.17. 
42. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
43. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). 
44. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The 
Carolene Products footnote has inspired more commentary than Chief Justice Stone's 
wildest dreams could have anticipated. See generally Ely, 37 MD. L. REv., supra note 9, 
at 454-469, and sources cited at nn.18-19 (1978). 
45. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
46. Indeed, it cannot be accidental that Palko appeared shortly after West Coast 
Hotel and shortly before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Palko implied a 
reservation of judicial right to establish a "transcendental body" of constitutional law, 304 
U.S. at 79. Viewed as a piece with West Coast Hotel's deference to legislative judgments 
concerning economic freedom and Erie's rejection of the concept of transcendent common 
law, Palko seems strangely out of the period's positivist character. At the height, then, of 
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This period also laid the groundwork for subsequent expan-
sions of the fourteenth amendment in other ways -in particular, 
Justice Black's eloquent rumblings about full-blown Bill of 
Rights incorporation, 47 Chief Justice Stone's immortal fourth 
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 48 and Justice 
Jackson's perceptive hint about the relatively "restrained" qual-
ity of equal protection intervention. 49 By the yardstick of concrete 
results, however, the era begun by announced withdrawal from 
Lochner ideology and concluded by the appointment of Earl War-
ren as Chief Justice stands as the low ebb of fourteenth amend-
ment activism in the twentieth century. The passivity of this 
period has often been explained as a reaction, perhaps an over-
reaction, to the vices of Lochnerism.50 When viewed, however, 
against the backdrop of the Court's narrow construction of the 
fourteenth amendment soon after its ratification,51 the period 
from 1937-1953 stands as a momentary and fragile judicial recol-
lection that aggressively employed fourteenth amendment theo-
ries of "ordered liberty," "natural law," or fundamental rights 
render the Court a ''perpetual censor upon all legislation of the 
States. "52 
C. 1954-1969 -'-- The Warren Court and the Emergence 
of Equal Protection Activism 
The elaborate equal protection developments of the Warren 
Court need no lengthy recitation here. I will simply track the 
major features of those developments, their unifying and motivat-
ing themes, and their relationship to the continuing saga of sub-
stantive due process. The Warren Court took on the "dual so-
ciety" in Brown v. Board of Education, 53 and· worked at disman-
tling it until Shapiro v. Thompson54 ended the era in style. The 
Court stood Lochnerism on its head; rather than viewing inequal-
ity as the divinely ordained and uninterruptable order of things, 
federal judicial withdrawal from scrutiny of state laws and rules of decision, Palko is 
striking evidence of the persistence of expansive theories of the fourteenth amendment. 
47. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
48. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See note 44 supra. 
49. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
50. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 450-55. 
51. The fourteenth amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868. 
52. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873). 
53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
54. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residence requirement for AFDC welfare benefits 
violates equal protection clause). 
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it saw inequalities deriving from racial and economic disadvan-
tage as the major obstacles to domestic tranquility and a more 
perfect union.55 It therefore attacked full force qn the equal pro-
tection front.56 Simultaneously, a majority of the Court remained 
steadfast and vigorous in its refusal to give an active, nontextual 
substantive content to the due process clause.57 
The Court's equality commitment, however, never quite es-
caped the charge that it was Lochnerism reincarnated. 58 Virtually 
none of the Court's truly controversial equal protection decisions 
relied solely on the nature of the classification; rather, all seemed 
inextricably linked with the substantive interests at stake.69 
Brown laid heavy emphasis on the value of education. 00 More 
critically, the Court's concern with the deprivations attributable 
to economic disadvantage was bound up with values lacking ex-
plicit constitutional protection. The linkage was evident in a se-
ries of decisions in which the Warren Court held that the equal 
protection clause barred the ·states from denying indigent crimi-
nal defendants appellate transcripts61 and appellate counsel,62 
from denying the vote in state elections to those unable or unwill-
55. See generally Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Foreword: Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV, 91 (1966). 
56. See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1065 (1969). 
57. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963): 
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like 
cases - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they 
believe the legislature has acted unwisely- has long since been discarded. We have 
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute 
their social and economic beliefs for the judgments of legislative bodies, who are 
elected to pass laws. 
58. Even a devoted fan of the Court's commitment saw clearly the parallels between 
the Lochner period and the 1960s. See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas 
and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process" Formula, 16 UCLA L. REv. 716, 739, 
744, 745-46 (1969). 
59. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) {right to travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 
(voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (criminal appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal appeal). 
60. 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954): "We must consider public education in the light of 
its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only 
in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs 
of the equal protection of the laws." 
Desegregation decisions subsequent to Brown appeared less concerned with the un-
derlying substantive interest. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curinm) 
(buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf course); Mayor 
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
61. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
62. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
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ing to pay a poll tax, 63 and from "penalizing" recent migrants to 
the state by conditioning welfare benefits upon durational resi-
dency requirements. 64 In the criminal appeal cases, the Court 
acknowledged the due process clause component of its theory, 65 
but the cases' obviously procedural setting preempted serious 
criticism of that component. 66 On the other hand, the Court did 
not provide such explicit recognition of its debt to the due process 
clause (or, for that matter, any other constitutional provision) in 
those cases in which nontextual substantive values emerged as 
fundamental. Rhetorically free of any substantive due process 
content, cases protecting interests in ballot-casting and inter-
state migration became key elements of the so-called fundamen-
tal interests wing of equal protection doctrine. 67 
Particularly illustrative of the Warren Court methodology 
was Shapiro v. Thompson, 68 in which the Court held that dura-
tional residency requirements for welfare benefits impermissibly 
burdened the right of interstate migration. Shapiro suggested the 
right had several possible textual sources - the privileges and 
immunities clauses of article N and the fourteenth amendment, 
or the commerce clause. 69 Whatever the source of the right, the 
Court relied on the equal protection clause (which clearly was not 
its source) to invalidate the challenged durational residency re-
quirements. That reliance echoed the integrating theme of a great 
bulk of the Warren Court's work; 70 as suggested above, Brown and 
63. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
64. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
65. "Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire 
judicial system - all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 
'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' ,,· Griffin v. -Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). 
66. See generally Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 289, 295. Cf. Michelman, Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 7, 
25-27 (1969) (due process implications of criminal procedure "equality" decisions). The 
procedural due process aspect of Griffin was virtually ignored in Willcox & Bloustein, The 
Griffin Case - Poverty and The Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957). 
67. E.g., the due process clause is not mentioned by the majority in Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966). In his Harper dissent, however, Justice Black charged that Harper was part of a 
trend which employed "the old 'natural-law-due-process' formula to justify striking down 
state laws as violations of the Equal Protection Clause.'' 383 U.S. at 675-77. See generally 
Karst, supra note 58. 
68. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
69. 394 U.S. at 630 n.8. 
70. See generally A. Cox, supra note 9, at 49-50. 
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Shapiro are end points of a straight line measuring egalitarian 
progress. 
Griswold v. Connecticut11 provided the severest test for a 
Court determined to advance chosen values- apparently, politi-
cal access and physical mobility were prominent among them -
without renewing the romance with the dreaded demon of sub-
stantive due process. Justice Douglas's famous "penumbras" and 
"emanations" opinion drew upon the incorporation legacy, rather 
than a doctrine of "naked" substantive due process, and tortured 
the Bill of Rights into yielding a protected zone of privacy that 
would not tolerate a law banning contraceptive use by married 
couples. Justice Goldberg's reliance upon the ninth amendment 
in his concurring opinion was equally disingenuous in its attempt 
to avoid the jaws of substantive due process.72 Only Justices 
White and Harlan73 were willing to grapple directly with the fear-
ful creature, and concluded that a law invading marital choice 
about contraception violated the due process clause itself, inde-
pendent of links with the Bill of Rights. Shocking though that 
analysis may have been at the time, subsequent developments 
seem to have confirmed the White-Harlan view, and not the mag-
ical mystery tour of the zones of privacy, as the prevailing doc-
trine of Griswold. 74 
Ultimately, the equal protection clause did for the Warren 
Court precisely what the due process clause did for the Lochner-
era Court - it served as a vehicle for judicial intervention in state 
policy choices to promote a set of values responsive to the Jus-
tices' vision of political and social ideals. Wars on poverty and 
racism were at the forefront of the liberal vision of those fifteen 
years.75 The Court perhaps never knew whether it was the com-
manding general or merely a footsoldier in the fray. Nonetheless, 
it was certain that the battle was raging and that failure to defend 
the forces of light was symbolically to embrace the forces of dark-
ness. Throughout the struggle, however, the Court never lost sight 
of which strand of the fourteenth amendment was tied to the 
battle mast. Constitutional history and the Court's value com-
mitment combined to unleash a species of equal protection activ-
71. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
72. 381 U.S. 479, 490 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
73. 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
74. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court obliquely 
returned to those zones in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text at notes 84-92 infra. 
75. See E. WARREN, MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 297 (1977); A. Cox, supra note 9, at 
5-12. 
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ism that seemed to suit, and sometimes even to lead, the progres-
sive forces of the day. 
All of this high spirit was not without its occasional interpre-
tive hurdles. In particular, what was a Court advancing equal 
protection concepts - while at the same time soberly reminding 
us of the death of substantive due process - to do about _restrain-
ing the federal government? Fortuitously, Korematsu v. United 
States16 had provided a legacy from which to draw an answer. 
Although the fifth amendment contains a due process clause but 
lacks an explicit equal protection analogue to section one of the 
fourteenth amendment, Korematsu had engrafted an anti-
discrimination principle onto the fifth amendment. Thus, in 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 77 and with little serious question since, the 
Court held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment has 
an "equal protection" component that restricts the national gov-
ernment in a manner virtually identical to the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection restrictions upon the states.78 
This development would seem to buttress an argument that 
the equal protection clause is constitutionally superfluous: if the 
due process clause of the fifth amendment can do equality's work, 
the comparable fourteenth amendment strand, standing alone, 
might theoretically have done the same. But that suggestion con-
fuses horses with carts. When the Warren era opened, due process 
76. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
77. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
78. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976) (unimportant 
whether fifth or fourteenth amendment applies as statute in question clearly violates 
either); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U.S. 78 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 
U.S. 163 (1964). Only the last two of these cases, of course, were decided during the 
Warren Court years. Nevertheless, the doctrine appeared to be "well-settled" by 1968. 
One obvious exception to the symmetry of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' respec-
tive equality components is the exclusion of aliens from opportunities provided to citizens. 
The cases establish broad federal power, but limit state power, to so treat aliens. Compare 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Congress's immigration power causes legitimacy classi-
fication in immigration laws to be subject to deferential scrutiny), and Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress's immigration power causes alienage classification in Medi-
care program to be subjected to deferential scrutiny), with In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 
(1973) (state may not exclude aliens from law practice) and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
U.S. 634 (1973) (states may not exclude aliens from competitive civil service employ-
ment). That simple division of authority between nation and state is not always control-
ling. Compare Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Federal Civil Service 
Commission constitutionally forbidden from excluding aliens from federal civil service), 
with Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state may exclude aliens from state police 
force). See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 
N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977). 
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clause activism, outside of Bill of Rights concerns, was in the 
deepest disrepute. The language and the relatively untroubled 
history of the equal protection clause combined to render accept-
able a species of judicial interventionism that, had it rested on 
the due process clause, would have been intolerable. At the very 
least, the Warren Court's dive into egalitarianism would have 
been perceived as wholly lacking legitimacy if its platform had 
been a provision whose use had almost destroyed earlier Courts. 
The subsequent leap from equal protection activism to parallel 
fifth amendment limits on the central government was a simple 
step towards symmetry - what the Constitution insulates from 
state regulation "surely" cannot be freely trampled by national 
authority.79 The resulting parallelism of equality limits is thus the 
product of reverse incorporation; just as the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment imposes Bill of Rights guarantees on 
the states, so the analogous fifth amendment clause operates to 
impose fourteenth amendment guarantees on the federal govern-
ment. Whether viewed as a matter of theory or as an historical 
phenomenon, however, the presence of the equal protection 
strand gave new life to both the fifth and the fourteenth amend-
ments. 
The Court's masking of judicial value choices in equal pro-
tection rhetoric, and its use of that clause to increase dramati-
cally the burden of justification demanded of states in certain 
areas of regulation, did not escape critical notice, either on or off 
the Court. In the Warren Court's final Term, its decision in 
Shapiro provoked a dissent from Justice Harlan that echoed 
across seventy years of intertwining fourteenth amendment 
strands. He attacked what he referred to as "the compelling inter-
est" doctrine (more commonly understood as the fundamental 
interest wing) of the equal protection clause: 
I think this [necessities of life] branch of the "compelling inter-
est" doctrine particularly unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfor-
tunate because it creates an exception which threatens to swallow 
the standard equal protection rule. Virtually every state statute 
affects important rights .... Rights [of economic freedom] ... 
are in principle indistinguishable from those involved here, and to 
extend the "compelling interest" rule to all cases in which such 
rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a "super-
79. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954): "In view of our decision that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it 
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the 
Federal Government." 
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legislature." ... When the right affected is one assured by the 
Federal Constitution, any infringement can be dealt with under 
the Due Process Clause. But when a statute affects only matters 
not mentioned in the Federal Constitution and is not arbitrary or 
irrational, . . _,,. I know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick 
out particular human activities, characterize them as 
"fundamental," and give them added protection under an unu-
sually stringent equal protection test. 80 
Despite Justice Harlan's admonitions, egalitarianism re-
mained the driving force of Warren Court activism. That force 
had its own momentum, reinforced by parallel commitments 
from other branches of government. 81 But egalitarianism as a 
constitutional concept, particularly when it assumed the 
"fundamental interest" form, was broad enough to engender 
great expectations and simultaneously to self-destruct. Equality 
as a goal admitted little compromise. As change came upon the 
mood of the nation and the personnel of the Court, the judicial 
choices became (a) continued vigorous pursuit of equality, (b) 
outright rejection of the Warren Court heritage, or ( c) a reshaping 
of doctrine to fit a new temperament. 
D. The Burger Decade -A Preliminary Look at 
the Strands Recrossing 
The Fourth Republic of fourteenth amendment jurispru-
dence is underway. Unlike the Second, in which the activism of 
the First was fairly uniformly rejected, the Fourth Republic has 
treated its predecessors more erratically. Yet one conclusion 
80. 394 U.S. at 661-662 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Commentators 
were similarly aware of the sleight-of-hand: "When an equal protection decision rests on 
this basis [fundamental interests], it may be little more than a substantive due process 
decision decked out in the trappings of equal protection." Developments in the Law, supra 
note 56, at 1132. The fundamental interests doctrine met with both acclaim, e.g., 
Michelman, supra note 66, and criticism, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and 
the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REv. 41, 89 (arguing that the theory is open-
ended, and the choice of which values are fundamental is not made on a principled basis). 
81. Congressional adoption of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 
Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), and 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 
74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.), reflected a deep concern 
with remedying racial discrimination in voting. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), was more comprehen-
sive. It included, for example, provisions dealing with desegregation of schools and public 
facilities. Title VII of the 1968 Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976), expanded Congress's 
egalitarian concern to include fair housing. President Johnson's declaration of a "War on 
Poverty" illustrated a parallel executive commitment to egalitarian ideals. Annual Mes-
sage to Congress on the State of the Union, Jan. 8, 1964, lLYNDONB. JOHNSON Pua. PAPERS 
112, 113. 
998 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:981 
emerges with startling clarity - fundamental rights activism 
stemming from the equal protection clause has been laid to rest, 
and in its stead has arisen an active doctrine o_f substantive due 
process. 
The watershed year was 1973, when the Court blasted with 
both barrels. With only the barest obeisance to the Griswold pri-
vacy penumbras, it embraced a substantive due process theory in 
Roe v. Wade, 82 holding that a woman's liberty to choose termina-
tion of her pregnancy was of a constitutionally preferred status. 
Only a few months later, the Court rejected in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District u. Rodriguez83 an equal protection attack 
on the interdistrict disparities in per pupil expenditure resulting 
from property tax financing of public education. 
The Court's misguided search in Griswold for a general zone 
of privacy in the penumbras of amendments I through VITI saved 
the Roe Court a great deal of trouble. Spared the awkward obliga-
tion of embracing a doctrine of substantive due process com-
pletely divorced from textual or structural values, the majority in 
Roe merely cited Griswold as authority for a textually rooted 
privacy doctrine, 84 asserted that general interests in procreation 
belong within the constitutional concept of privacy, 85 and con-
cluded that the choice to terminate a pregnancy was a sufficiently 
significant element of procreative freedom to require extraordi-
nary justification from any state that seeks to restrict it.88 To 
what I am certain was no Justice's surprise, few seemed fooled by 
Roe's flimsy attempt to maintain a textual cloak of legitimacy 
around the decision. Griswold's ties to the Bill of Rights were 
attenuated, but at least the "home as castle" theme linked its 
factual setting to the third and fourth amendments.87 Nothing 
about the abortion decision can claim even that degree of kinship 
to the Bill.88 
Since the Roe majority's suggestion that the abortion choice 
lies safely within a penumbra of a penumbra is so unpersuasive, 
the case is more accurately understood as an exercise in "naked" 
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
83. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
84. 410 U.S. at 129, 152. 
85. 410 U.S. at 152. 
86. 410 U.S. at 153-56. 
87. See Ely, 37 Mo. L. REv., supra note 9, at 452 n.7. 
88. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 928-933 (1973). 
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substantive due process.89 The reliance on Griswold authority was 
a fiction, but while it virtuously maintained the appearance of 
continuity, that reliance led to a serious vice as well- an illusory 
exemption from the duty to explain and defend the substantive 
due process theory of the opinion. Moreover, the political volatil-
ity of the abortion issue has deflected scholars from emphasizing 
that duty. Given Roe's emotional and moral context, commenta-
tors have paid most attention to the intrinsic merits of Roe's 
calculus of interests, private and governmental. A few came to 
bury Roe, 90 others to praise it, 91 but the question of a reinvigorated 
future for substantive due process, as a matter of theory and 
methodology, has received significantly less attention than the 
Griswold decision produced in response to its privacy doctrine a 
decade earlier.92 
89. Cf. id. at 933 (comparing Roe to Lochner, and asserting that Roe is a more glaring 
example of indefensible judicial value infusion, lacking constitutional support). See also 
Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. 
CT. REv. 159. 
90. Epstein, supra note 89; Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a 
Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1250 (1975). 
91. See, e.g., Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 
Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and 
Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. 
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1973); Wellington, Common Law Rules and 
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 297-311 
(1973). Most of those in praise of Roe, it should be noted, lauded its result without 
necessarily complimenting its system of reasoning. 
92. Griswold produced voluminous scholarly commentary. Seen by commentators as 
a sharp break with the recent past and as a hint of an exciting new direction in constitu-
tional law, each of the several opinions in Griswold inspired massive scholarly speculation 
on the future of the privacy doctrine, the ninth amendment, and substantive due process 
revisited. See, e.g., Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental 
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965); Emerson, Nine 
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965); Beaney, The Griswold Case 
and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 979; Note, The Uncertain Renais-
sance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814 (1966). 
That Griswold sparked more theoretical speculation than Roe may have resulted from 
differing scholarly perceptions of the Warren and Burger Courts. Commentators probably 
believed that the former was aggressive enough to extend Griswold in a variety of fascinat-
ing directions. That judgment was for the most part erroneous. Between 1965 and 1969 
the Court carefully avoided decision in cases that might have pushed outward, or clarified,, 
the boundaries of Griswold. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) (sodomy prosecution of married couple); Ferrell v. Dallas 
Indep. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (public school hair length regulation). Conversely, Roe in-
spired somewhat less creativity, partly because the Griswold commentary had exhausted 
most of it. More fundamentally, perhaps, those writing after Roe either condemned it, and 
had no inclination to speculate on the future of substantive due process, or were so pleased 
with it that they feared undermining its legitimacy by terming it a product of pure 
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Several months after Roe, the opinion for a narrow majority 
in Rodriguez signaled a retreat from fundamental rights activism, 
equal-protection-style, every bit as pronounced as Roe's plunge 
into due process intervention. In Rodriguez, the claimant's argu-
ment for constitutional reordering of public school financing 
placed its weight against the flimsiest pillars of the Warren Court 
edifice: the hints of presumptive invalidity of wealth-based clas-
sifications93 and the fundamentality of certain "constitutionally 
significant" interests, a group to which "education" arguably be-
longed. The plaintiffs apparently hoped that at least one of these 
theories, or perhaps their interaction, would trigger "strict scru-
tiny" - a demand for extraordinary justification of the chal-
lenged inequality.94 After rejecting the "wealth" claim as inap-
propriate to the case's facts, the Court announced that the manu-
facture of fundamental interests, for equal protection purposes, 
would no longer be a growth industry: 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive consti-
tutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of 
the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is 
"fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or 
housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as 
important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assess-
ing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 95 
Dicta in Rodriguez left ajar the door of judicial solicitude for 
claims of absolute denial, rather than relative deprivation, of 
public education.96 Nevertheless, the holding that, in the absence 
of proven use of suspect classifying criteria, claims of unequal 
distribution of educational opportunities would be subject only to 
rationality scrutiny suggested much more than a mere failure of 
that particular claim. Indeed, the entire discussion of the 
Rodriguez "fundamental rights" claim proceeded on the articu-
substantive due process adjudication. But cf. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 91, at 777• 
79. (Roe relies on basic value related to widely accepted concepts of society). 
93. See McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1968); Harper 
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966). By the time the Rodriguez suit made 
its way to the Supreme Court, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), had firmly rejected 
such a constitutional stance. 
94. The equal protection theory underlying the Rodriguez claim is handsomely elabo-
rated in J. CooNS, w. CLUNE & s. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 
(1970). 
95. 411 U.S. at 33-34. 
96. 411 U.S. at 37. 
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late~ assumption that the fundamentality of a right depends on 
its coincidence with textual or structural values. 97 
That Roe and Rodriguez were decided close in time was pre-
sumably a historical accident, but the accident dramatized a 
collision between the strands of the fourteenth amendment as 
they crossed paths once again. All would agree that neither abor-
tion nor educational opportunity is explicitly guaranteed in the 
Constitution; is the implication of a guarantee truly stronger for 
the former than for the latter? And if the Court is· unauthorized 
or incompetent to create substantive rights in the enforcement of 
equal protection, how does it acquire authorization or compe-
tence for substantive due process adjudication? 
Although doctrinal conflicts over fourteenth amendment in-
terpretation persist, 98 the Burger Court's decisions over the past 
five years reveal intermittent untangling of the strands. The 
Court's substantive fourteenth amendment adjudication reflects 
(1) an expansion of suspect classification doctrine, in hybrid 
form, to protect women, 99 aliens, 100 and chiidren born out of wed-
97. See text at note 95 supra. 
98. The dilemmas and pressures of Rodriguez, viewed from the level of "two-tiered" 
equal protection, contributed further to the process of intertwining fourteenth amendment 
strands. In his Rodriguez dissent, 411 U.S. at 98-111, Justice Marshall elaborated on his 
dissent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970), and formulated a so-called 
"sliding scale" of equal protection review. According to Justice Marshall, the intensity of 
equal protection scrutiny has been and should continue to be a function of the nature of 
the classification created by statute, the nature of the substantive interest affected 
thereby, and the impact of the classification on that interest. In his view, interests need 
not be fully "preferred" in order to garner judicial care; rather, the closer the interest, 
logically or pragmatically, to a recognized fundamental one, the more judicial attention 
should be paid to relative deprivations of it. 
Apart from the conventionally understood drawbacks of that theory, see The Supreme 
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 105-16 (1973), Justice Marshall's view incorrectly 
and indefensibly tangles the strands of the fourteenth amendment. As will be elaborated 
in greater detail below, the equal protection strand properly speaks to the permissibility 
of classification bases, and to no more; substantive due process, in contrast, speaks to 
substantive liberties, without direct regard to the inequality of their distribution. See 
Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications - A More Modest Role for 
Equal Protection, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 108-21. Of course, inequality may enter the 
analysis at the level of evaluating the state's justification for restricting the liberty. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200-01 (1973); but see Police Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 
92 (1972). Although Justice Marshall's attempt to burst through the conceptual barriers 
of two-tier equal protection has met with some success, see United States Dept. of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); see generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972), its tangling of fourteenth amendment 
ideas fosters analytical confusion, unprincipled decision and "doctrinal disorder," Mon-
aghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978). 
99. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
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ef 
lock101 against legislative discrimination; (2) a usually steadfast 
refusal to recognize, for purposes of intensifying equal protection 
review, substantive interests other than those recognized by the 
Warren Court; 102 and (3) an invigoration of pure substantive due 
process theories, partly by way of the irrebuttable presumptions 
fiction 103 and partly with full candor, 104 to protect procreative 
choices and family autonomy. 
These innovations have taken the Burger Court in the proper 
direction; its equality-based activism confronts what are truly 
classification problems and its concern with substantive rights is 
less often expressed through inappropriate equal protection 
methodology and rhetoric. But questions remain: What is the 
appropriate direction for the new substantive due process? Is it 
any more legitimate, principled, or confinable than the old? And 
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
100. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U.S. 88 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634 (1973). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 
(1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
101. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co., 406 
U.S. 164 (1972). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S.Ct. 518 (1978); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495 (1976); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Judicial solicitude for illegitimate 
children predated the Burger Court. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 
U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
102. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boreas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (no fundamental 
interest in nonfamilial association for residential purposes); San Antonio Indep, School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a "fundamental interest"); Lindsey 
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no "fundamental interest" in housing); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no "fundamental interest" in welfare benefits). But cf, 
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (intermediate scrutiny 
oflimitation on right to receive food stamps by unrelated member of household); Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) ("fundamental right" to marry triggers strict equal protec-
tion review). Zablocki is analyzed in detail in Section ill. B. infra. 
103. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. 
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Although I believe LaFleur and Vlandis to be substantive due 
process decisions in disguise, other "conclusive presumptions" cases suggest disguised 
equal protection review. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 608 
(1973). Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), and Weinberger 
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), seemed to have tolled the bell for irrebuttable presumptions 
methodology. The method was always a fictionalized account of the true fourteenth 
amendment story, and now that substantive due process talk has unabashedly reemerged, 
the Court's need for a fictional devi<,e in its stead has, happily, run its course, See 
generally Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 
(1975); Note, The lrrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. 
REv. 1534 (1974). 
104. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
431 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397, 
399-400 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J. concurring); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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what is to be done with the Warren Court's strand-tangled 
legacy? Must it be rejected to restore order to fourteenth amend-
ment jurisprudence? 
m. THREE SNAPSHOTS OF THE STRANDS - Maher v. Roe, Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, AND Zablocki v. Redhail 
A trio of cases from the past two years highlights recent 
trends and unresolved struggles in fourteenth amendment adjudi-
cation. In Maher v. Roe, 105 the liberty-equality tangle produced 
inadequate analysis and an unsatisfying outcome. In Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 106 the pressures generated by the tangle 
led to an active and controversial renewal of the romance with 
substantive due process adjudication. Finally, despite Moore's 
attempt to break loose from the tangle, a majority in Zablocki v. 
Redhail107 dove headlong back into the morass. A review of these 
cases will set the stage for the effort in Section N to identify the 
methods and values of distinguishing liberty claims from equality 
claims in constitutional adjudication. 
A. Maher v. Roe 
At issue in Maher was the constitutionality of Connecticut's 
policy permitting the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse women. 
for the costs of childbirth and "medically necessary" abortions, 
but forbidding their use to reimburse women for the costs of so-
called nontherapeutic abortions. In an opinion by Justice Powell, 
a majority of six Justices concluded that the Connecticut regula-
tion satisfied constitutional requirements. 108 
The key to Maher lies in its methodology for framing the 
constitutional question(s) to be.resolved. The Court first asked 
whether the Constitution, after Roe v. Wade, 109 affirmatively re-
quires state subsidy of abortions for women too poor to bear the 
cost privately. That question has both a libertarian dimension (if 
all women are free to choose abortion, must the state guarantee 
the power to effectuate that freedom) and an egalitarian dimen-
sion (if women of means can obtain abortions, is the state respon-
sible for the "discrimination" that market pricing produces 
105. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
106. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
107. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
108. 432 U.S. at 474-79. 
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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against women without means), but the Court answered in a 
single conclusory assertion: 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay 
the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or in-
deed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. 110 
On the facts of Maher, however, that question seemed unnec-
essarily broad. Connecticut had not simply ignored the medical 
expense plight of pregnant women; rather, it had paid all such 
expenses except those arising from so-called convenience abor-
tions. Therefore, the Court ultimately focused its attention not on 
the discrimination between rich and poor women, but on the 
discrimination between poor women seeking one resolution of a 
pregnancy and those seeking another .111 This, the Court declared, 
"presents a question arising under the Equal Protection Clause," 
the analytic framework for which "is well settled." 112 That 
"settled" framework turned out to be one wholly derived from 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 113 calling 
for a finding of disadvantage to a suspect class, or impingement 
"upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by 
the Constitution" to trigger strict scrutiny.114 In choosing to rely 
upon Rodriguez's substantive equal protection formula, the Court 
once again became trapped in the tangled strands of the four-
teenth amendment. 
To answer the narrower question as framed, the Court en-
deavored to define the fundamental right discovered in Roe v. 
Wade. 115 Roe struck down a statute criminalizing most abortions, 
and the Maher Court concluded that the right that Roe had vindi-
110. 432 U.S. at 469. 
111. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage ns a 
consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues ns before 
to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires. The State may hove 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's' 
decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortion that was not 
already there. 
432 U.S. at 474. 
112. 432 U.S. at 470. 
113. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
114. 411 U.S. at 17. 
115. My discussion of Maher v. Roe proceeds on the assumption that the Maher 
Court believed that Roe·v. Wade was decided correctly. Surely the Maher opinion, on its 
face, offers no evidence that the Court believed otherwise. Closer analysis will indicate 
that the right to terminate an ongoing pregnancy should not hove been held 
"fundamental" in Roe v. Wade, see text at notes 82-92 supra and 264-65, 313, & 335-41 
infra, and Maher might thus be defensible as a simple refusal to require state subsidy of 
a constitutionally insignificant activity. On the Court's terms, however, Maher illustrates 
the Burger Court's continuing struggle with strand separation. 
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cated was a freedom from significant state-created obstacles in a 
woman's path to an abortion. 116 Having thus cast Roe negatively 
- the state has duties to refrain from choice-blockage, but no 
affirmative duties to facilitate the choice - the Court concluded 
that the right was not significantly threatened by the Connecticut 
regulation because state subsidy for childbirth in no way blocked 
access to an abortion. 117 The upshot of this analysis was the appli-
cation of deferential rationality scrutiny, 118 a standard generally 
appropriate for judicial review of resource allocation decisions.U9 
Under the placid gaze of that scrutiny, the Connecticut policy 
survived as a legitimate expression of preference for childbirth 
over abortion. 
The Court's- analysis in Maher deserves careful attention for 
several reasons. First, it confirmed and accelerated the Rodriguez 
trend toward limiting the line of cases in which the Court had 
seemed to indicate that "ability to pay" was not a permissible 
criterion for the distribution of constitutionally significant oppor-
tunities. 120 In so doing, it squarely rejected a doctrine of four-
teenth amendment "affirmative duties." 121 Second, it offered an 
unusual and instructive, but inadequately elaborated; twist on 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The next two subsec-
tions of this Article analyze those facets of the Maher opinion. 
Viewed most comprehensively, they reveal a partial misappre-
hension by the Maher majority of the separate and distinct func-
tions of the strands of the fourteenth amendment. 
116. "Roe did not declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion,' as the 
District Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burden-
some interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." 432 
U.S. at 473-74. 
117. "The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles - absolute or otherwise - in 
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion." 432 U.S. at 474. 
118. 432 U.S. at 478. 
119. "In Dandridge v. Williams, . • . despite recognition that laws and regulations 
allocating welfare funds involve 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings,' we held that classifications survive equal protection challenge when a 'reasonable 
basis' for the classification is shown." 432 U.S. at 479. 
120. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); text at notes 122-30 infra. 
121. See generally Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of 
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. RE:v. 877, 897-901 (1976); Michelman, supra note 66; 
Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. 199. See also Karst, 
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 59-64 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of 
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 
90 HARV. L. RE:v. 1065 (1977). 
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A significant portion of the Warren Court's equal protection 
legacy revolved around the link between payment requirements 
and access to constitutionally "special" opportunities. Griffin v. 
Illinois, 122 which required states to furnish necessary transcripts 
without charge to indigent appellants in criminal cases, laid the 
initial groundwork. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 123 
which invalidated Virginia's poll tax as a prerequisite to voting 
in state elections, followed suit. Finally, the Burger Court in 
Boddie v. Connecticut124 held unconstitutional Connecticut's re-
quirement that a divorce petitioner pay a $60 filing fee, on the 
theory that indigency could not be allowed to block access to the 
only means to dissolve a marriage relationship. Several commen-
tators interpreted this line of doctrine broadly, inferring from it 
that government could not limit the provision of a broad category 
of "just wants" to those who happened to possess adequate pur-
chasing resources. 125 
In footnotes to Maher the Court limited severely the sweep 
of the Griffin-Harper-Boddie precedents. Prior cases had already 
refused to extend the theory to "necessities," such as housing120 
and welfare benefits. 127 In Maher, the Court tightened the vise by 
characterizing Boddie128 and Griffin129 (and, by implication, 
Harper as well) as cases with a common feature - state monopo-
lies of processes affecting constitutional fundamentals of family 
or liberty from confinement. Since the state did not monopolize 
pregnancy termination opportunities, the Court believed the 
Maher problem critically distinguishable. 
122. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state 
must furnish and compensate counsel in appeals of right). 
123. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
124. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
125. Professor Michelman's Foreword, supra note 66, is particularly noteworthy in 
this regard. See also J. RAwr.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Tribe, supra note 91, at 47, 
For a powerful argument against such a constitutional stance, see Winter, supra note 80, 
126. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972): "[T]he Constitution does not 
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality 
" 
127. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
128. 432 U.S. at 469 n.5. 
129. 432 U.S. at 471 n.6. 
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The monopoly doctrine, first articulated in Boddie itself, 130 
may have sound justification as a matter of decisional economy, 
accuracy, and constitutional principle. Its premise is that the 
state incurs special obligations to the indigent when it exercises 
power unique to the sovereign authority. Foreclosure of state-
monopolized opportunities leaves the excluded individual with 
absolutely no alternative source of redress. Because individual 
powerlessness is a recurring and significant theme of judicial in-
tervention, 131 any state monopoly of a significant opportunity 
appropriately triggers heightened concern over the suffering that 
may be experienced by those trapped in a state of legal, politi-
cal, 132 or familial deprivation so long as they remain within the 
state's boundaries. 
Moreover, abandonment of the monopoly concept in search 
of an approach more responsive to the indigent's plight would 
leave the Court with two unpalatable choices. The first would 
require that the state provide or fully subsi_dize all services neces-
sary to the exercise of preferred rights. In the first amendment 
context, such a doctrine would produce an enormous and unman-
ageable allocation of state resources toward a socialized system 
of access to expressive media. 133 The problem would be com-
pounded by the threat to first amendment values posed by gov-
ernment control of such a system and by the insuperable diffi-
culty of deciding· at what point the state's affirmative duty had 
been fully satisfied.134 
130. [G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship ·in this society's 
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for 
legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, 
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek 
judicial dissolution of their marriages. 
401 U.S. at 374. That the monopoly criterion of Boddie carries significant weight was made 
clear in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). For general discussion of indigent 
access to courts, see Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The 
Right to Protect One's Rights, (pts. I & II), 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527. 
131. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
132. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 
(1972). 
133. Justice Powell alluded to this problem in Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 n.9. See Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
134. It is conceptually impossible for anyone, indigent or otherwise, to exercise ex-
pressive (or religious) freedoms to a point of "completion." Of course, one might distin-
guish an individual abortion in the sense that it, unlike speech, is physiologically finite. 
To the extent, therefore, that the abortion claim is one for a measurable quantum ofrelief, 
it is more justiciable than the comparable first amendment claim, with respect to which 
minimum satisfaction would be difficult to define. It seems to me, nevertheless, that a 
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The other alternative left open by rejection of the monopoly 
doctrine is to explore the adequacy of the marketplace to provide 
the benefit for which the state charges a fee or which the state 
refuses to subsidize. Choice of that alternative would lead the 
Court to demand state satisfaction of a claim if the private sector 
were sufficiently unlikely to relieve the financial obstacles to ac-
cess to a constitutional opportunity. This is precisely the inquiry 
that the Court avoided in United States v. Kras, 135 in which it 
upheld filing fees charged to persons seeking a personal bank-
ruptcy discharge, on the ground that private settlement and re-
lease agreements were at least theoretically available to the 
claimant. The refusal to probe the adequacy of "private reme-
dies'' in Kras and Maher seems entirely correct. If the state's 
obligation to subsidize abortions turns on the availability in fact 
of private subsidy of the same activity, the refusal might be con-
stitutional in some parts of a state but not in others or constitu-
tional one day but not the next. Results of that sort clash with 
legitimate state needs to plan and budget operations, and might 
work as a significant disincentive to private charity - once a 
court found private effects insufficient and ordered a local or 
statewide government support of the activity, existing private 
efforts might disappear and new ones would rarely arise. More 
fundamentally, the question of the sufficiency of private services 
to the poor is not amenable to principled resolution. Whether, for 
example, the availability of three abortion clinics within twenty· 
miles, offering half-price abortions performed by recent medical 
school graduates, is an "adequate" private alternative presents a 
theory of affirmative duty to satisfy claims of access to "preferred" opportunities is ren• 
dered worthless, or at least horribly fractured, if it cannot move beyond the "preferred" 
opportunities whose needed quantity and market price are readily ascertainable. The 
provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants presents analogous problems, but 
there, at least, the state has some control over the number of persons who wind up in a 
position to assert the claim. 
On broader theoretical grounds, speech cannot adequately be distinguished from 
abortions for purposes of "wealth-plus" affirmative duty doctrine; both are "preferred 
liberties," and both may require expensive third-party assistance to be effective and 
adequate. Indeed, to the extent free expression is viewed as necessary for the health and 
well-being of a democratic society, the claim to full subsidization by the state of speech 
seems more pressing as a matter of constitutional theory than the comparable abortion 
claim. 
This, I know, is endlessly debatable. Is subsidized speech more socially important 
than subsidized abortion? Both involve self-actualization opportunities, but speech, we 
are told, advances truth and self-government as well. On the other hand, most speech 
advances nothing but the speaker's breath, while all abortions have tangible results. 
Apples versus oranges might be easier. 
135. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
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question to which courts are not capable of providing meaningful 
answers. 136 
Thus, Maker's reliance on the monopoly doctrine is more 
than an outcome-oriented application of a limitation first sug-
gested in Boddie. It is conceptually sound.137 Moreover, it exposes 
the problems o( "state action" lurking beneath the surface of 
Maher. The "villain" of the abortion drama may not be the state 
at all; an economic system that renders many women and fami-
lies too poor to pay the going rate and a fee-for-service system of 
medical care delivery that places financial barriers between pa-
tients and necessary care seein to be better cast for that role. It 
is thus state omission, or inaction, that triggers complaints of 
constitutional wrongdoing, and under prevailing state action 
theory, omissions generally do not violate fourteenth amendment 
proscriptions. 138 
The sole exception to that assertion arises from the "public 
function" theory of state action139 ·_ certain functions of govern-
ment cannot be liberated from constitutional limitations, regard-
less of who performs them. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 140 
narrowed the definition of public function to include only those 
functions traditionally and exclusively associated with sover-
eignty, 141 and the Court's recent decision in Flagg Brothers, Inc. 
v. Brooks142 has reinforced the Jackson approach. The monopoly 
doctrine of Boddie and Maher and the public function test of 
Jackson and Flagg Brothers reflect shared views of the role of 
136. A doctrine that required such answers solely in the context of constitutionally 
fundamental opportunities might also discourage initial judicial recognition of the pre-
ferred nature of a liberty. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. R.Ev. 72, 141 
(1977). 
137. For a sharply contrary view of the monopoly doctrine, see Clune, supra note 66. 
138. Otherwise the·state would be responsible for all private conduct, or at least all 
that can be constitutionally regulated; such a result would effectively obliterate the 
public-private distinction that the text of the fourteenth amendment seems to draw. 
139. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Evans v. New-
ton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Cf. Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (15th amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) 
(15th amendment). The "shopping center" cases momentarily extended Marsh's public 
function reasoning rather broadly, Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 
391 U.S. 308 (1968), but the Court subsequently retreated in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551 (1972), and finally retracted the extension altogether in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 
U.S. 507 (1976). 
140. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
141. 419 U.S. at 352-53. 
142. 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (a warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to hi;m for storage, 
as a statutorily authorized self-help remedy for nonpayment, is not performance of a 
"public function"). 
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government and a concern for the autonomy of the private sec-
tor .143 Jackson's restricted view of which private activities are 
"public," for state action purposes, recognizes that governmental 
functions often possess private counterparts and refuses to consti-
tutionalize those activities, in part from fear of injuring the pri-
vate sector in the process. The monopoly doctrine reflects a paral-
lel respect for private action and choices, since it limits judicially 
mandated government competition with the private sector, leav-
ing to the legislature the decision whether to enter the market for 
a particular good or service. Thus, there exists a core of exclu-
sively governmental activities, which the state can delegate to 
private parties only with a full coterie of constitutional restric-
tions and which the state itself may not administer in a way that 
discriminates against the poor. Outside that narrow core, how-
ever, power and efforts are appropriately shared, and private ac-
tivity creatively and constructively supplements government ac-
tivity. There both the demand for state subsidization and the 
attempt to constitutionalize private activity threaten the part-
nership system, albeit in different ways.144 
This lengthy discussion of the monopoly doctrine limitation 
on "wealth plus fundamental right" principles reveals that it 
speaks primarily to the government's role in ordering access to 
the means of effectuating substantive liberties, and only second-
arily to questions of equality. Because the claims the monopoly 
doctrine sanctions generally involve de facto, and not de jure, 
classifications, the doctrine is not responsive to the concerns tra-
ditionally associated with equal protection review: invidious for-
mal classifications and enforcement patterns. Indeed, Boddie and 
143. The doctrines are not perfectly coincidental, however. Conceivably, the state 
might monopolize a function traditionally associated with the private sector. If it did, and 
operation of the function controlled access to a constitutionally fundamental opportunity, 
it presumably could not explude the poor from participation. If, however, two years there-
after a private counterpart reemerged, its operations would not be subject to the four-
teenth amendment. Moreover, its emergence would terminate the state monopoly and 
demand a different result on the indigent's claim for free participation. 
144. The state sovereignty doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976), holding states immune from commerce power-based regulation of labor stan-
dards for state and municipal employees is also conceptually linked with the monopoly 
doctrine. Both the monopoly doctrine and the Usery preservation of states' "freedom to 
structure integral operations in the area of traditional governmental functions" enable the 
state to allocate resources and plan operations without excessive fear of direct federal 
intervention. Furthermore, a forewarning that monopolization of access to critical oppor-
tunities is the automatic trigger to affirmative state responsibilities to the indigent is 
useful in the budgetary planning process. 
145. 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). 
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Griffin, two leading "monopoly" cases in the field, rely on proce-
dural due process notions explicitly, in the former case as a sole 
ground of decision145 and in the latter as an alternative. 146 If one 
erroneously views the "wealth-plus" cases as resting upon the 
equal protection clause, to which the monopoly doctrine seems 
poorly tailored, Maher seems wrong; in my view, however, deci- . 
sions concerning minimum access to constitutionally significant 
opportunities rest far more persuasively on libertarian justifica-
tions, a critical conclusion obscured in the overgrowth of tangled 
strands. 
2. Pressures on the Liberty System - Payment 
and Preference for Childbirth 
The monopoly limitation on a doctrine of affirmative state 
duty to satisfy the desire to exercise constitutional rights thus 
serves as a complete defense to a contention that the state must 
guarantee access to abortion for all who seek one. The existence 
of state subsidization for the costs of childbirth is generally irrele-
vant to such a claim, since the "impediment" to abortions cre-
ated by state refusal to subsidize is not enlarged by a state deci-
sion to pay for childbirth.147 
Connecticut's coverage of other pregnancy-related proce-
dures does raise, however, substantial questions about the per-
missibility of government-financed forays into the liberties mar-
ket. In Maher, Justice Powell alluded to the problem by defining 
the Roe right as freedom from "unduly burdensome interference 
with [a woman's] freedom to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy,"148 and by acknowledging that Connecticut's prefer-
ence "may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, 
thereby influencing the woman's decision." 149 He then attempted 
to escape the dilemma by pointing out that the status quo of fee-
for-service abortions was neither created nor altered by Connecti-
cut's preference.150 Although Justice Powell is correct that the 
status quo cffthe abortion market was unaltered by the Connecti-
cut policy, thorough analysis cannot terminate with that observa-
146. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). 
147. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) ("The indigency that may make it 
difficult - and in some cases, perhaps, impossible - for some women to have abortions 
is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.") 
148. 432 U.S. at 474. See note 115 supra. 
149. 432 U.S. at 474. 
150. 432 U.S. at 474. 
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tion. The abortion market contains potential buyers as well as 
sellers, and the degree of state influence on the buyers - the 
holders of primary rights in the matter - is a crucial variable. rni 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions152 assumes a piv-
otal role in the analysis of that variable. That doctrine, applied 
most frequently in the setting of first amendment interests, 103 
presumptively forbids15' the conditioning of government largesse 
on the recipient's surrender of constitutional rights. Its premise 
is the fragility of certain special freedoms, and its specific concern 
is that government will use its economic clout to "buy up" rights 
which the Constitution protects against more direct, punitive 
coercion. 
At first glance, the doctrine seems to fit Maher v. Roe rather 
nicely. Connecticut, forbidden to outlaw abortions, opted for the 
purchase of abortion rights from the poor with an offer of free care 
for childbirth. On closer inspection, however, the analogy as-
sumes complicating dimensions. A pregnant woman must ac-
tively exercise one constitutional right or another - she must 
either bear her child or terminate her pregnancy. Each has a 
certain medical cost attached to it. Unlike the typical first 
amendment "conditions" case, in which rights are in effect sur-
rendered for a purely economic benefit, government subsidy of 
. childbearing costs encourages the exercise of a preferred liberty. 
Furthermore, the long-term financial cost of bearing the child, in 
both cash outlay and lost economic opportunity, heavily out-
weighs the financial cost of the average abortion. For a rational 
woman in possession of adequate short-term purchasing re-
151. As a practical matter, many indigent women will f~el they have no choice but 
to carry their pregnancies to term because the State will pay for the associated 
medical services, even though they would have chosen to have abortions if the State 
had also provided funds for that procedure. This disparity in funding by the State 
clearly operates to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children they would not 
otherwise choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only operate upon 
the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this form of financial pressure, 
432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 0 
152. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: 
Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966). 
153. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (freedom of political thought and association). 
154. The presumption can be overcome if the state shows that the condition which 
limits the exercise of constitutional rights is necessary to the proper and efficient function• 
ing of the overall benefit system. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (fourth 
amendment does not bar conditioning AFDC benefits on recipient's consent to a "homo 
visit" by a welfare caseworker); United States Civil Sorv. Commn. v. National Assn. of 
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (first amendment does not bar limitation on partisan 
political activity by federal civil servants). 
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sources, the state offer of payment for childbirth is hardly likely 
to be a sufficient inducement to choose childbirth over abortion. 
On the other hand, the choices confronting the indigent preg-
nant woman are dramatically different. Lacking the funds to opt 
for abortion, given the prospect of cash to defray childbirth ex-
penses, and trapped by the immediacy of her dilemma, she may 
find her judgment about long-term costs and benefits clouded or 
tragically irrelevant to her plight in the here-and-now. She may 
choose childbearing (the more expensive long-run option) over 
abortion simply because only the former will meet her most press-
ing cash flow needs. 
This suggests that the state subsidy payment for childbirth 
places unmistakable pressure on a system of free choice in mat-
ters of procreation. In Maher, however, Justice Powell rejected 
the analogy to a classic ,unconstitutional conditions case, 
Sherbert v. Verner, 155 where the Court had held it unconstitu-
tional to condition receipt of unemployment benefits on a per-
son's surrender of the right to abstain for religious reasons from 
Saturday work. Justice Powell distinguished Sherbert as having 
arisen in "the significantly different context of a constitutionally 
imposed 'governmental obligation of neutrality' in religious mat-
ters."156 He argued further that payment for childbirth and not 
abortion was indistinguishable from public funding of govern-
ment-operated schools without any corresponding subsidy to 
private schools.157 Although both points are relevant, neither 
responds directly to the question raised by the precise facts of 
Maher: If government must be neutral with respect to some_ but 
not all private choices of liberty exercise, is the abortion choice 
one that calls forth neutrality requirements? 
Arguments have been maintained that abortion questions 
are so tied up with the views of organized religion that the reli-
gious neutrality requirements of the Constitution ought to be 
155. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
156. 432 U.S. at 475 n.8, (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963)}. 
157. 432 U.S. at 477. The establishment clause bars most forms of government finan-
cial assistance to elementary and secondary private schools with religious affiliation. See, 
e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); 
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971). The establishment clause barrier surely weakens any argument that govern-
ment spending for schools must be perfectly even-handed, even though it is evident that 
the existence of public schools 1) provides tough competition for private schools, and 2) 
may influence a parent's choice away from the constitutionally protected private school 
option. 
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controlling.158 The Court's studious avoidance of that theory in 
Roe u. Wade, however, together with its inherent difficulties, 169 
preclude any serious reliance upon it in criticizing Maher. Com-
mentators have argued further that payment for childbirth and 
not abortion violates the government's obligation to remain neu-
tral in cases where one must choose between two alternatives, 
each of constitutional dimension.180 By that standard, Connecti-
cut's policy is doubly damned - it generates financial pressure 
to forego abortion and it transmits the message that the body 
politic disapproves the abortion choice. The latter point is signifi-
cant enough that it should have led to a contrary outcome in 
Maher. Unlike public funding of publicly controlled schools, 
which manifests no social or moral condemnation of those who 
select private education, the message delivered by the Connecti-
cut policy is, assuming the validity of Roe, a constitutionally 
unacceptable one.181 And to its impoverished addressees, the dol-
lar medium of that message can be telling indeed. 
Invalidation of Connecticut's preference and payment for 
childbirth would not, of course, guarantee state subsidy of abor-
tions. The state might eliminate all payment for pregnancy-
related services rather than expand its coverage to include preg-
nancy termination, and that, I have argued above, would not 
violate the Constitution.182 Unhappy a concluding note as that 
might be, it underscores my essential point. Maher u. Roe was a 
case about the role of government in the liberty system, not about 
, inequalities for which government can be held constitutionally 
responsible. The tangled strands of substantive equal protection 
formulations either blocked full recognition of that insight by the 
Maher majority or enabled them to avoid it while seemingly hold-
ing fast to prevailing fourteenth amendment methodology. Maher 
is glaring evidence that the elaborate linkage of liberty and equal-
ity in the Court's work of the past twenty-five years can quell 
revolutions as easily as it can arm them. 
The Maher majority's devotion to equal protection clause 
158. Professor Tribe once advanced that view, see L. TRmE, supra note 1, at 928 & n, 
54, but has since recanted. Id. at 928. 
159. Id. at 928-29. 
160. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 72, 137, 145-46 (1977). 
See also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1432 (1974). 
161. See Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN D1Eoo L. REV. 
1155, 1157 n. 10 (1978). 
162. It might, however, violate a state's statutory obligation to provide Medicaid 
assistance to an extent "consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX]." 42 U.S.C. § 
1396(a)(17) (1976). 
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theory is still less defensible when that case is compared with 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland163 and Zablocki v. Redhail. 164 In 
those, our next two snapshot cases, several Justices from the 
Maher majority proclaimed substantive due process theories of 
fundamental liberty interests to be preferred over comparable 
equal protection theories as grounds of fourteenth amendment 
decision. That apparent recrossing of strands may contain a sig-
nificant hint about the direction of fourteenth amendment doc-
trine in the near future. 
B. Moore v: City of East Cleveland 
It is a rare and significant occasion when the Supreme Court 
writes self-consciously about its choices of doctrine and theory, 
and self-consciousness of that sort illuminates at high levels of 
candlepower when it is accompanied by judicial disagreement. 
Such was the case in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 165 in which 
the Court invalidated, on pure substantive due process grounds, 
an East Cleveland zoning ordinance that limited dwelling unit 
occupancy to members of a "family."166 The ordinance defined 
family in a way that excluded a wide variety of relatives of the 
head of the household. In particular, the ordinance prohibited 
occupancy by grandchildren of the head of the household, with 
an exception for the children of one (but only one) dependent 
child of the household head. 
Inez Moore shared a household in East Cleveland with a son, 
his offspring, and a grandson by another of her children. After 
city officials gave her notice of the ordinance and she failed to 
comply with it or seek administrative relief from its strictures, 167 
she was charged with and convicted of a violation. A closely di-
vided Supreme co·urt reversed the conviction and invalidated the 
ordinance. In an opinion for a plurality of four, 168 Justice Powell 
concluded that the East Cleveland ordinance failed to satisfy the 
substantive requirements of the fourteenth amendment:s due 
163. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
164. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
165. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
166. See 431 U.S. at 496 n. 2. 
167. This failure to exhaust administrative remedies led Chief Justice Burger to 
conclude that Moore's claim should have been dismissed and the substantive constitu-
tional merits never reached. 431 U.S. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). None of the other 
Justices agreed, and the case law leans strongly in their direction. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 
392 U.S. 309 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
168. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell formed the plurality. 
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process clause. Viewing the case as implicating the liberty to 
structure extended family living arrangements, the plurality con-
cluded that the East Cleveland ordinance must be "examine[d] 
carefully" for the "importance of the governmental interests ad-
vanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged 
regulation."169 That formulation of a substantive due process re-
view standard left a bit to be desired, for nowhere does the plural-
ity indicate how important the state's objectives must be nor how 
well advanced by the ordinance. Nevertheless, the latter half of 
this test proved fatal: the plurality concluded that the ordinance 
served "marginally, at best" the interests in preserving "the char-
acter of a single-family neighborhood"170 proffered by East Cleve-
land.171 
Three of the four dissenting Justices discussed the merits in 
Moore. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist argued that substantive 
due process d,octrine should be limited to those interests "implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty,"172 and concluded that Moore's 
interest in living with her children and grandchildren was not of 
169. 431 U.S. at 499. 
170. The phrase is Justice White's, 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). Although 
the purpose of the ordinance might be formulated in "family-neutral" terms ( e.g., control 
of population density, traffic congestion, or school-age population), Justice White's attri-
bution of purpose seems most consistent with the precise family-splitting terms used in 
the ordinance. Those terms are the best evidence of the provision's dominant purpose. 
171. 431 U.S. at 500. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the East 
Cleveland ordinance worked an unconstitutional property deprivation. He cited approv-
ingly several state court opinions that, he claimed, evinced a trend in that direction. 431 
U.S. at 516-21 nn.8-16. Many of those cases involved statutory interpretations of "family" 
in a zoning ordinance so as not to prohibit occupancy by groups, unrelated by blood or 
marriage, that cohabited for important and legitimate purposes. They included City of 
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300,313 N.E.2d 756,357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (group 
home licensed by the state to care for abandoned and neglected children "conforms to the 
purpose" of an ordinance restricting occupancy to families), cited at 431 U.S. at 517 n.9, 
and Missionaries of Our Lady v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 
(1954) (household of six priests and two lay brothers are a "family" for purposes of the 
ordinance), cited at 431 U.S. at 519 n.13. Other cases cited by Justice Stevens involved 
limiting· interpretations of state-wide zoning enabling statues. See City of Des Plaines v. 
Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (city not authorized by state lnw to limit 
occupancy to related persons), cited at 431 U.S. at 516 n.8. While courts in these cases 
were no doubt influenced by substantive due process notions of liberty interests in struc-
turing a household and property interests in the use to which property is put, only one 
case from a court of last resort cited by Justice Stevens squarely held a single-family 
ordinance in violation of the due process clause on grounds of property deprivation. Kirsh 
Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241,281 A.2d 513 (1971), cited at 431 U.S. 
at 517 n.10. See generally Developments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 
1568-78 (1978). 
172. 431 U.S. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 
(1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
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that magnitude. Justice White, in a more elaborate dissent, 173 
traced the history of substantive due process ideas, cautioned 
against the abuses of power likely to be engendered by uncritical 
employment of such theories, 174 and concluded that the depriva-
tion of Moore's liberty and property worked by the East Cleve-
land ordinance was of the sort that any rational government justi-
fication would validate. Finding such justification in East Cleve-
land's objective of maintaining family-oriented neighborhoods, 
Justice White concluded that both the due process clause175 and 
the equal protection clause176 had been satisfied. 
Moore was a remarkable decision. Its choice of rationale re-
versed a pattern that had endured for four decades: it was the 
first decision since the 1937 revolution to invalidate a statute on 
naked substantive due process grounds177 when equal protection 
grounds seemed readily available. Griswold and Roe, the leading 
substantive due process cases of the past forty years, had not 
presented such alternatives; in both cases, the complained-of pro-
hibition swept broadly across the state's entire population, and 
thus offered no classification readily subject to equal protection 
attack. In Moore, by contrast, the "family" definition in the ordi-
nance seemed perfect for invalidation as an arbitrary classifica-
tion: the limitation of permitted resident grandchildren to those 
in one and only one descendant line is rather remote from a con-
cern to protect the character of a single-family neighborhood.178 
The plurality opinion stood at least thirty years of conventional 
wisdom on its head by adopting a substantive due process theory 
and proclaiming in a one-sentence footnote that the due process 
holding rendered it unnecessary for the Court to reach the equal 
protection claims made in the case.179 • 
The notion that due process clause doctrine should be pre-
ferred to equal protection clause analysis is an intriguing one. 180 
173. 431 U.S. at 541 (White, J., dissenting). 
174. 431 U.S. at 542-44. 
175. 431 U.S. at 547-51. 
176. 431 U.S. at 550-51. f 
177. Conventional wisdom was strongly to the effect that substantive due process, 
wholly divorced from the Bill of Rights, was dead and buried. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 
589, 596-97 (1977); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). But see 
text at notes 82-89 supra. 
178. See note 170 supra. The city might have been on safer equal protection ground 
if it had excluded all grandchildren, although the Moore plurality's due process theory 
would presumably have been no less hostile to such a tack. 
179. 431 U.S. at 496 n.3. 
180. Moore is also remarkable for its controversial extension of family autonomy 
rights. Prior family autonomy cases had only concerned relationships of parent and child. 
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Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. 
New York, 181 had counseled precisely to the contrary: 
The burden should rest heavily upon one who. would persuade 
us to use the due process clause to strike down a substantive law 
or ordinance . . . . Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due 
process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct 
which many people find objectionable. 
Invocation of the equal_protection clause, on the other hand, 
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the 
subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation 
must have a broader impact.182 
It remains unclear whether the Moore plurality was indiffer-
ent to Justice Jackson's concern for the relative consequences of 
due process versus equal protection invalidation. The theories of 
Moore, which criticize only the peculiar means chosen, do not 
leave ungovernable the problem of population density .183 If, how-
ever, the "objectionable" conduct that troubled East Cleveland 
was the practice of extending families within a household, the 
Jackson dictum has been ignored. It is entirely possible that the 
Court employed the theories of Moore fully aware of their sweep-
ing consequences. If so, the Court may have been consciously 
opting for the broad effects that substantive due process holdings 
are likely to produce rather than the narrower, more restrained 
effects that Justice Jackson found more acceptable. 
Comparing Moore with Skinner v. Oklahoma184 may illus-
trate the different consequences of due process and equal protec-
tion intervention. Skinner invalidated, on equal protection 
grounds, an Oklahoma statute that· required sterilization of cer-
tain classes of habitual criminal offenders. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the statute's coverage of larceny offenders such as 
Skinner, coupled with its exemption of other classes of thieves, 
including embezzlers, constituted an "invidious discrimina-
tion. "185 The Court was aided toward that conclusion by the 
premise that reproductive freedom is a "basic civil right" 186 whose 
Moore's household included two grandchildren, both of whom had at least one living 
parent. 431 U.S. at 496-97. 
181. 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949). 
182. 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
183. Communities remain free to regulate density directly (i.e., number of people per 
square foot of usable space), and to prohibit at least some groups of unrelated persons from 
sharing a household. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boreas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally 
Developments in the Law, supra note 171, at 1443-62. 
184. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
185. 316 U.S. at 541. 
186. 316 U.S. at 541. 
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discriminatory abridgment receives unusually exacting judicial 
inquiry. Skinner's 1942 vintage helps to explain why the Court 
preferred a relatively narrow equal protection ground of decision 
to a broader preferred liberty theory that would have impugned 
all involuntary sterilization schemes. No matter how serious the 
issue, the Court presumably was unwilling to reinstate substan-
tive activism under the due process clause only five years after 
its repudiation.187 Nevertheless, Skinner has been criticized for 
the narrowness of its approach and for its consequent failure to 
protect other classes of persons, criminal offenders and otherwise, 
whose reproductive interests were potentially threatened by steri-
lization schemes.188 
Skinner was unrestrained in its vigorous protection of a non-
textual liberty, yet cautious in its grounds that went no farther 
than the particular case at hand. Moore's reversal of the strand 
preference can be viewed as an inversion of the Court's restraint 
priorities as well. The decision is deferential toward state zoning 
objectives - communities remain free to control population 
density and neighborhood character, so long as the definition of 
appropriate living units does not sever family· connections. Yet 
the due process clause theory, with its strict attention to the 
means used to achieve those ends, delivers the message of Moore 
in a way unlikely to give rise to further litigation on the point. 189 
If Moore had chosen the equal protection route, it might have 
invalidated the East Cleveland ordinance while suggesting the 
permissibility of other, less arbitrary definitions of "family". In-
stead, Moore holds that families, defined by blood and marriage 
relations, cannot be carved up unless such limitations are criti-
cally necessary to achieve substantial zoning objectives. Thus, 
unlike the Skinner equal protection approach, which at the time 
left room for doubt whether classes of habitual criminals could be 
sterilized, the Moore due process methodology clearly marks the 
extended family as an institution heavily protected against direct 
municipal regulation. 
Although Moore's machete leaves open fewer questions than 
' 187. That is, the majority was unwilling. Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justice Jack-
son, concurred in Skinner on substantive due process grounds. 316 U.S. at 544 (Stone, ' 
C.J., concurring). 
188. See Arthur Garfield Hays Conference, The Proper Role of the United States 
Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 457, 471-72 (1964) (remarks of 
Professor Foote). 
189. Cf. Dixon, supra note 11, at 87 (the Court decided Roe v. Wade in a way "de-
signed . . . to regulate the field in such detail as to minimize future questions and litiga-
tion."). 
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Skinner's scalpel, that may not have been what principally moti-
vated the Moore majority to choose due process methodology. A 
more persuasive speculation, perhaps, is that at.least three of the 
five Justices voting to invalidate the East Cleveland ordinance 
wanted most to avoid manufacturing arrows for the substantive 
equal protection bow.190 The influence of Justice Marshall's slid-
ing scale of equal protection, 191 which correlates the review stan-
dard with the importance of the claimed interest, would have 
been buttressed had the Court used the liberty to structure family 
living arrangements to trigger stringent equal protection review. 
By avoiding the equal protection ground, the majority was able 
to fortify the fourteenth amendment barricade without reinforc-
ing the sliding scale or other, less flexible, theories of substantive 
equal protection.192 
The contrast between Moore and Maher, viewed from this 
perspective, is striking. In Maher, a Court intent on upholding 
the Connecticut policy chose to leave the strands tangled; in 
Moore, it preferred to untangle in order to invalidate. The Court 
thus continued to make substantive value choices in fourteenth 
amendment adjudication, but chose to make new advances in the 
protection of substantive rights in the name of the due process 
clause. It left the structure and rhetoric of substantive equal pro-
tection formally intact, however, perhaps to preserve the under-
pinnings of important Warren Court work, to avoid abrupt doc-
trinal discontinuities, or to retain judicial flexibility. Whatever 
the explanation, the Maher-Moore sequence seems a tentative 
but significant step in the untangling process currently under-
way. 
190. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens supported the disarmament. Unper-
turbed, Justice Marshall remains an avowea proponent of substantive equal protection, 
see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting), and Justice Brennan has joined in, 411 U.S. at 62, although at times he has 
taken pains to mask his preference in a "strict rationality" formula of some sort. See 
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972). Intriguingly, Justices Brennan and Marshall also submitted a concur-
ring opinion in Moore, emphasizing the role of the extended family in the cultural patterns 
of nonwhite minorities. 431 U.S. at 507-11. This attempted relinkage of Moore to equal 
protection seems unpersuasive in face of East Cleveland's predominantly nonwhite char-
acter. If any "racial discrimination" was operating, it was self-imposed. 
191. See note 99 supra. 
192. The Rodriguez formulation, see text at notes 83-97 supra, articulated a pure 
"two-tier" theory, providing strict scrutiny of all suspect classifications and all classifica-
tions impinging upon "fundamental interests." An equal protection approach in Moore 
might have held family-structuring interests to be fundamental for this purpose, See 
generally Gunther, supra note 98. 
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The Court's use of the substantive due process strand in 
Moore forced it to venture once again into the thicket of defining 
fundamental liberties.193 The opinions in Moore offer a variety of 
approaches to determining which rights merit the active protec-
tion of substantive due process.194 First, although the Justices 
disagreed about the governing standard by which to evaluate 
claims that particular liberty interests are fundamental, 195 not 
one opposed the continued employment of substantive due pro-
cess to protect some liberties wholly removed from the Bill of 
Rights. Seco~d, the terms of the review standard employed by the 
Moore plurality suggest that the Court is finally prepared to open 
formally an "intermediate wing" of substantive due process re-
view. Third, the fight over substantive due process standards 
reveals two distinct but similar versions of an "ordered liberty" 
193. See text at notes 2-8 supra. 
194. The vigorous protection of the extended family in Moore expands the class of 
preferred nontextual liberties, in result if not in theory. Moore moves beyond Griswold 
and Roe, which involved procreative freedom of choice, as well as beyond Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the Court revived the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine to strike down a statute that proscribed awarding custody of an illegitimate child to 
the father. Stanley's protection of the relationship between biological parent and child was 
not a particularly bold leap. The biological choice to conceive and the emotional choice 
to perform the parental function are hardly unrelated. In the absence of constitutional 
protection of the latter choice, the protection of the former in Skinner, Griswold, and Roe 
is robbed of a substantial portion of its significance. Viewed in that light, the statutory 
prohibition of custody can be seen as a retroactive "sterilization," and, as such, fully 
within the scope of the procreative freedom principle. 
The family restrictions imposed by East Cleveland, however, did not intrude on the 
relationship between parent and minor child. Both the majority and the dissent in Moore 
seemed acutely aware of the extension of the family privacy notion being sought by the 
petitioners. In the end, the battle reduced to a disagreement about the appropriateness 
of judicial elevation to special status of new elements of liberty. The plurality viewed 
freedom to structure an extended family as a critical element of our cultural heritage, 
hence deserving extraordinary judicial protection: 
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the mem-
bers of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally 
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition. 
431 U.S. at 504. Several dissenting Justices, more deeply troubled by any new applications 
of substantive due process doctrine, thought the case failed to present the harm to vital 
interests that is necessary to overcome the heavy presumption against such new applica-
tions: 
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen 
and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise to 
[the] level [of preferred liberty]. To equate this interest with the fundamental 
decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the limited substan-
tive contours of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition. 
431 U.S. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In my view, developed at length in Section N. 
A. below, those Justices seriously and inappropriately devalued Moore's claim. 
195. See note 194 supra. 
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standard articulated in Palko196 and elaborated in Justice Har-
lan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 197 One version - that of the Moore 
dissenters - has no apparent unifying theory, It does appear, 
however, to accept existing substantive due process decisions, 
like Roe, and to recognize new claims closely analogous to those 
already recognized. 198 The other version - that of the Moore plu-
rality - seems to depend on the historical understanding of lib-
erty: 
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from 
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful "respect for the 
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values 
that underlie our society." Our decisions establish that the Consti-
tution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass 
down m~y of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.100 
The problem of defining standards for ascertaining funda-
mental liberties is an old one. Its difficulty has led judges200 and 
commentators201 alike to conclude that defensible standards do 
not exist and that substantive due process adjudication is ines-
capably an abuse of power. Indeed, one of the attractions of sub-
stantive equal protection, in its heyday, was the perception that 
notions of constitutional equality possessed an intrinsic set of 
standards. The recent reduction in substantive equal protection 
activism, coupled with the rebirth of substantive due process 
activism, has revived the search for standards, and the quest 
must be vigorously pursued. This century's constitutional law is 
overpowering tes_timony to the allure and might of substantive 
due process.202 The Court will not abandon it, and a fabric of 
expectations has been woven around it; the task is to confine it 
and make it as amenable to defensible principle as possible. 
Moore started down that path, 203 but major advances in constitu-
196. See text at notes 43-46 supra. 
197. 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
198. 431 U.S. at 536 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). 
199. 431 U.S. at 503-04 (citations omitted). 
200. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-513 (1965) (Black J. 
dissenting). ' ' 
201. See, e.g., Ely, Foreword, supra note 9. 
202. See A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT at xx 
(1976). 
203. In Section IV, I will propose a standard of fundamentality which builds upon 
the foundations of Moore and provides a mode of analysis more subject to principled 
application. 
April 1979] Untangling the Strands 1023 
tional law are often marked more by fits and starts than by grace-
ful strides. The third snapshot in this brief album is therefore not 
surprising, for it pictures the strands of the fourteenth amend-
ment rewoven in a knot twisted enough to warm a sailor's heart. 
C. Zablocki v. Redhail 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 204 decided in January 1978, illustrates 
perfectly the complex interweaving of and subtle rivalry between 
liberty and equality themes in fourteenth amendment adjudica-
tion. The Wisconsin statute challenged in Zablocki provided that 
a person with outstanding court-ordered support obligations to 
minor children not in his custody could not obtain a license to 
marry absent permission from a state court. The court could 
grant the license only if the petitioner demonstrated at a hearing 
that 1) all prior court-ordered obligations had been satisfied, and 
2) the minor child beneficiary of the obligation was not then, and 
was not likely to become, a public charge.205 
Roger Redhail, plaintiff in the case, told a tale of many woes. 
He had fathered an infant girl out of wedlock in 1971. As a result, 
he faced a paternity suit in 1972 in which he admitted paternity 
and was ordered by the Milwaukee County Court to pay $109 per 
month for child support. For the next two years Redhail was 
"unemployed and indigent, "206 and made no payments on his 
daughter's behalf. In the fall of 1974, Redhail sought a license to 
marry another woman, who was pregnant with his child. After the 
clerk denied the license application in light of the statute de-
scribed above, Redhail and his prospective bride sought federal 
injunctive relief against the scheme. Redhail did not seek the 
hearing provided in the statute, but the state conceded that such 
a petition would have been futile. Redhail had an undisputed 
arrearage of over $3,000, and even if he met his monthly obliga-
tion, his daughter would be, as she had been since birth, a recipi-
ent of public assistance. 
In an opinion for a majority of the Court, Justice Marshall 
held that the Wisconsin marriage bar violated the equal protec-
tion clause. His opinion, true to the substantive emphasis of his 
sliding scale theories, made the nature of the right impeded more 
significant than the nature of the classification drawn. Proceed-
204. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
205. The statute is set out in the Court's opinion. 434 U.S. at 375-77 n.1. 
206. 434 U.S. at 378. 
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ing from the premise that marriage is a fundamental right, Jus-
tice Marshall invoked an active review standard, one which de-
manded a close relationship between the marriage prohibition 
and "sufficiently important state interests."207 The statute, not 
surprisingly, failed the test. Although the opinion conceded the 
importance of ensuring compliance with family support obliga-
tions, it found the Wisconsin scheme too heavy a burden on mar-
riage formation and insufficiently likely to increase the rate of 
compliance. 
Three separate concurring opinions were filed in Zablocki. 
Justice Stevens concurred on equal protection grounds,208 Justice 
Powell concurred on both equal protection and substantive due 
process grounds, 209 and Justice Stewart agreed with the result 
solely on due process grounds.210 Justice Stewart spoke directly 
and at some length about the problem of tangled strands: 
In an opinion of the Court half a century ago, Justice Holmes 
described an equal protection claim as "the usual last resort of 
constitutional arguments." ... Today equal protection doctrine 
has become the Court's chief instrument for invalidating state 
laws. Yet, in a case like this one, the doctrine is no more than 
substantive due process by another name. 
Although the Court purports to examine the bases for legisla-
tive classifications and to compare the treatment of legislatively 
defined groups, it actually erects substantive limitations on what 
· States may do. Thus, the effect of the Court's decision in this case 
is not to require Wisconsin to draw its legislative classifications 
with greater precision or to afford similar treatment to similarly 
situated persons. Rather, the message of the Court's opinion is that 
Wisconsin may not use its control over marriage to achieve the 
objectives of the state statute. Such restrictions on basic govern-
mental power are at the heart of substantive due process. 
The Court is understandably reluctant to rely on substantive 
due process . . . . But to embrace the essence of that doctrine 
under the guise of equal protection serves no purpose but obfusca-
tion .... 
To conceal this appropriate inquiry invites mechanical or 
thoughtless application of misfocused doctrine. To bring it into the 
open forces a healthy and responsible recognition of the nature and 
purpose of the extreme power we wield when, in invalidating a 
state law in the name of the Constitution, we invalidate pro tanto 
207. 434 U.S. at 388. 
208. 434 U.S. at 403. 
209. 434 U.S. at 396. 
210. 434 U.S. at 391. 
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the process of representative democracy in one of the sovereign 
States of the Union. 211 • 
The tangling in Zablocki was even worse than Justice Stew-
art indicated. The majority opinion, resting wholly on the equal 
protection clause, seems almost completely unconcerned with 
questions of "classification" or "discrimination." The de facto 
wealth classification generated by the Wisconsin scheme - the 
very poor were blocked from marriage regardless of their satisfac-
tion of support obligations - received only the scantiest atten-
tion.212 Given the prominence of "wealth plus fundamental right" 
reasoning and rhetoric in Warren Court equal protection deci-
sions,213 abstinence from that approach in Zablocki is striking. It 
suggests that wealth, or lack of it, may perhaps return to the 
status of "constitutional irrelevance" it once apparently en-
joyed.214 
Paradoxically undercutting that suggestion, however, is the 
failure of those who perceived the Zablocki majority's tangle to 
avoid their own. Although Justices Stewart and Powell urged a 
due process clause theory upon the Court, both laid controlling 
emphasis on the Wisconsin statute's disproportionate burden 
upon the indigent.215 That an equality-centered theme of a decade 
past can be transformed magically into a liberty-centered theme 
of the moment is marvelous testimony to the staying power of 
arguments to protect the poor, but it simultaneously indicates 
that the theoretical basis of much of the Warren Court's substan-
tive equal protection effort is sorely in need of reexamination. 
The Zablocki plot thickens when one notices that Justices 
Powell and Stewart each expressed concern about the conse-
quences of the Zablocki holding for other state-created barriers 
to marriage, such as limitations based on age or consanguinity. 
211. 434 U.S. at 395-96. 
212. 434 U.S. at 387. 
213. See text at notes 122-25 supra. 
214. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Justice Jackson was, of course, concerned about the de jure discrimination against the 
poor challenged in Edwards, and, in that context, indigency was not an "irrelevance." His 
point, I think, was that states must treat it as an irrelevance, or, more accurately, cannot 
create sanctions and punishments which are triggered explicitly by indigent status. What 
Jackson thus intended is something like what the elder Justice Harlan intended when he 
said the Constitution is "color-blind," Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting), where he presumably meant to say that the Constitution color-
consciously requires the states to be color-blind. 
215. 434 U.S. at 393-95 (Stewart, J., concurring); 434 U.S. at 400-02 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
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Both Justices warned that Zablocki might be read to require" 
extraordinary state justification for such time-honored restric-
tions. But notwithstanding their conclusory say-sos, neither clari-
fied how or why a substantive due process theory would be less 
destructive of traditional marriage impediments than a substan-
tive equal protection theory fueled by the same sensitivity to 
restrictions on marriage formation. 216 
Given the surprising and doctrinally unnecessary resurrec-
tion of substantive due process in Moore, why did the Zablocki 
Court revert to substantive equal protection labels? The family 
formation context of Zablocki made it a less controversial setting 
for the invocation of a substantive due process theory than Moore 
- marriage barriers had, as an alternative ground of decision in 
Loving v. Virginia, 217 been under due process clause clouds before, 
Moore, in contrast, demanded a much greater extension of prior 
holdings to qualify as a legitimate preferred liberty claim. Two 
plausible explanations for this enigmatic doctrinal flip-flop pre-
sent themselves. A primary goal of several members of the Court 
appears to be flexibility - the avoidance of rigid formulae that 
might produce unpalatable results in unforeseeable cases. The 
disagreement about choice of strands may thus be only a dispute 
over which approach best preserves open discretion and the power 
to decide cases ad hoc. For some, that discretion is preserved by 
fluid notions of the substance of equal protection; for others, the 
erratic quality of due process clause intervention is better suited 
to the task. A more frightening explanation for the Moore-
Zablocki inconsistency is that the Justices think the choice of 
doctrine insignificant, either because all that counts is mustering 
a majority for a given result or because the distinct functions of 
the strands have long been blurred. Either way, constitutional 
law is done a great disservice. Liberty against government and 
equality under the law are not fungible concepts, and the majesty 
of both is sullied by attempts to treat them as such. The strands 
must be untangled. 
216. A due process theory might be more solicitous of such traditions, for reasons 
developed in Section IV.A., infra. The trick is to take care to define the fundamental 
right in a way that preserves what ought to be preserved. An equality-centered approach 
has trouble doing that, but I hope to show that a straightforward liberty approach, 
properly understood and employed, might be a sensitive enough instrument. See text at 
notes 324-25 infra. 
217. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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N. UNTANGLING THE STRANDS 
The trials and errors of history and the evolution of constitu-
tional values are responsible in tandem for the complex modern 
interplay between liberty and equality in fourteenth amendment 
adjudication, and the interplay has at times served valuable pur-
poses. Beyond question, certain conceptions of liberty and equal-
ity are mutually reinforcing. Equality of opportunity, unham-
pered by invidious discrimination, may lead to enhanced eco-
nomic status and a more secm:e base from which to exercise lib-
erty interests. Similarly, the unfettered exercise of various liber-
ties may operate to enhance both equality of opportunity and the 
individual belief that we are a society oflegal and political equals. 
These notions of mutual reinforcement do not, however, always 
require specific doctrinal embodiment. Although liberty and 
equality are, operationally, inextricably linked, consistency of 
decision, persuasiveness of judicial reasoning, and maintenance 
of appropriate institutional restraints would all be enhanced by 
their separation theoretically. The pretended death of substan-
tive due process has long impeded any candid attempt to sepa-
rate; its recent resurrection in Moore and the subsequent retan-
gling in Zablocki suggest that the time is. ripe for the effort that 
follows.· 
A. The Multiple Meanings of Liberty 
By the turn of the century, the theory of liberty protected by 
the fourteenth amendment was simple yet expansive. Although 
liberty was viewed as negative - a right to be let alone - it 
embraced every important interest valued by sensible people. 218 
In one oft-cited formulation, it included the' "right[s] of the 
individual ... to enjoy those privileges long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men."219 The Court drew no lines among those privileges; con-
tracting to work in excess of sixty hours per week was neither a 
greater nor lesser exercise of liberty than studying a foreign lan-
guage, marrying, or selling a product at a price the unregulated 
market would bear. Because the Court considered all liberties 
equal in their claims to due process clause protection, the Court 
218. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 
405, 411-16 (1977). 
219. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
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demanded, in theory, an unchanging degree of justification220 
from a state that imposed any liberty restriction. Although his-
tory and intuition suggest that, in fact, the Court engaged in 
substantive due process review at different degrees of intensity, 
the theory upon which such review rested admitted of no "sliding 
scales" or tests of "fundamentality." Liberty was liberty was lib-
erty, and it had to be protected against invasion on improper 
grounds. 
Post-1937 developments have complicated enormously the 
meaning of liberty protected by the due process clause. One of the 
more dramatic complications has been the separation of 
"procedural due process" from "substantive due process" liber-
ties. For purposes of procedural due process, the term "liberty" 
comprises the specifics of the Bill of Rights, 221 freedom from phys-
ical restraints, 222 and an ill-defined group of interests created by 
state laws.223 That, at least, is the definition of procedural due 
process liberty enunciated in Paul v. Davis224 - a definition that 
despite persuasive calls of "Halt! " 225 seems destined to endure220 
for the foreseeable future. 
Although the Court has appeared unwilling to explain the 
220. Although the Court presented the standard in a variety of verbal cloaks, it 
required essentially a "direct and substantial" relationship between the restriction and 
some legitimate aim of the police power. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 
(1905). 
221. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 n.5 (1976) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961)). 
222. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,674 (1977) (corporal punishment in public 
schools implicates liberty, despite neither alteration in state law status nor possible eighth 
amendment violation). Despite Ingraham's posture as a procedural due process case, its 
refusal to require prior hearings on whether the student committed the "offense" leading 
to the punishment and its reliance on state law remedies for "excessive" punishment mark 
it as a case -protecting substantive rights as much as if not more than procedural ones. 
For what the Court really seemed to be holding was that states must provide a remedy in 
tort for public school students who are excessively (that is, disproportionately) punished, 
a requirement that can emerge only from an underlying recognition of an inviolable federal 
constitutional right of a student not to be so treated. 
223. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). This final group of liberties seems 
difficult to distinguish conceptually from "property" entitlements of the sort covered by 
the theory of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). For the Court's most recent 
struggle with the problem of appropriate sources of "liberty," see the range of opinions in 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979). 
224. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
225. Monaghan, supra note 218, at 424-34. See also Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: 
A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293, 322-28 (1976). 
226. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 
816 (1977) (assumed, without deciding, that source of foster parents' "liberty" interests 
is state law). 
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distinction, the meaning of "liberty" in the substantive due pro-
cess setting springs from different roots. Paul's positivism is not 
controlling; indeed, a footnote to Paul explicitly distinguishes 
liberty for procedural due process purposes from liberty for sub-
stantive purposes. 227 For the latter, liberty encompasses a far 
broader range of interests; it may yet, for all we know, include all 
those "long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men."228 And the source of these 
interests is federal constitutional law; if a new state entered the 
Union and simultaneously criminalized the act of bearing a child, 
one could have no doubt that "liberty" had been endangered, 
even though state law entitlement to the liberty had ceased to 
exist. 
The distinction in methodology between procedural and sub-
stantive due process is magnified at the second stage of analysis. 
For, unlike the all-inclusive theory of the Lochner era that held 
all liberties equally inviolable, and unlike the procedural due 
process theory that assesses the weight of any protected interest 
in a refined way for purposes of "balancing,"229 modern substan-
227. "[The Court's] discussion [of the source of liberty interests] is limited to 
consideration of the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and is not intended 
to describe those substantive limitations upon state action which may be encompassed 
within the concept of 'liberty' expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment." 424 U.S. at 710 
n.5. 
The only sensible explanation for holding a positivist view of liberty for procedural 
due process purposes, while simultaneously maintaining an independent federal constitu-
tional view for substantive purposes, is that of minimizing the intrusion of federal consti-
tutional law on the day-to-day operations of state and municipal institutions. For in-
stance, a state law may impinge upon substantive liberty but be defensible under prevail-
ing doctrine as rationally justifiable. Thus, the law's substantive constitutionality, if ever 
challenged, can usually be authoritatively determined in a single proceeding. Application 
of that law to many parties, however, may give rise to countless encounters between state 
officials and private citizens. In turn, under a broad, nonpositivist view of procedural due 
process liberty, each such encounter could trigger requirements of notice and opportuni-
ties to be heard. The Court, despite the apparent "promise" of Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972), seems eager to avoid that consequence. See, e.g., Board of Curators 
v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (academic dismissal from state medical school, even if a 
deprivation of liberty or property, does not trigger a right to a hearing under the fourteenth 
amendment); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976). 
228. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
229. To determine the level of "process that is due" a liberty protected by procedural 
guarantees, a court assigns weights to the individual's interests and balances them against 
the state's interest in their summary deprivation. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's 
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three 
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976); See also Van Alstyne, 
Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 
62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977). Unlike the question ofliberty vel non, the task of weighing 
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tive due process theory has a distinct all-or-nothing quality to it. 
Most liberties lacking textual support are of the garden variety 
- like liberty of contract - and thus their deprivation is consti-
tutional if rationally necessary to the achievement of a public 
good. 230 Several select liberties, on the other hand, have attained 
the status of "fundamental" or "preferred," with the consequence 
that the Constitution permits a state to abridge them only if it 
can demonstrate an extraordinary justification. 231 Because the 
review standard for ordinary liberties is so deferential, and the 
standard for preferred liberties so rigid, outcomes are ordained by 
the designation of "preferred" or not. 232 For procedural purposes, 
liberties may weigh anything from a gram to a ton; for substan-
tive purposes, they must weigh either a microgram or a megaton. 
The volatility and, on occasion, the seemingly anti-democratic 
consequences of this latter mode of classifying liberties bespeak 
the overwhelming necessity to discover a sound theory to justify 
its existence and guide its application. 
1. Substantive Rights - The Sources of Preferred Liberty 
Preferred liberties in constitutional law generally, and in the 
substantive due process side of the fourteenth amendment specif-
ically, have flowed from three major sources. Two of those sources 
derive from the Constitution itself; the parentage of the third 
remains in doubt. 
takes place on a scale with an infinite number of gradations. Thus, in the judicial response 
to the question of "what process is due," subtle and refined judgments are permitted and, 
quite frequently, are required. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), with 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
230. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). Some com-
mentators, most notably Judge (then Professor) Linde in Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 
NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976), have argued that "rationality" review is useless and senseless. 
Nevertheless, the rationality standard is an extremely "settled" principle, at least insofar 
as such principles are discoverable from the face of judicial opinions. Whether it is one of 
those requirements of constitutional Jaw that courts cannot enforce, but legislatures 
should take seriously, is a question with which others may grappie. Judge Linde, for one, 
does not see the requirement as sensible even at that level. Id. at 222-35. See generally 
Sager, Fair Measure: Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV, L. REV. 1212 (1978); 
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 585 (1975). 
231. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 155 (1973) (restrictions on abortion justifia-
ble only upon a showing of necessity to the accomplishment of compelling state interests). 
Dissenting in Moore, Justice White articulated precisely this dichotomy of substantive 
due process standards. 432 U.S. at 542-44 . 
. 232. Equal protection doctrine had, of course, its comparable period of development. 
See Gunther, supra note 98, at 10; Developments in the Law, supra note 56, at 1127-28. 
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a. Sources within the document - text and structure. The 
principal source of preferred liberties, of course, has been the Bill 
of Rights, incorporated in the due process clause. Although the 
relationship between Bill safeguards and state governmental 
power has sparked fascinating and seemingly endless contro-
versy, 233 the proposition that many provisions of the Bill impose 
limitations on- states234 coextensive with the limitations they im-
pose on the federal government is a settled one.235 Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 236 the Court's most recent word on how to decide which 
Bill guarantees apply to the states, teaches that the test of incor-
poration is whether the guarantee is necessary "to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty. "237 
A second source of preferred liberty has been the constitu-
tional structure and the values that-structure implies. Predomi-
nantly structural concerns have animated the Court's protection 
of the right of interstate travel;238 the open federal union implicit 
in the constitutional design generates a corollary of free move-
ment within the nation's borders. The Court's close watch over 
legislative apportionment and distribution of the franchise by 
states also may rest, at least in part, upon structural assumptions 
concerning the democratic process and fair opportunity to partic-
ipate in that process. 239 A lamentable consequence of the recent 
prominence of substantive equal protection is that these inter-
ests, whose creation may be defensible on structural theories, 
have been anchored in the equal protection clause, 240 from which 
233. I spare the reader (and myself) the usual string citation. For those obsessed with 
cumulative documentation, however, see the sources cited in G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, 
at 525 n.t. 
234. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 11-2. 
235. There have been some serious recent objections to this unity. See, e.g., Crist v. 
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J., and Burger, 
C.J.); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by 
Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J.); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 369 (1972) (Powell, 
J., concurring). (Powell's concurrence treats several cases and so precedes the Apodaca 
majority opinion.). 
236. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
237. 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14. 
238. See the detailed discussion in text at notes 371-86 infra. 
239. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1969). 
240. See cases cited in notes 76-78 supra. It may be that no fourteenth amendment 
strand is necessary to support application of structurally derived concerns to the states, 
and that the supremacy clause alone provides the necessary authority. That seems some-
what persuasive in the context of the travel right, given its pre-1868 antecedent in Cran-
dall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), although Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969), apparently perceived the relevance of the due 
process clause to that travel problem. And the cases involving reapportionment and voting 
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a necessary set of limiting principles does not readily spring. 
b. Moving outside the document - fundamental value 
discovery. The third and most controversial source of preferred 
liberties has been a "non-source": naked judicial judgment that 
a liberty is of special constitutional magnitude, despite a lack of 
persuasive linkage with structural or textually identified values. 
Virtually all of the decisional law meeting this description pro-
tects family relationships, actual or potential. Resort to the so-
called constitutional rights of "privacy" begs the question of the 
source of those rights, since, despite the contrary assertion in 
Griswold, the constitutional text creates no such general right.241 
Furthermore, even if such a right did exist, family autonomy 
concerns would fit uneasily within it, and the decisions of the past 
fifteen years suggest that not even judges believe that a "privacy 
as autonomy" right exists in any generalizable form.242 Privacy as 
a label is both infinitely useful and ultimately useless; it can take 
you everywhere, and consequently, cannot reliably get you· any-
where.243 If the "naked" substantive due process decisions had to 
rights seem impossible to defend without some fairly direct linkage with the fourteenth 
amendment. But despite the strong equality themes in these cases, I think they too rest 
so uneasily on the equal protection clause that other avenues should be pursued. See text 
at notes 371-86 infra. 
241. See Ely, supra note 88, at 929 (right of privacy inferable only "so long as some 
care is taken in defining the sort of right the inference will support.") (emphasis original). 
Professor Ely reads Griswold as a case protecting the home against the "most outrageous 
sort of governmental prying" which enforcement of the ban on contraceptive use would 
require. Id. at 930. See also Dixon, supra note 11, at 83-85 (Griswold and Roe are cases 
about "freedom of action," not about privacy). Some commentators have argued that the 
privacy right is really a set of rights relating to autonomy and seclusion. See generally 
Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Li{ estyle, 62 Co RN ELL L. REV. 
563 (1977); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 670 (1973). Autonomy as a claim moves far beyond any existing conception of' 
constitutional privacy. Autonomy is a claim made by every substantive due process plain-
tiff, seeking to be "let alone," whether from wage and hour regulation or a contraceptive 
ban. See also Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV, 233 
(1977). 
242. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), proffered a general discussion of the privacy 
right, but held that a statute under which information was stored about legitimate users 
of dangerous prescription drugs is subject to no more than a rationality test, albeit a fairly 
careful one. And both Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (upholding a hair grooming 
regulation for police officers), and Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), 
affg. mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding a statute proscribing homosexual 
relations between consenting adults), suggest that the Court is rather unreceptive to a 
general "autonomy" component of the privacy concept. For reasons that will appear in 
Section IV.A.2. below, I think such general unreceptivity is warranted. 
243. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 15-1. 
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be summed up in a brief capsule, rights of "familial choice"244 
would be a far more accurate description than rights of "privacy." 
But rights of "familial choice" stand starkly naked, since no 
amount of Bill of Rights penumbra-fashioning can responsibly 
lead to "family rights" as a protected category.245 What, then, is 
244. Cf. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 11 & n.40 (suggesting that the Court had 
lumped together the distinct activities of sex, marriage, childbearing, and childrearing to 
form a constitutional unit.) 
245. An intriguing straw man to pursue is the possibility that the free exercise clause 
might house the "familial choice" liberties that are currently preferred. The clause cannot 
be totally irrelevant to the inner-directed and (at least occasionally) spiritually influenced 
choices at stake in family matters. If marriage and family choices could fairly be viewed 
as exercises of a consensus American religion, rather than merely shifting social arrange-
ments akin to "shifting economic arrangements," Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), a textually based doctrine protecting those choices might 
be defended, confined, and legitimized. Such a doctrine might, for administrative ease 
and out of concern to avoid intrusion in matters of conscience, conclusively presume that 
family and parental choices are constitutionally equivalent to religious choices. Both 
involve dimensions of the human spirit that include, but go beyond, rational judgment. 
Both are a function of man's deepest needs to overcome isolation and the loneliness of 
atomized existence, and to reach out for connections with forces that define and give 
meaning to life. Both require commitment, dedication, and acceptance of obligation be-
yond narrow sensclry satisfaction. Fastening substantive due process activism to the free 
exercise clause would exonerate the Court from charges of looking to natural law, or 
personal prejudices, in marking special areas of liberty, and would refocus the debate on 
the contemporary meaning of religion in an increasingly secularized state. 
Such a theory, though remotely plausible, cannot escape serious, perhaps insur-
mountable, difficulties. First, the claims are rarely made that way, and there are limits 
beyond which even the most creative rerationalization cannot responsibly proceed. Sec-
ond, there are good reasons why family autonomy claims are rarely pressed as religion 
claims; the rights being sought, in the minds and hearts of the seekers, presumably bear 
little or no resemblance to concerns commonly understood as "religious." For the Court 
to seize upon this theory might well invite some very strange claims of "religious freedom." 
(How seriously would we have been willing to take Margaret Lovisi's claim, if she had 
made one, that she had been divinely inspired to invite a fellow to join her husband and 
herself in a menage a trois?) See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). We would 
take it seriously as part of an insanity defense, but not as a free exercise defense. Lawyers 
are skeptical, and sometimes it is healthy. Freud might take a different view of the linkage 
between sex and religion. Religion (at least monotheistic forms of it), you see, involves 
subservience to an ultimate father figure, suggesting that, at least for males, acts of 
heterosexual intercourse are religious in the sense of taking the Oedipal risk - coupling 
with mother at the peril of patriarchal retribution. All very interesting, but all quite 
repressed and unconscious, thank goodness. Constitutional law would do well to limit its 
concern to the conscious mind.) 
Finally, the most telling objection to a free exercise rationalization of substantive due 
process activism is that it seems too reminiscent of the vice of the Griswold penumbras. 
It redefines a specific constitutional protection at a level of generality that permits the 
addition of a large bloc of content that is excessively remote from the core concept of 
religion. An expansion of the free exercise clause to include familial choices on grounds 
of the sort suggested at the outset of this footnote could not, I fear, produce principled 
distinctions between family choices, on one hand, and achievement of sexual satisfaction 
in diverse ways, drug consumption choices (but see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 
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the magic formula for determining who resides in this wing of the 
preferred-liberty mansion? As a matter of constitutional theory, 
it can hardly be sufficient that a majority of the nine landlords 
desire to let the room. 
A responsible defense of judicial discovery of unenumerated 
fundamental values must respond to the persistent and articulate 
attacks upon that practice.246 Simply put, the standard criticism 
runs something like this: Judicial invalidation of the outcome of 
ordinary political processes is undemocratic, and hence presump-
tively counter to the explicit premises around which we have 
organized our relationship to government. 247 Textual warrant for 
the invalidation partly overcomes this "usurpation" argument, 
because the constitutional text itself emanated from an extraordi-
nary act of popular sovereignty. 248 Thus, courts relying on clear 
and specific commands in the text to strike down a legislative act 
are acting as agents of the people; judicial review imposes a re-
flective, extraordinary majoritarian judgment against identifi-
able excesses of a momentary majority.249 However, the critics 
assert, courts are no longer justified in calling upon the protective 
mantle of the Constitution to validate their actions if 1) the text 
provides no warrant for intervention or 2) the warrant lacks de-
monstrable standards to guide its use. 250 
Those are the criticisms; whatever their merit or applicabil-
ity in other areas, aggressive fourteenth amendment intervention 
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (Native American Church members are constitutionally 
protected in their use of peyote in bona fide religious practices)), and other so-called 
"autonomy" interests. Dumping all these choices in the free exercise wagon would soon 
break it down, a collapse that might imperil the modern trend to expand the definition 
of religion for free exercise purposes beyond narrowly theistic conceptions. See L. T!ueE, 
supra note 1, § 14-6. 
246. The most recent and most important is Ely, Foreword, supra note 9. Professor 
Ely, it should be pointed out, believes that certain clauses do have a nontextual content, 
but that the due process clauses are not among them. Id. at 5 n.3. His Foreword, in any 
event, is a general rejection of all nontextual value sources other than those implicit in 
the theories of judicial intervention suggested by the Carolene Products footnote. See also 
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). The classic attack on judicial review pur-
suant to the "sweeping terms" of the fourteenth amendment is that of Learned Hand in 
his book, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). 
247. See, e.g.,' A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962); Ely, 
Constitutional lnterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 !ND. L.J. 399, 404-12 (1978). 
248. Ely; supra note 247, at 412 (citing, inter alia, Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705-06 (1975)). 
249. See Grey, supra note 248. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 247, at 16-23. 
250. The most outspoken proponent of this view, aimed particularly at substantive 
due process, was Justice Black. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510-24 
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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does not necessarily fall before either. The argument that the text 
does not warrant this sort of intervention is more easily asserted 
than defended. If repetition is not worthless (and the law rarely 
makes it so), the fourteenth amendment's longstanding service as 
a textual warrant must be somewhat probative.251 Even if the due 
process clauses do not properly encompass substantive claims, 
both the ninth amendment and the privileges or immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment suggest that the constitu-
tional framers recognized the need for relatively open-ended pro-
visions, 252 and were not content to limit the protection of rights 
to the enumeration in amendments one through eight. Further-
more, any insistence that the fourteenth amendment imposes no 
substantive values upon the states leads to an unraveling of sig-
nificant portions of the fabric of modern constitutional law, in-
cluding the application of the first and the eighth amendments 
to the states.253 The less extreme idea that the Court can properly 
shop inside, but not outside, the Bill of Rights for values to im-
pose upon the states by way of the fourteenth amendment has 
never been intellectually defensible on textual grounds alone. 254 
And even if a critic can resist the allure of partial incorporation 
- that is, even if he can swallow the implications of a fourteenth 
amendment defanged except for certain matters of race discrimi-
nation255 - it seems far too late for either the Court or society to 
pay much attention. Judicial expansion of the fourteenth amend-
ment - including its substantive, libertarian dimensions - has 
proceeded for so long, and has generated such an elaborate matrix 
of rights, duties, values, and expectations, that sudden with-
drawal from the practice would undermine established patterns 
of constitutional protection presently perceived as essential in a 
free society. 256 
The other component of the argument against fundamental 
value adjudication - that the process is purely and inescapably 
251. But see R. BERGER, supra note 246, at 352 ("Usurpation - the exercise of power 
not granted - is not legitimated by repetition.") 
252. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 5 n.3; Ely, supra note 247, at 424-36, 440-
45. 
253. See Monaghan, supra note 98, at 129-30. 
254. If the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the entire Bill of Rights but 
does authorize a search for values outside the amendment itself, the only objection to 
going outside the Bill must be that th~ search lacks objective reference points, not that 
the text fails to authorize it. 
255. Raoul Berger is apparently willing to swallow them. See R. BERGER, supra note 
246. 
256. See Monaghan, supra note 98, at 129-30. 
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subjective - presents a more formidable challenge. 257 In his re-
cent Foreword, Professor Ely has unleashed a broadside attack on 
the fundamental value theorists, and for precisely these rea-
sons. 258 He argues that once the Court moves beyond the Carolene 
Products footnote conception of fostering values protective of 
powerless minorities, 259 no source of adequate standards exists for 
the discovery of fundamental values. Concerning many of the 
commonly invoked criteria for discovery offundamental values -
the judge's personal values,260 natural law,281 neutral principles,262 
"reason, " 263 and the idea of progress264 - I agree on all significant 
points with Professor Ely's conclusions that the subjectivity prob-
lem remains unresolved. With respect to those two sources of 
value that Professor Ely has more difficulty attacking - tradition 
and the social consensus - I am in significant, though not com-
plete, disagreement, for reasons that will become apparent very 
shortly. 
I am, of course, far from alone in attempting to find non-
subjective sources to invoke responsibly in fundamental-values 
adjudication. Several commentators who endorse such adjudica-
tion have made similar attempts, but their formulations some-
how fall short of the mark, often for the same reason: a felt need 
to defend the indefensible result in Roe v. Wade. For example, 
Professor Perry, one of the most diligent and determined advo-
cates of substantive due process adjudication, has argued that it 
has textual warrant and is justifiable as the performance of what 
Perry terms an "ethical function."265 The textual warrant is the 
due process clause itself,266 which was intended, according to 
Perry, to evolve over time287 and to require that legislation be 
related to the "public welfare."288 In order to determine what 
257. Here, of course, those who stake their lot with partial incorporation and no more 
are on safer ground, because incorporation doctrine at least has the virtue of imposing 
values that the framers intended to impose on some level of government. 
258. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 16-55. 
259. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. See note 44 supra. 
260. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 19-22. 
261. Id. at 22-32. 
262. Id. at 32-33. 
263. Id. at 33-39. 
264. Id. at 52-54. . 
265. See Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11. Professor Perry has further elabo-
rated his views in Substantive Due Process Kevisited: Reflections on ( and Beyond) Recent 
Cases, supra note 11. 
266. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11, at 699-706. 
267. Id. at 699, 713-19. 
268. Id. at 693-94. 
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constitutes the "public welfare" - and in particular the "public 
morals" portion of the "public welfare"269 - the court must eval-
uate the "conventional moral culture."270 This evaluation, con-
tends Perry, is what involves the Court in the ethical function of 
substantive due process adjudication, because a probe of the con-
ventional moral culture propels the Court into deciding whether 
particular private moral decisions are, in light of the evolving 
norms of society, properly regulatable by the legal manifestations 
of public morality.271 Thus, in Perry's view, the sources for ascer-
taining what is within and without the "public welfare" include 
informed public opinion and each Justice's own conscientious 
assessment of that opinion, the state of the moral culture, and the 
relationship of the claim to that culture.272 
The major difficulty with the Perry view273 is the tension built 
into it, and the unacceptably high risk of "error" which that 
tension creates. This tension operates between Perry's dynamic, 
open-ended Constitution, capable of growth to meet the needs of 
succeeding generations, and the rapidity -of social change that 
stimulates the cry for constitutional dynamism. That rapidity 
renders exceedingly difficult any meaningful conclusions about 
the "conventional moral culture." Views on abortion and homo-
sexuality, for example, have shifted dramatically in the past de-
cade, and continue to evolve. But the change has not proceeded 
uniformly, and judges can never confidently predict what the 
"conventional moral culture" will hold with respect to these is-
sues ten years from today. Moreover, in a nation spanning close 
to five million square miles and including over two hundred mil-
lion people, the "conventional moral culture" is likely to vary 
significantly from place to place274 and to vary as well among 
different groups within the same community. The Perry view 
thus puts the Court at terrible risk that it will misperceive the 
near future, no matter how "objective" its calculations may be 
269. Id. at 723-33. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 719-33. 
272. Id. at 729-31. The essence of the argument, however, turns out to be more 
"inner" than "outer" directed: "Ultimately, however, each individual Justice must map 
the relevant contours of conventional moral culture alone. Each Justice must ask whether 
particularized claims about that culture resonate with him or her." Id. at 730. 
273. The view is not his alone. See, e.g., Wellington, supra note 91, at 284. See also 
sources cited in Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 43 nn.166-67. 
274. Although Professor Perry does not provide clear signals on this point, he seems 
to conclude that national (not state or local) moral culture is what counts. Perry, Ethical 
Function, supra note 11, at 732 n.201. 
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at the moment of decision. For reasons I will explain in a moment, 
Perry is correct that support in conventional morality is a 
necessary condition for substantive due process activism on be-
half of unenumerated rights, but he goes astray in concluding 
that it is also a sufficient condition. 
In a recent essay,275 Professor Tushnet has espoused a view 
that is, on the matter of standards, yet a step closer to my own. 
He argues that two criteria should govern the establishment of 
substantive due process rights: (1) "general agreement on the 
social importance of that right, "276 and (2) "the settled weight of 
responsible opinion" .277 Tushnet's first criterion turns out to be 
not too distant from Perry's, although Tushnet adds the Mar-
shallian suggestion that "the relationship between the right and 
other constitutionally guaranteed rights"278 is a relevant, al-
though apparently not controlling, consideration. Tushnet's sec-
ond criterion, however, adds a useful dimension, because it offers 
some insurance against the unreasonable risks associated with 
Perry's analysis.279 Although Tushnet's attempt strikes me as 
moving in the right direction, it lacks adequate development and 
justification. Tushnet seems to argue that "almost any publicly 
disclosed standard will do"280 for substantive due process, so long 
as it does not unnecessarily sti.fle the opportunity for state experi-
mentation with new policies. Given the painful history of sub-
stantive due process adjudication, Tushnet's relaxed attitude 
about acceptable standards seems wholly unacceptable .. 
Tushnet's proposal is plagued further by the uncertainty of 
its implications for substantive constitutional adjudication. His 
primary target is the erratic evolution of the notion of "property" 
for purposes of triggering the procedural safeguards of the four-
teenth amendment.281 Though his theory seems broader in scope, 
he purports to be doing no more than providing a substitute for 
the Board of Regents u. Roth282 theory that the locus of property 
interests consists of expectations crystallized by the operation of 
275. Tushnet, supra note 11. 
276. Id. at 279. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. The Marshall reference is of course to the present Associate Justice and his 
Rodriguez dissent, and not to the 19th century Chief Justice. See note 98 supra, 
279. It does not, however, offer enough assurance, unless "settled" has roots reasona-
bly deep in time. See text at notes 304-14 infra. Moreover, the reference to "responsible 
opinion" is discomfortingly elitist. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 51. 
280. Tushnet, supra note 11, at 279. 
281. Id. at 261-77. 
282. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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state law.283 Tushnet may have chosen a useful weapon, but un-
less he defends it more carefully, his choice seems exceedingly 
disproportionate to his target. 284 
In my view, a single insight paves the way to an approach to 
unenumerated rights adjudication that maximizes its legitimacy 
and minimizes the risks of subjectivity and unauthorized coun-
termajoritarianism: the Constitution, whether or not its judicially 
enforceable provisions are (or were meant to be) open-ended and 
dynamic, is itself always open-ended. The framers ·saw to that in 
article V, which, as good schoolchildren know, explains how the 
document can be amended. Indeed, one of the most smugly as-
serted and rarely answered charges leveled periodically at four-
teen th amendment activism is that it involves the Court in 
amending the Constitution.285 This, of course, is one of the ways 
in which judicial work-product is dismissed as illegitimate and 
usurping, because those sanie· good schoolchildren will tell you 
that article V requires Congress or a state-inspired constitutional 
convention to propose amendments and st"ate legislatures to rat-
ify them. Justices of the United States Supreme Court are con-
spicuously omitted from any formal role in the process. 
The schoolchildren have certainly learned their lessons well, 
but here Professor Perry and I share a common rejoinder: An 
extraordinary national majority may oppose a law over many 
decades, but for reasons that dramatize the difference between a 
republic and a democracy, its members may fail to enshrine their 
opposition in the form of a statute or constitutional amend-
ment.288 On such occasions, the Court has a legitimate gap-filling 
283. See generally Monaghan, supra note 218, at 434-43; Van Alstyne, supra note 229. 
284. As discussed earlier, see text at notes 222-27 supra, analysis of both property and 
liberty have significantly different starting and ending places, depending on whether the 
constitutional claim is procedural or substantive. Professor Tushnet appears to miss this 
point, with the consequence that his arguments for more complete procedural protection 
for government-created benefits get unnecessarily bound up with, and bogged down by, 
his case for something he calls "substantive due process." Given his concern for the 
process of adjudicating claims, rather than the adequacy of the substantive ground ad-
vanced by the government to justify the deprivation, his label is what seems to be mis-
placed. 
285. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 246, at 1-3. 
286. See Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11, at 727-28. The failure to translate 
attitude into legal protection may stem from simple incognizance: many citizens might 
reasonably fail to perceive that what was once a minority position has quietly become 
quite popular indeed. More likely, inaction of this sort may be accounted for by a theory 
of political change that distinguishes between favorable attitude and self-interest. Suc-
cessful agitation (and its requisite money, organization, and political representation) for 
change is not likely to occur until mere sentiment for a change becomes a concrete 
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role to play. _Pieces of the nation's bedrock may lie chipped and 
broken in the gap, and the Court can mend them by performing 
a function akin to that performed in other contexts by the amend-
ing process - it can test the depth, over time, of the community's 
commitment to the inviolability and unique importance of cer-
tain values.287 This notion is hardly novel, although some of its 
theoretical trappings may be. It echoes ceaselessly across this 
century's constitutional law, from Holmes288 to Cardozo28u to 
Frankfurter290 to Harlan. 291 The words may change, but the search 
remains the same. It is for values deeply embedded in the society, 
values treasured by both past and present, values behind which 
the society and its legal system have unmistakably thrown their 
weight. Contemporary consensus, even if discoverable, is not 
enough, due to the risks canvassed above. 292 To protect against 
those risks and be confident that the value being insulated from 
government power is truly an "embedded" one, the Court must 
decide that the claim satisfies two related tests: 
1) Historically, American institutions must have recognized the 
liberty claim as one of paramount stature. 
"interest." Cf. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScOIT CASE 28 (1978): 
From time to time at the Constitutional Convention there had been confrontations 
between a slavery interest and an antislavery sentiment. The interest was concen-
trated, persistent, practical, and testily defensive. The sentiment tended to be 
diffuse, sporadic, moralistic and tentative . . . . 
In the day-to-day operations of government . . • interest would usually have 
the advantage over sentiment. 
Political scientists have made similar observations about modern pluralism and the pro-
cess of political change. See R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (Yale Studies in Political Science 
No. 4, 1961). And especially for some of the emotion-charged, value-tied claims that are 
presented to the Supreme Court under the substantive due process rubric, the intensity 
of self-interest may well be missing despite a highly favorable, long-standing national 
sentiment in favor of change. Sparse enforcement - such that most citizens feel safe from 
the law's prohibitions and penalties - often operates to undercut any development of the 
requisite interest. A program of vigorous investigation and prosecution of the crime of 
fornication between consenting unmarried adults would be a powerful incentive to eradi-
cation of the prohibition. See generally Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the 
Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 251 (1978). 
287. The time dimension suggested here distinguishes the proposed approach from 
the "continuing constitutional convention" image invoked and criticized by Berger. See 
R. BERGER, supra note 246, at 2-3 & n.5. 
288. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) ("fundamental principles as they 
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law") (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
289. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934) ("principles of justice so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"). 
290. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-30 (1949). 
291. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
292. See text at notes 273-74 supra. 
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2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a 
level of high priority. 
If a liberty claim satisfies both prongs of the inquiry, the 
Court should preclude any state interference with that liberty, 
absent extraordinary justification for permitting it. An approach 
of this sort does not endeavor to define the elusive "public wel-
fare" as does Perry's theory; nor does it attempt to project an 
unlimitable spectrum of human choices for protection as I think 
Professor Tribe's theories do.293 Rather, it is a deeply conservative 
and restrained theory of value discovery; it would not permit the 
Court to lead society's "progressive" forces against their more 
"reactionary" foes. Although it authorizes the Justices to do a 
small portion of the general citizenry's article V work, it recog-
nizes the extraordinary countermajoritarian qualities of that 
authority, and it accordingly counsels the Justices to do so only 
when a state invades the holy core of the American sanctuary of 
liberties. · 
Professor Ely's Foreword attacks any such approach to the 
value source problem on two grounds: 1) nonascertainability and 
2) general irrelevance to the task of individual rights adjudica-
tion. The latter point requires immediate response; if Ely is right 
on this score, no one need bother with a reply to the former. Ely's 
central thesis is that individual rights adjudication under the 
constitution exists primarily to ensure an open political process 
and to protect powerless minorities against abuses of that pro-
cess. 294 He concludes from that thesis that "it simply makes no 
sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehi-
cle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the ma-
293. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 889 ("preservation of 'those attributes of an 
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood' "). Professor Tribe, in a later section on 
"Sources of Protected Rights of Personhood," id. at 893-96, suggests a range of possible 
sources, carefully avoids coming to rest on any particular one, and ultimately seems to 
opt for an amalgam of approaches to the problem of judicial- discovery of the human 
essence. He does, however, posit a vision of the protection of enduring values. ("Nothing 
less [than wise reflection] will yield a language and structure for creating a future contin-
uous with and contiguous to the most humane designs of the past." Id. at 982-93.) Profes-
sors Wilkinson and White, in their article on Constitutional Protection for Personal 
Lifestyles, supra note 241, at 611-14, do not offer a governing standard at all. Rather, they 
suggest several reasons why "lifestyles" should be a judicial concern, including protection 
of "human dignity," protection of "powerless minorities," respect for pluralistic values, 
and partial coincidence with first amendment values. I am sympathetic to all of these 
ideas, yet I remain unconvinced that they offer a meaningful avenue of relief from either 
the countermajoritarian difficulty or the problem of subjectivity. 
294. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 5-15; see generally Ely, 37 Mn. L. REv. 451, 
supra note 9. 
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jority. ''295 He makes clear, moreover, his view that the value judg-
ments of "past majorities" ("tradition") are no more useful in 
this regard298 than those of present majorities ("consensus"), a 
secondary premise that seems to follow quite perfectly from the 
initial one. 
But just as Ely admits to being F .A. Hayek's "demago-
gue,"297 I am Ely's believer in nonsense. Ely is so intent on 
protecting minorities that he has forgotten the nature of the 
protective agency. For what is the Constitution itself, if not a 
collection of "[enduring] value judgments of the majority," in-
terpreted and applied by courts so as to be "the vehicle for pro-
tecting minorities from the [monetary] value judgments of 
the majority"?298 The entire body of the Constitution, amend-
ments and all, is a series of judgments by an extraordinary major-
ity that limit the power of future political majorities. 299 Require-
ments of political consensus are thus built in by the ratification 
requirements. Moreover, tradition played a vital role in the very 
creation of the Constitution. 300 The "value judgments of the ma-
jority" are not only a sensible source of protection of minorities; 
those judgments turn out, in the end, to be the only source of 
protection for minorities against the hostile passions of an occa-
sional, transient majority. 
Secondly, Ely's rejection of the "value judgments of the ma-
jority" as a source of rights fails to distinguish among national, 
statewide, and local majorities. The ratification of the fourteenth 
amendment itself stands as an act by the national majority to 
295. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 52 (emphasis original). 
296. Id. at 42-43. 
297. The reference is to Hayek's assertion that "[o]nly a demagogue can represent 
as 'antidemocratic' the limitations which long term decisions and the general principles 
held by the people impose upon the power of temporary majorities." Id. at 44 (citing F. 
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 181 (1960)). 
298. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 52. 
299. Professor Ely acknowledges this problem, Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 42-
43, but attempts to avoid it by reference to the open-endedness of the provisions under 
discussion. "Hone wanted to freeze a tradition," he says, "the sensible course would be 
to write it down." True, if one knew in advance which traditions might conceiuably come 
under siege. Various battles over the rights of Englishmen gave the framers some clues -
hence, a Bill of Rights in reasonably specific terms. But if one had the sense that, out of 
a range of important traditions, some would wither and others endure, and that the 
enduring ones would come under occasional attack by momentary (and usually local) 
majorities, one might well write an open-ended provision and expect the judges interpret-
ing it to take account of surviving traditions in doing so. 
300. The Bill of Rights surely was prompted in part by a developing tradition of 
liberty against government, a tradition sparked by the impositions of the English Crown 
upon the colonists. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). 
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limit the power of a state or municipal majority. If one reads Ely's 
italics with that idea in mind, his sentence runs "it simply makes 
no sense to employ the value judgments of [national] majorities 
as the vehicle for protecting [local] minorities from the value 
judgments of the [local] majority." If that is what Professor Ely 
means, then he thinks that judicial review under any substantive 
provision addressed to the states makes no sense. But we know 
he doesn't think that at all.301 Having focused so long on the 
Carolene Products footnote, Professor Ely's vision has gone off by 
a few diopters. While he correctly observes that the Constitution 
itself "concretizes" relatively few "value judgments"302 and per-
suasively theorizes that those portions of the document most 
often invoked in individual rights adjudication were designed to 
protect minorities and minority viewpoints, he has forgotten that 
such is not the document's total design, its exclusive result, or, 
most importantly, its originating force. 
Viewed with an eye toward the structure of the Constitution 
and the role its official interpreters have continuously envisioned 
for judges, tradition and community values cannot be irrelevant. 
We must therefore confront Professor Ely's other objection -
that the values deserving of protection are not objectively ascer-
tainable. Of course, when the values are expressed in an 
amendment, their underpinnings are usually well-understood, 
and the Court must do its best, in any event, to find them. More-
over, whenever the amendment process produces something, it 
has resolved conflicts and contradictions among traditional and 
contemporary values, and has done so by a politically complete 
expression of the popular will. By contrast, substantive due pro-
cess adjudication cannot be said to share those qualities of chan-
neled discoverability, value resolution, or national ratification. 
Its sources of value and legitimacy are elsewhere, and the 
"elsewhere" that I propose must measure up against Professor 
Ely's powerful criticisms.303 
(i) Historical recognition. The Moore plurality em-
braced this element of the test, 304 and it may be the more impor-
301. Indeed, Professor Ely is outspoken and eloquent in defense of an active judicial 
role of the sort suggested in the Carotene Products footnote. See, e.g., sources cited in note 
294 supra. 
302. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 42 n.160. 
303. Even Professor Ely concedes that nonascertainability can never be a completely 
dispositive objection on issues where close judgments must inevitably be made. Id. at 42 
(tradition), 49 (consensus). 
304. 431 U.S. at 503-06, (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.). Justice Powell's emphasis 
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tant of the two for circumscribing the growth of substantive due 
process. Far more effectively than a nebulous doctrine of privacy 
or autonomy that expands to include new rights every time a 
judge hears a claim that "resonates" within him, 305 a doctrine 
controlled by history resists rapid growth. There may, of course, 
be many ways in which history demonstrates recognition of a 
liberty as fundamental: a lengthy record of common or statutory 
law protecting the interest, 306 a conscious and purposeful tradition 
of nonregulation, 307 or strong currents of respect for the liberty by 
the "progenitors and architects of American institutions. "308 Each 
of these sources appears to be a tempting starting place for the 
search for historically embedded values. Professor Ely, however, 
asserts that the problems here are "obvious." The problems he 
mentions309 include those of cultural geography (whose tradi-
tion?), time (which era's tradition?), competing traditions (which 
one counts?), and level of generality (how big is a tradition?). The 
general invocation of "tradition" as a source of values does sug-
gest all of these problems. A difference exists, however, between 
a test that entails only a vague and general scrutiny of "tradi-
tions," such as Ely discusses, and one that demands a continuous 
on history has found expression in the opinions of other Justices as well, See 431 U.S. at 
507-10 (Brennan, J., concurring); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978); Carey 
v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); 431 U.S. at 708-09 (Powell, J,, concur-
ring); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251-53 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roe v, 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-41, 158 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-95 
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J,, 
dissenting); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534 (1925); Meyer v, Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J ., dissenting), 
305. Cf. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 265, at 730 ("each individual Justice 
must map the relevant contours of the conventional moral culture alone" and "ask 
whether particularized claims about that culture resonate with him or her."), 
306. See, e.g:, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977) (lengthy history of 
common law protection of liberty against excessive paddling). 
307. Concededly, evidence of this sort may not be so easy to discover. Nonregulation 
is presumably the product of indifference as often as it is the product of respect for the 
liberty at stake. At times, however, exemption from regulation may result from deeply 
held principles; for example, such a pattern might arise if some interested organization 
undertook to introduce, in several state legislatures, a series of bills aimed at forbidding 
parents from serving alcoholic beverages to their own minor children. Persistent rejection 
of them on grounds of family autonomy, especially if the rejections continued over time, 
would be useful evidence of historical recognition. 
308. The phrase belongs to Sanford Kadish. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in 
Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319,328 (1957), Profes-
sor Kadish limited his survey to problems of procedural fairness in criminal cases; conced-
edly, the opinions of the "architects" on such matters may be easier to discover than their 
opinions on the substantive liberty questions with which I am concerned. 
309. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 39-40. 
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and continuing historical momentum in favor of a liberty interest 
over any competing claims in society. I advocate the latter ap-
proach, and with my position so framed, I will respond to Ely's 
charges. 
Geography is easy - only our traditions are relevant. Evi-
dence of heightened respect for some threatened freedom in other 
nations, English-speaking or not, is simply makeweight. Without 
continuous support in American legal and social traditions, any 
claim that a value is fundamental in the American constitutional 
scheme lacks merit. We can learn from others' good ideas and 
cherished freedoms, but we are surely not bound by them. 
The question of time is only slightly more troublesome. The 
essence of the test of historical recognition is long-standing re-
spect for the liberty, up to and including the time of decision 
(when it becomes the test of contemporary values). Long-aban-
doned traditions are inadequate, even if recently resurrected. 
Exactly how far back the historical record must go to satisfy 
this part of the test is difficult to pin down. The length of 
historical support required to support the claim might vary with 
the intensity with which it is held, but, in any event, no less than 
a generation of special respect ought to suffice. A shorter period 
would run the risk associated with Professor Perry's view, and any 
requirement much longer than a generation would generate insuf-
ficient power to protect values that have truly achieved stable 
and continuous support. The suggestion in Rodriguez that states 
might have a constitutional duty to provide a minimum of public 
education310 - given the long-standing and deeply significant 
expectation that it will be provided - is consistent with the 
theory suggested here. Additional illustrations might ultimately 
emerge from the evolution of family law. A statute limiting 
grounds for divorce to adultery might run afoul of the "deeply 
embedded values" standard, 311 since most states have recognized 
the right to dissolve marriage on no-fault grounds, and that ex-
pectation has at least begun to sink deep roots into our social soil. 
Some cases will, of course, raise difficult issues of historical 
interpretation and value discovery. Hopefully, judges can assess, 
the historical strength of a claimed liberty with sufficient subtlety 
310. 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973). 
311. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (violation of due process for state 
to deny disolution of marriage because of inability to pay where state monopolizes means 
of dissolution). See generally Monograph No. 6, 4 FAM. L. REP. 4033 (1978) (as of Aug. 1, 
1978, only three states retain "fault only" grounds for divorce). 
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to take into account the texture of historical processes, such as 
major events in the life of a nation, or temporary periods of set-
backs for a particular value, sandwiched between lengthy periods 
of respect for it. 
The problems of competing traditions and levels of generality 
raised by Professor Ely can be analyzed from a similar perspec-
tive. Within the paradigm I have espoused, the ju'dge is free nei-
ther to select one personally favorite tradition out of many, nor 
to redefine the history of liberty in a way that produces a desired 
result. At times the common law may provide a useful reference 
point in resolving competing claims of tradition and in defining 
the level of specificity at which a claim has adequate historical 
support.312 Some claims, however, will not present precise com-
mon law analogues. A legislative prohibition, for example, of the 
use of "cloning" techniques for human reproduction would, if 
attacked on substantive due process grounds, raise the sort of 
problems with which Professor Ely is concerned. Is the claim 
supported by a "deeply embedded value" of autonomy in repro-
ductive decisions? Or (and this would be my view), is that formu-
lation of the value both too general, and too hostile to competing 
sensitivities, to cope adequately with a wholly new reproductive 
capability, which might well be stimulating a general social 
abhorrence? In light of the essentially conservative premises un-
derlying the "embedded values" notion, care must be taken to 
define "preferred liberty" at a level general enough to capture all 
of its historical essence, yet specific enough to resist open-ended 
growth that is likely to outdistance the social commitment upon 
which the liberty rests. 
Thus, as I have proposed it, the historical test rejects both a 
fully "closed" and a fully "dynamic" view of the substantive 
content of the fourteenth amendment. If applied as intended, it 
prevents the Court from latching on prematurely to social trends 
and thereby too hastily freezing the power of the political pro-
cesses to respond to them. This, I fear, is an accurate description 
of Roe v. Wade, where the Court, in an effort to justify its conclu-
sions by historical analysis, overlooked the powerful trend of the 
past one hundred years to proscribe most abortions.313 
312. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See note 222 supra. 
313. See generally Destro, supra note 90, at 1273-82. Destro argues further that Roe's 
analysis of early English common law, construing it to recognize abortion as common law 
right (410 U.S. at 135-36) is flawed. Id. at 1267-73. 
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The historical test also explains, in light of persistent 
prohibitions on consensual adult homosexuality, the affirmance 
(though not necessarily the failure to justify it) in Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney.314 If, on the other hand, the great bulk of 
states decriminalize homosexuality, the Court might be justified 
some years later in overruling that case and adding a new compo-
nent to preferred liberty. It is the deep and continuous social 
embrace with a value, and not its importance to the individual, 
that brings it special stature. 
(ii) Contemporary values. Incorporation of contempo-
rary values into a fundamental liberty test presents some difficul-
ties. On the one hand, consensus is a necessary component of any 
theory of constitutional adjudication in support of unenumerated 
values.315 Without more pointed textual warrant to support judi-
cial intervention, some element of popular sovereignty appears 
essential to the legitimacy of the process. 316 In contrast, however, 
to the ordinary research and analysis designed to discover respect 
for a particular liberty by legal institutions, social consensus is 
difficult to measure, especially on a nationwide basis. Moreover, 
I do not differ here with Professor Ely's observation that the 
opinions of lawyers, judges, and "experts" alone are insuffi-
cient.317 If the Court is "amending," substantial support in the 
hearts and minds of the entire populace, not only of a professional 
elite, is a prerequisite. The Court's handling of that inquiry in 
this decade's capital punishment cases318 suggests the hazards of 
evaluating contemporary values in this fashion. Finally, the very 
314. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); affg. mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge 
court). 
315. The Justices have on occasion embraced this approach, but not without greater 
trepidation than in the case of inquiry into traditional values. If "weight of authority" 
counts for anything here, I am afraid my side of the scale comes up a bit light. For dicta 
apparently approving a consensus standard, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 519 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); 410 U.S. at 174 (1973); Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But see Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) ("Constitutional questions 
••• are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion .... "). 1 
316. See note 273 supra. 
317. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 37-39. 
318. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
408 U.S. at 332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring). Ironically, it is with respect to the eighth 
amendment that "community standards" had seemed most acceptable. See Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."). 
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law under attack is always at least some evidence that contempo-
rary social values do not overwhelmingly predominate in favor of 
the proposed liberty interest. 319 In a nation as demographically 
diverse as this one, the favorite freedom of northern California 
may be shocking sin to those in the Bible Belt. 
These obstacles do not necessarily render contemporary so-
cial values irrelevant to substantive adjudication ·under the due 
process clause. They do, however, counsel great caution and re-
straint in applying this portion of the test. A court should not 
sweep under the closest rug obvious and deep divisions of opinion 
on the value in question; when significant numbers stand deeply 
opposed on moral grounds to a particular practice, the contempo-
rary respect for those who engage in it can hardly be called 
"deeply embedded. "320 
Acceptable sources of data on contemporary value consensus 
are, concededly, difficult to pinpoint. Federal legislation - if 
recent and closely on point - helps, since it reflects the views of 
a national majority321 (though, admittedly, not necessarily an ex-
traordinary one). But here too, caution is required, since Congress 
can readily repeal the legislation if values suddenly shift, while 
the Court will not likely overrule its own pronouncement of a 
"fundamental value." A widespread pattern of state legislation in 
support of the liberty is also relevant; although many legislators 
may be lawyers, they can still roughly reflect the perceived popu-
lar will. The work of social science may also buttress - but not 
replace - other indicators that a particular value possesses wide-
spread and powerful social support. · 
At the extreme, isolating contemporary moral values is not 
overly difficult. Can a reasonable mind dou.bt that a general con-
sensus exists concerning government interference with the choice 
of contraception by a married couple? Or, to propose a doomed 
case, that freedom to smoke marijuana has not even reached the 
threshold level of widespread social respect, much less the level 
of "deeply embedded values"? For the hard cases, the available 
data may admit of no simple conclusion. Lack of easy answers, 
319. -Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11, at 724. But cf. id. at 727 (some laws have 
been "on the books for so long that [they] no longer reflect contemporary moral culture," 
citing the Connecticut prohibition on contraceptive use as an example). 
320. For example, Roe v. Wade cannot possibly be justified on the basis of a deeply 
embedded contemporary or historical value. 
321. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1183-93 
(1977), for a refined discussion of reliance upon congressional action as a source of consti-
tutional norms. 
,, 
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however, provides no excuse for failure to search for guideposts, 
in both legal and extralegal sources. Of course, the test does not 
require a demonstration of social unanimity; not even the official 
amendment process imposes such an insuperable obstacle. But 
serious and legitimate doubt about social values should counsel 
rejection of the claim or, at the least, imposition of a requirement 
that the historical hurdle of this steeplechase be cleared with 
extraordinary room to spare. 
Finally, the question of judicial competence to discover con-
temporary values deserves a word. Professor Ely argues that legis-
lative competence to translate existing social, moral, and politi-
cal values into law substantially exceeds judicial capability to 
perform a similar task. 322 Once again, his failure to distinguish 
national from state government is crucial. If the search for funda-
mental values embodied in the fourteenth amendment is one for 
national values, can a single state legislature really uncover them 
as well as a supreme national court? Presumably, the national 
legislature is in the best position to make the required assess-
ment, but, as a general matter, it frequently refuses to accept th~ 
assignment. 323 Modern theories of judicial notice - that courts 
are free to notice "legislative facts" when it is convenient, so long 
as the parties are notified and given opportunities to rebut324 -
provide further support for the claim of competence offered here. 
Ongoing public or scholarly doubts concerning competence sug-
gest, moreover, the critical importance of full judicial disclosure 
of the controlling standards for this sort of adjudication. To the 
extent a court must passively rely on party control over and provi-
sion of data, its competence will in part be a function of the 
clarity with which parties can discern and address the relevant 
issues. 
322. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 49-50. 
323. It might superficially appear that many of the substantive areas with which the 
fundamental rights cases tend to be concerned fall outside the delegation of powers in art. 
I, § 8 and are therefore beyond congressional reach. That view ignores, however, the broad 
power to spend on behalf of congressionally determined national priorities. Presumably, 
Congress might exercise such powers in favor of research, grants to states, and federal 
entitlements - witness, for example, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram (42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976)) requirement that children live with specified relatives 
to be eligible, and the recent national concern to secure enforcement of child support by 
absent parents. (See Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-647, § lOl(c), 88 Stat. 2359 (1975) (amendipg42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a), 603,606 (1976)). 
324. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 310 (3d ed. 1972); see also Kadish, supra 
note 308, at 358-61. 
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The test of deeply embedded valuee thus demands indepen-
dent satisfaction of inquiries into historical and modern concep-
tions of the spheres of liberty from which goverm;nent is presump-
tively excluded. Although each is at times a problematic inquiry, 
the difficulties of application are partially offset by the stringency 
of a two-level inquiry. If, for example, the relevant history was 
checkered with shifting or conflicting trends, the availability of 
the contemporary facet of the test would temper any tendency to 
resolve the historical question dishonestly. In that sense, a two-
pronged standard offers internal checks, balances, and restraints 
that no single criterion can supply; a narrow survival of the claim 
on one inquiry cannot, by itself, tip the balance in the activist 
direction. Because a "no" response to either of the questions de-
mands rejection of the claim, opinions exploring the outer bound-
aries of both requirements should appear only when the Court 
announces the discovery of a new preferred liberty. 325 That form 
of restraint, in and of itself, should reduce some of the controver-
sial and necessarily speculative judgments the test might other-
wise demand. 
Although the test would not completely answer the charge of 
judicial revision of the Constitution, it would place a check on 
fully open-ended dynamism in fourteenth amendment adjudica-
tion and simultaneously permit creative continuity in the devel-
opment of substantive due process doctrine. Given the controver-
sial history of substantive due process, the dual standard, with 
its built-in forces of restraint, authorizes judicial intervention in 
cases of extreme and aberrational departures from tradition in 
matters of intense moral concern, yet at the same time leaves 
ample room for legislatures to respond to new problems of legiti-
mate public concern in any manner that does not threaten so-
ciety's deepest values. Moreover, the proposed standard properly 
avoids the delicate task of justifying regulation of private morals 
and so-called victimless crimes; to the extent such matters have 
been historically and continuously regulated by American legisla-
tures, substantive due process doctrine would leave them un-
touched. 
325. If the Court has decided to reject the preferred liberty claim on either ground of 
the proposed standard, ordinacy restraint concepts should operate to preclude any discus-
sion of the other ground. Cf. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (Court 
need not decide if academic dismissal from medical school implicates liberty or property 
interests because procedural due process requirements do not attach to academic determi-
nations). 
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2. The Standard Applied - Moore Reconsidered 
The conclusions reached by the plurality opinion in Moore326 
would survive the scrutiny proposed here. In essence, the claimed 
interest in Moore - freedom to structure a household with var-
ious relatives - is freedom to seek human intimacy. To share 
common living space is to create the potential for both physical 
and emotional closeness. The opportunity to develop intimacy 
with others, furthermore, touches deep currents of personality. 
Intimacy is the means through which we invest feeling in others. 
Closeness permits emotional self-expression, feelings of caring 
and being cared for, sexual fulfillment, and the grief and sense 
of loss that death or other terminations of the relationship may 
bring. Less positive, but no less inherent in intimacy, are the 
darker emotions - fear, hate, envy. Of course, intimacy can be 
developed without cohabitation, and conversely, common living 
quarters do not guarantee significant emotional investment. Nev-
ertheless, there can be little doubt that a shared household im-
measurably enhances the opportunity for intimacy. 
Yet the Court in Moore did not equate shared living space 
with intimacy opportunities. Rather, the opinions stressed eco-
nomic necessity, the intergenerational transmission of family val-
ues, 327 and the prevalence of extended family households among 
racial and ethnic minorities.328 Notwithstanding the discomfort 
and likely self-consciousness that might have accompanied more 
explicit discussion of the emotional needs satisfied by living part-
ners, greater attention to emotional satisfaction would have high-
lighted both the problems in, and reasons for distinguishing 
Moore from, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. 329 The Belle Terre 
decision upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited groups of 
three or more individuals, unrelated by blood or marriage, from 
sharing a single-family residence. The Court's emphasis on fam-
ily patterns in Moore (a difference from Belle Terre) diverted 
attention from the common element of the cases: potential satis-
faction of deep human needs. · 
Families, whether extended or nuclear, do not generate 
"need satisfaction" in and of themselves. As a mechanism for 
pursuing such satisfaction, however, the social consensus prefers 
326. See text at notes 154-203 supra. 
327. 431 U.S. at 503-05 (plurality opinion). 
328. 431 U.S. at 508-10 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
329. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
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family groups. More significantly, in light of the historical prong 
of my standard for detecting preferred liberties, common and 
statutory law have for many years reinforced ~he special rights 
and responsibilities created by family ties. Even the most cursory 
consideration of this tradition calls to mind the presumption of 
parental fitness as a child custodian, 330 obligations of financial 
support, 331 recognition of those obligations in various tax codes, 332 
rights of parental control in childrearing, 333 intrafamily tort im-
munity, 334 the testimonial privilege of husband and wif'e,335 
family-based statutory rights to inherit, 336 and family relationship 
requirements in various income maintenance schemes.337 Govern-
ment has not seen fit to bestow such privileged treatment upon 
groups of unrelated adults sharing a household. The Court in 
Moore and Belle Terre was thus not distinguishing between alter-
native goals of human liberty - the claimants in both cases 
might have sought intimacy, as well as convenience, through co-
habitation. The distinction that led to a "fundamental liberty 
interest" in Moore alone lay in the methods for pursuing that goal 
- Inez Moore chose one long sanctioned by legal institutions, 
while Bruce Boraas and his friends did not. 
That distinction may initially seem unappealing at best, or 
downright censorial and oppressive at worst. Communal living 
arrangements are experiments in human liberty, in the tradition 
of Brook Farm, and may well offer extraordinary possibilities for 
beneficial human development and interaction. To the extent 
their occupants are otherwise law-abiding, such arrangements 
present no threat of concrete social harm. Akin to other uncon-
ventional lifestyle choices, their only sin is that they may arouse 
330. See, e.g., Ju.. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 3, § 132 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch, 119, § 1 
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975). 
331. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 32 (McKinney 1977), These duties are not 
necessarily restricted to nuclear family relationships. See, e.g., N.J. STAT, ANN. § 44:l• 
140 (West 1977); see generally 41 AM. JUR. Parent & Child§§ 6-7 (1938); 67 C.J.S. Parent 
& Child §§ 17, 24 (1955). 
332. I.R.C. § 151 (b), (e). 
333. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); see also MASS, ANN. LAWS 
ch. 119, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op 1975). 
334. See generally J. HENDERSON & R. PEARsoN, THE TORTS PROCESS 519-21 (1975) 
(noting the immunity doctrine and discussing departures from it). 
335. See generally McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 161-74 (2d ed. 
1972), and authorities cited therein. 
336. This pattern is hardly a novel one in Anglo-American law.See Statute of Distri-
bution, 22 & 23 Car. II, c.10 (1670); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 2-101 to -109 (4th ed. 1975), 
337. To be categorically eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, a child 
must live with at least one specified relative. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1976). 
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fantasies and fears of socially unacceptable behavior in the minds 
of nosy neighbors. 
Nevertheless, constitutionally adequate reason exists for a 
community to prohibit such living arrangements when they lack 
the connective tissue of the family relationship. Both historical 
and modern social experience validate the judgment, albeit a 
somewhat gross one, that households composed of unrelated 
adults are likely to be more transitory than family units, 338 ex-
tended or not. Those with family ties to children are perhaps 
more likely to assume responsibly the burdens of child care. 
Moreover, in a society where the marital relationship remains the 
only legally accepted outlet for sexuality, adults in a nonfamily 
household, freed of the incest taboo that checks intra-household 
sexuality in the extended family, are the more likely group to 
offend the common morality by their sexual practices.339 
To be sure, all of the above distinctions are by no means 
absolutes or universal truths. More troubling still, to permit such 
considerations - some might say prejudices - to serve as an 
obstacle to significant social change is to risk social stagnation. 
On balance, however, I think these considerations are adequate, 
for several reasons. First, some communities will tolerate alterna-
tive lifestyles. The nation as a whole thus does not lose the bene-
fits of experimentation. Second, for a community devoted to pre-
serving stability and morality, there exists no palatable alterna-
tive to bright-line distinctions between families and other groups. 
No system of individualized hearings could adequately predict 
which living units present substantial risks of community harm, 
nor could any such system avoid outrageous intrusiveness in 
gathering its information. Finally, it has been a constant tenet of 
American constitutional tradition that, outside the realms of 
thought, expression, religion and conscience, the political agen-
cies of the community may define the limits of acceptable human 
enterprise. Belle Terre is consistent with that tradition.340 Moore, 
then, represents a limited inroad upon it, based on a premise that 
the family is the historically and culturally preferred means for 
338. See R. KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY 182 (1972) (membership in many 
modem communes "is rarely the same for long"). 
339. See id. at 185; see also W. KEPHART, THE FAMILY, SoCIBrY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
121-41 (1977), reprinted in J. AREEN, FAMILY LAw 713-25 (1978) (discussion of sexual 
practices in the Oneida Community, and public response thereto). 
340. For an argument that communal life· styles deserve constitutional protection 
against, inter alia, hostile zoning regulations, see Comment, All in the "Family": Legal 
Problems of Communes, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (1972). 
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satisfying certain legitimate human needs. 
Viewed in that light, Moore is eminently more defensible as 
a preferred liberty case than is Roe v. Wade. FreE!dom to structure 
an extended family arrives at the Court with substantially more 
historical and cultural support than freedom to terminate preg-
nancy. That the Court was more divided in Moore than Roe may 
reflect a judgment by some members of the Court that the liberty 
interest in Moore was not of deep significance. Such a judgment, 
tested against the appropriate standards, is erroneous. 
This argument does not imply that Professor Ely errs when 
he claims that notions of consensus or enduring tradition can be 
manipulated to almost any conclusion.341 Of course they can, just 
as any broad legal concept can be so manipulated. But that in-
sight does not counsel wholesale rejection of broad concepts, in-
cluding those particular broad concepts for which Professor Ely 
frequently expresses fondness. 342 Rather, the insight requires 
judges to be intellectually fit and honest, to understand the temp-
tations to manipulate, and to appreciate the need to resist the 
temptations. Of course judges are only "human", but I would 
rather build a constitutional jurisprudence that assumes and 
demands their best than one that expects their worst. 343 
B. The Single Meaning of Equality 
"What," asked Kenneth Karst in the opening sentence of his 
Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, "is the substance 
of substantive equal protection?"344 His essay proceeded to de-
velop his answer: a guarantee of "equal citizenship." I would 
answer rather differently. Equal protection has no "substance" in 
the sense in which I have employed the term. Equal protection 
has a singular concern, and although "equal citizenship" may 
follow from judicial respect for that concern, Professor Karat's 
intensely substantive focus tends to mislead. The strand-tangling 
in the fourteenth amendment led, understandably and inexora-
bly, to the question framed by Professor Karst. In what follows, I 
341. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 40-41, 49. 
342. Professor Ely apparently is not troubled by the breadth of the concepts of 
"discreteness," "insularity," and "minority," see note 348 infra and accompanying text, 
as used in the Carolene Products footnote. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 5-15; Ely, 37 
Mo. L. REV., supra note 9, at 454-56; Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial 
Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723, 729 (1974); Ely, supra note 88, at 933-35. 
343. Cf. Ely, supra note 247, at 403. ("I hope we shall always judge judges in part by 
their capacity to resist personal sympathy with the principle expressed.") 
344. Karst, supra note 121. 
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hope to demonstrate that equal protection thinking can be alto-
gether shorn of libertarian substance within an analytic frame-
work that enhances clarity and comprehensibility, while avoiding 
all damage to the basic structure of modem constitutional law. 
1. The Limited Choice of Imperatives 
If the original purpose of a constitutional provision is neither 
hopelessly obscure nor irretrievably lost, 345 judicial elaboration of 
it is properly limited to its framers' concerns and their twentieth-
century counterparts. The fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion clause (and its unwritten fifth amendment analogue) has 
ascertainable roots. Given its motivating force and linguistic 
form, the clause points to judicial protection against certain lim-
ited kinds of "class legislation" and it points no further. Hence, 
the equality strand concerns only "suspect classifications." 
But even at that level of analysis, critical choices remain. 
The notion of "suspect classifications" has wavered between two 
imperatives that reinforce one another in some instances and 
compete in others: the "process imperative" and the "moral im-
perative." A struggle between the two has marked the last decade 
of equal protection adjudication, and the constitutional resolu-
tion of the reverse discrimination question and many others may 
ride on the ultimate choice of a victor. I will explain; fortunately, 
my purpose in this Article does not force me to choose. 
Agonizingly for anyone who must choose, both options are 
wholly reasonable inferences from the objective of those who 
wrote and ratified the clause - to constitutionalize a prohibition 
of state laws that explicitly disadvantage black people in the 
exercise of civil rights.346 The "equal protection" language is of 
345. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452, 463 
(1978). 
346. See generally Karst, supra note 121, at 11-21; J. TENBROEK, THE ANTlsLAVERY 
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951). "Civil rights" are of course not self-
defining, and a substantial portion of the past century's controversy has revolved around 
the content of the "civil rights" concept. The narrowest view is that it includes no more 
than the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, see R. BERGER, supra note 246, 
or perhaps the 1866 statutory rights and those closely related by analogy, see Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 365-69 (1879). The infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), took a narrow view of the civil rights protected by the__fourteenth amendment, 
while Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), clearly embraced the broad, modem 
view that any and all state-sponsored racial separation stigmatized nonwhites and, di-
rectly or indirectly, denied or impeded their exercise of civil rights. The "civil rights" 
concept is thus "open-ended"; its beneficiaries, however, and the purposes of constitution-
ally protecting them, may not be quite so open. See text at notes 347-50 infra. 
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course not so limited, and it is the uncertain import of the lan-
guage chosen that has generated the difficulty. Each option seeks 
to reconcile the clause's historical objectives ~nd its sweeping 
language, yet the two theories are, at times, antagonistic. 
The "process imperative" finds much of its judicial heritage 
in the Carolene Products footnote. 347 The footnote suggests that 
certain forms of prejudice may impede the operation of an other-
wise fair pluralist democracy, and that the Court may be autho-
rized by the Constitution to protect "discrete and insular minor-
ities" against systematic operation of prejudice transformed 
into law. The process imperative, of course, raises its own 
special brand of questions - what constitutes "discreteness" or 
"insularity" of a minority,348 whether a "minority" is to be identi-
fied in purely numerical terms, 349 whether a Court animated by 
the process imperative is free to probe the actual workings of the 
political process,350 and so forth. At its core, however, the impera-
tive makes no moral judgments other than about the occasional 
immorality of democracy. 
The "moral imperative" is concerned primarily with the 
qualities of the classification, not with the process that classifies. 
It looks back to the framers' objectives and derives from them a 
moral standard, such as "race should be irrelevant to governmen-
tal action," or "it is immoral to disfavor someone on the basis of 
immutable characteristics (or group membership, or some similar 
concept)."351 The elder Justice Harlan's famous dictum about the 
347. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4: "Nor need we enquire .•. whether prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 
348. "It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a laWYer to find 'insular and 
discrete' minorities at every tum in the road." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 
(1973) (Rehµquist, J., dissenting). 
349. This is a problem in the gender discrimination cases. See Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (plurality opinion) (arguing that, despite the numerical 
superiority of females over males, the former are "vastly underrepresented in this Nation's 
decision-making councils." 411 U.S. at 685 n.5). 
350. This question has led to the interminable struggle over the extent to which 
courts are free to look behind facially neutral government decisions in search of impermis-
sible animating prejudices. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977). For an excellent collection of essays on the Arlington Heights problem, 
see Colloquium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978), For further 
discussion and refinement of the Carolene Products process-prejudice framework, see Ely, 
supra note 342, at 729-36. See also Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 
M1cH. L. REv. 629 (1970). 
351. For presentations of this view, see Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on 
Equal Protection and Due Process. 63 VA. L. REv. 383, 401-02 (1977); Ginsburg, Gender 
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inability of the Constitution to distinguish among various hues -
"Our Constitution is colorblind"352 - was perhaps the earliest 
judicial statement of one form of the moral imperative. As one 
might suspect, formulating a precise and universally acceptable 
moral imperative is no easy task. Indeed, the qualifications that 
any form immediately provokes suggest that the moral approach 
to equal protection is as problem-laden as the process approach.353 
The exact form of the moral imperative, however, is unimportant 
for my purpose. What is important is to distinguish it from the 
process imperative, and to realize that the process imperative 
speaks from democratic political theory, while the moral impera-
tive speaks from a vision of constitutional norms of justice. 
During the early years of equal protection adjudication, 
courts failed to perceive the gap between the imperatives. Cases 
involving discrimination on the basis of race354 and national ori-
gin355 provided no occasion for such perception, because that type 
in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REv. 1; Kaplan, Equal 
Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of Special 
Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 363 (1966). Professor Karst's Foreword, supra note 121, at 
22-24, argues in part from the moral imperative, but acknowledges the process imperative 
as well, id. at 24-26; Karst concludes that the equal citizenship principle, which he cham-
pions, derives from a combination of both imperatives: "[T]he degree of suspectness of 
a classification is chiefly determined by the degree to which the classification interferes 
with the interest in being treated as a person who belongs to the society as a respected, 
responsible, and participating member." Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
352. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
353. The game of qualifications is easy: 
1) Race should be irrelevant to government actions ( except for remedial purposes; 
that is, except when courts, or perhaps legislatures, or perhaps bureaucracies, or perhaps 
even local school boards, make "findings" of past racial discrimination. . . . The list of 
"remedial" purposes is practically ·endless). 
2) Immutable characteristics should not form the basis of legislative classifications 
( except when necessary, such as strength or intelligence for job performance purposes, or 
even race or gender if role-modeling is important, and so forth). 
3) Persons should not be singled out for disfavored treatment on the basis of charac-
teristics over which they have no control and for which they are not responsible ( except 
strength and intelligence as in proposition two above, and except many families in cities 
subject to desegregation plans, see proposition one, above. Again, the exceptions appear 
to engulf the rule). 
Perhaps all these examples reveal is that the moral imperative is rarely an 
"imperative" at all. Even when a form of it suggests values we usually expect government 
to respect, the complexity of our history, society, and collective aspirations eventually 
transform all the moral imperatives into no more than "weights" in a complex calculus 
of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, the weighing process begins with a search for norms, 
and if describing this approach to equal protection as the "moral imperative" is a bit 
simplistic, it at least forces the analysis into proper normative terms. 
354. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
355. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 124 (1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886). 
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of discrimination is "suspect" under either imperative. The gen-
eral requirement of rationality of classification is similarly a func-
tion of both, although it leans toward the moral imperative. 356 The 
alienage and illegitimacy cases did not seriously threaten the 
unspoken duality of imperatives, because they too raised respect-
able claims under either.357 Cases involving de facto wealth dis-
crimination began to generate anxiety, because those claims fell 
uneasily within either imperative; the group was not so "discrete 
and insular" as some others for "process" purposes, and the possi-
bility of "free will" entry into and exit from the class raised in-
tractable dilemmas for earlier forms of the moral imperative.3"s 
The real crunch arrived, however, in a pair of explosive social 
and political controversies - the issues of gender equality and so-
called "reverse discrimination." They highlight perfectly the con-
flict between the imperatives. Is racial preference for nonwhites 
in graduate school admissions unconstitutional, since it allows 
356. The requirement that classifications rationally further a legitimate state purpose 
helps - but not much - to shield minorities from thoroughly arbitrary impositions on 
their interests and is a watered-down form of the moral imperative (inequalities cannot 
be premised on attributes wholly irrelevant to legitimate governmental purposes). The 
precise relationship of the varying forms and intensities of rationality requirements to the 
starker outline presented in the amendment's text is beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally Gunther, supra note 98. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 56; Note, 
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). For a 
powerful argument that courts are poorly equipped to engage in any sort of rationality 
review, see Linde, supra note 230. 
357. Both aliens and illegitimates have, as classes, been historically saddled with civil 
disabilities, and both groups have been the subject of prejudice and stereotyping by 
legislatures. For instance, aliens have historically been excluded on a de jure basis from 
political participation, and illegitimates are disproportionately represented among the 
poor and nonwhite. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) 
(illegitimates); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (aliens are a "discrete and 
insular minority"). Under at least some forms of the moral imperative, moreover, both 
aliens and children born out of wedlock are appropriate candidates for "suspect classifica-
tion" treatment. In particular, both illegitimates and recently-arrived aliens fall within 
statuses for which their parents, if anyone, are responsible. Of late, however, the court 
has seemed unsure of what any of this should mean for constitutional adjudication. 
Compare Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S.Ct. 518 (1978), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); 
compare Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), with Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 
(1973). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (minimal scrutiny for illegitimacy 
classification involving aliens). Age discrimination cases have implicitly embraced a pro-
cess imperative only. See Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Although age is immutable, and mandatory 
retirement may be stigmatizing, the Court has consistently applied restrained review 
standards. 
358. For a discussion of the problems of treating wealth as a suspect classification 
under either approach, see sources cited in note 66 supra. See also Wilkinson, The Su-
preme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional 
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 978-84 (1975). 
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skin color to control access to a scarce good, thereby offending the 
moral imperative?359 Or is it acceptable, since its "victims" are 
well-represented in the decision-making processes~360 Similarly, 
are all gender classifications "suspect" because they violate some 
formulation of the moral imperative?361 Or should classifications 
that disfavor males be of no judicial concern, because males are 
surely protected by the political processes?362 
Although· the Burger Court has reached no agreement on 
these questions, 363 answers have been suggested and ably de-
fended elsewhere,364 and I raise them here simply to make one 
point: while both imperatives are legitimate inferences from the 
objectives of those who framed the equal protection clause, any 
movement away from the "suspect class" notion that underlies 
both of them lacks such inferential support. Regrettably, the 
whole equal protection enterprise has been complicated by an 
initial insistence that the "suspect class" decision was all-or-
nothing, and by a subseque:q.t nimble retreat to a half-way house 
of "intermediate" review standards365 for classifications ap-
359. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.). 
360. See Ely, supra note 342. The Bakke problem has immense complexities; the 
statements in the text are painted from opposite poles, and fail to do justice to the subtlety 
of the issues raised. Among other things, the statements in the text ignore the possibility 
that certain forms of "benign discrimination" might overcome the presumption of uncon-
stitutionality that could attach under the moral imperative. For general discussion, see, 
in addition to Professor Ely's article, Kaplan, supra note 351; Posner, The DeFunis Case 
and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. 
REv. 1; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and 
the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653 (1975); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of 
"Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 559 (1975); : 
Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 995 (1974); . 
O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REv. 925 
(1974). 
361. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) 
(sex characteristic is immutable and "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform 
or contribute to society"). 
362. See, e.g., Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 9, 12; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
218-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
363. Bakke might have done it, but in the end did not, primarily because four of the 
Justices (Burger, Stewart, Reh)lquist, and Stevens) rested their judgment on Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and expressly reserved judgment on whether or not Title VI 
swept more broadly than the Constitution. 438 U.S. at 408, 417-18. In other words, those 
four Justices read Title VI to embody the moral imperative, without deciding whether the 
fourteenth amendment does likewise. 
364. On the racial preference questions, see the commentary cited in note 360 supra. 
On the gender classification problem, see generally Ginsburg, note 351 supra; Note, Do 
We Need an Equal Rights Amendment, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499 (1971). See also Wasser-
strom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 
UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977). 
365. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender classifications, to 
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proaching, but not quite reaching, the core of either imperative. 
The field remains in some disarray, and lately signs of continued 
uncertainty have been glowing brightly.366 Nevertheless, the 
Burger Court's overall equal protection performance, despite its 
substantive rhetoric, 367 has been generally consistent with a trend 
of disentanglement. Equal protection advances have come at the 
frontier of suspect class doctrine, 358 and even the Court's most 
notable equal protection "retreat," in the school finance case, 369 
marked an obvious withdrawal from the mistaken substantive 
equal protection methodology. 
2. Reanalyzing Substantive Equal Protection 
While recent developments may thus display tentative 
movement toward untangling the strands of the fourteenth 
amendment, it remains theoretically unsound to attribute the 
previous decade's substantive fourteenth amendment develop-
ments to the equality strand. It is correspondingly unsound for 
the Court to write of that strand as if it could legitimately lay 
claim to that case law. The former vice misleads as to the legiti-
macy and proper scope of decisional law; the latter makes prom-
ises of equality-centered activism that should not, and probably 
will not, be kept. Those equal protection cases that relied, in 
whoie or in part, on factors other than the classification imposed 
by the challenged scheme need reanalysis. The central cases con-
cerned rights of interstate movement and rights of political par-
ticipation. 370 
a. Durational residency requirements and the right to 
satisfy the equal protection clause, must be "substantially related to achievement of 
[important governmental] objectives.") Compare Craig with the opinions in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), that, taken together, formed the majority supporting 
invalidation. 
366. See the cases cited in note 357 supra. 
367. See the discussion of Maher u. Roe, text at notes 105-21 supra. 
368. See discussion of the Burger Court era, text at notes 82-104 supra. 
369. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 
370. Although those cases involving claims by indigent criminal defendants to state 
subsidization of the costs of pursuing appellate relief can be characterized as a portion of 
"substantive equal protection", their procedural setting, their open acknowledgment of 
due process clause roots, see, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) and 372 
U.S. at 363 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and their recent drift away from equality-centered 
analysis, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), 
differentiate them from the more tangled rights of interstate travel and political participa-
tion. The right to appellate process has become based on due process in fact and methodol-
ogy. 
April 1979] Untangling the Strands 1061 
travel. As noted earlier, Shapiro v. Thompson311 was both a cap-
stone to the Warren Court's egalitarian efforts and a glaring sym-
bol of equal protection hyperactivity. Unable or unwilling to rest 
the travel right upon any explicit textual provision, the Court 
elected to protect the right through the equal protection clause 
- one provision that clearly could not have been its source. 
Shapiro's progeny have thrashed about in the analytical bog 
of their ancestor. After Dunn v. Blumstein312 extended Shapiro's 
teaching to durational residence requirements for voters, and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County313 reaffirmed Shapiro's 
concern with deprivation of the necessities of life, Sosna v. Iowa314 
managed to distinguish and uphold durational residency require-
ments for divorce. Taken together, the cases seem a conceptual 
disaster area. It would appear to take a legal Houdini to reconcile 
a holding that residency requirements for "life's necessities" are 
never permissible with a holding that waiting periods for the 
exercise of constitutionally significant interests (such as marital 
choice) are sometimes permissible. In fact, one need not be a 
Houdini to follow his example - and untie the knots. 
The uncertain course of durational residency cases is unmis-
takably a product of tangled strands. They have left the constitu-
tionally unjustifiable suggestion that, except for the special case 
of voting, 375 only the indigent should be free from state-created 
impediments to interstate movement "with intent to settle and 
abide."376 One might expect that an equality-centered view of the 
problem would produce such results; a more justifiable liberty-
centered view, however, could produce similar (though not identi-
371. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See the discussion in the text at notes 54 & 68-70 supra. 
372. 405. U.S. 330 (1972). 
373. 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidation of one-year durational residence requirement 
for nonemergency hospitalization or outpatient care for indigents at county expense). 
374. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
375. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), rested its reasoning more upon the 
Harper-Kramer standard of regulatory precision in franchise distribution than upon the 
impact of the restriction upon migration. An honest assessment could hardly do otherwise 
- the prospect of no welfare benefits on arrival might immobilize a prospective migrant, 
but temporary disfranchisement is not likely even to enter the potential migrant's cost-
benefit calculation. 
376. The phrase is from Justice Marshall in Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 255. It tells 
us that Shapiro's protection is not for transients. The privileges and immunities clause of 
art. IV is for transients, but the interests protected by art. IV appear, for strange reasons, 
to diverge substantially from interests Shapiro and its progeny protect against a compara-
ble xenophobia. Compare Maricopa County with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) 
(dictum that state may constitutionally maintain a "policy of preserving state-supported 
facilities for [bona fide state] residents"). Wander aimlessly if you will, but if you are 
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cal) outcomes in those cases, without the vices and distortions of 
substantive equal protection thinking.377 
I suggested earlier that the travel right is one gleaned from 
fundamental structural assumptions derived from the Constitu-
tion, the federal union it creates, and the supremacy of national 
over state interests in that union. 378 A right so derived, and so long 
recognized, is entitled to protection against state interferences in 
certain instances. As Justice Harlan so appropriately recognized 
in his Shapiro dissent,379 however, elevation of the travel liberty 
above statutory enactments is defensible only if it depends upon 
the values implicit in that liberty and not upon the egalitarian 
overtones of particular exercises of it. 
Although the opinion does not fully disclose its premises and 
may well have reached the wrong result, Sosna u. Iowa380 has 
taken an important step toward untangling the strands in this 
corner of constitutional law. Its means-focused, interest-
balancing analysis is much closer to Justice Harlan's dissent than 
it is to the majority opinion of Shapiro. That, in itself, is insuffi-
cient evidence of disentanglement, since the apparent review 
standard of reasonableness in Sosna381 has appeared in other 
equal protection cases.382 More persuasive is the evolution of the 
"penalty" theory, a theory clearly adapted to straightforward 
protection of the travel liberty, and not to a consistent principle 
of equal treatment for newcomers. As the cases from Shapiro 
through Maricopa County to Sosna383 have progressed, the notion 
of penalty has evolved imperfectly in the direction of "the likely 
infliction of irreparable harm." Thus, a year without the basic 
poor, do not get sick. On the subject of the evolution of art. IV privileges and immunities 
doctrine, see generally L. TruaE, supra note 1, at 404-12, and Supp. 1979 at 34-40. 
377. For an analysis of Shapiro and its progeny that reaches a similar conclusion for 
somewhat different reasons, see Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifica-
tions - A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 109-12, 116-
20. See also McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions - Fundamental Right to Travel 
or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987 (1975); Note, Freedom of 
Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YAIX L.J. 1564 (1975). 
378. See text at note 238 supra. 
379. 394 U.S. at 659-62. 
380. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
381. 419 U.S. at 406-407. 
382. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (expressly adopting intermediate 
review standard for gender discrimination cases arising under the equal protection 
clause), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (engaging in interest-balancing compar-
able to that of Craig, but without identifying the standard as such). 
383. The "penalty" theory actually originated in Dunn, but, in light of earlier deci-
sions marking the vote as constitutionally special, Dunn quite properly viewed a depriva-
tion of voting rights as a penalty per se. 
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sustenance that AFDC benefits provide and a year without access 
to medical care (even if only nonemergency care) are both penal-
ties. In the former case, common sense suggests the injury is 
significant enough to deter some interstate migration. Whether it 
does ijO or not, the conclusion is undeniable that one year without 
welfare benefits results in a net, unrecoverable loss. If and when 
the benefits resume a year later, the hardship created by their 
absence is unremedied and irremediable. 
Sosna stands in the curious position of having moved in the 
right direction without fully recognizing the shift's analytic con-
sequences. The migrant forced to wait for a divorce is also penal-
ized, although the loss is not quantifiable. The harm may be 
irreparable: potential marriage partners may not be willing or 
able to wait, and the year of emotional uncertainty cannot be 
undone. Moreover, a waiting period for divorce may be, in effect, 
a waiting period for marriage, and Zablocki indicates that mar-
riage impediments, aside from age and consanguinity, are consti-
tutionally dubious. Furthermore, a person deeply desirous of a 
quick divorce may in fact be deterred from migrating to 1;1 state 
that imposes a waiting period. Sosna's movement away from 
Shapiro's equal protection approach seems entirely correct, but 
its outcome is not easily squared with the migration-protecting 
principles for which that line of cases purports to stand.384 
Nevertheless, this analysis reveals that the reasoning of cases, 
involving penalties on migration rights rests more comfortably on 
the due process strand than on the equal protection strand of the 
fourteenth amendment. The penalty theory is nothing more than 
another variant of the unconstitutional conditions theme385 - a 
waiting period puts a potential migrant to an unacceptably harsh 
choice between interstate travel and essential government serv-
ices.388 Nothing is novel or unique about careful judicial scrutiny 
of burdens placed by government on the exercise of rights; that 
scrutiny has always been focused on whether the state has inter-
fered significantly with the private calculation of costs and bene-
fits associated with exercising preferred rights. 
Shaking Shapiro free from its equality moorings, moreover, 
384. The state concern embraced in Sosna, that its courts not become "divorce 
mills," would evaporate if all states were forbidden from using durational residence re-
quirements for divorce. 
385. See text at notes 152-54 supra. 
386. See also L. ThmE, supra note 1, at 1005 n.18 (analogizing durational residence 
requirements to judicial comment to the jury on a defendant's exercise of the right to 
remain silent). 
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may make a real difference in the outcome of related controver-
sies. The subordination of the equality theme of Shapiro would 
properly invite judicial examination of waiting periods that harm 
the nonpoor. A one-year durational residence requirement for a 
professional license, for example, might be seen to offend the 
constitutional freedom of interstate migration, either because it 
results in a quantifiable income loss to those who migrate in the 
face of it, or more persuasively, because it is likely to interfere 
significantly with the migration choice. Shapiro, viewed as a sub-
stantive liberty case and not as a "wealth-plus" equal protection 
case, thus becomes an important weapon in the Court's liberty-
protecting arsenal. 
b. Rights of political participation. In the past two decades, 
the Supreme Court has aggressively protected a variety of inter-
ests in political participation. These have included interests in (1) 
a tegislature apportioned by population, 387 (2) access to a spot on 
an electoral ballot,388 and (3) exercising the franchise.389 All of 
these developments present serious problems of tangled strands; 
indeed, the cases protecting interests in voting and fair appor-
tionment may be the most difficult "substantive equal protec-
tion" decisions to rerationalize on a set of grounds that maintains 
strand separability.390 The difficulty has double-barreled dimen-
sions: the political participation doctrines possess powerful 
· connections with ideals of equality,391 and some of the doctrines 
are the input analogues of the output concerns expressed by the 
process imperative.392 
Funneling political participation rights through the due pro-
cess clause rather than its section one companion requires, on the 
theories advanced herein, a showing that those rights are either 
387. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The reapportionment cases 
present a universe of problems of their own. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 738-
61. 
388. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See generally Wilkinson, supra 
note 358, at 956-76; L TRIBE, supra note 1, at 775-84. 
389. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper 
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 763-72. 
390. Professor Wilkinson strenuously argues exactly that: "[T]he realm of equality 
in which judicial intervention is most desirable and justifiable [is] that of political 
equality." Wilkinson, supra note 358, at 956. He refers as well, however, to a concept of 
"political fair play," id. at 957, 961, suggesting that his views and mine may not be grossly 
divergent, see text at notes 398-410 infra. 
391. See id. at 956-67. They also possess powerful connections with libertarian and 
contractarian values at the heart of the first amendment, and Professor Wilkinson so 
acknowledges. Id. at 961-63. 
392. See text at notes 347-50 supra. 
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1) properly inferable from the Bill of Rights or other textual guar-
antee, 2) properly inferable from the constitutional structure, or 
3) otherwise protected- by satisfaction of the "deeply embedded 
values" test. The cases protecting candidate access to a place on 
the ballot fall, the Court has said, explicitly within the first op-
tion: the first amendment protects the interests of both candidate 
and candidate supporters in appealing to the electorate for sup-
port. 393 The reapportionment cases and the cases restricting ine-
qualities in distribution of the franchise, however, have not rested 
on the first amendment and need support from elsewhere. 
An initial glance at text and structure deepens the difficulty 
of justifying these doctrines. The creation of a national legislature 
composed of elected representatives who possess the law-making 
power, and the guaranty clause394 aimed at the states, suggest a 
broadly democratic theory of government is assumed and de-
manded by the Constitution. 3~5 The details of franchise entitle-
merit and regulation, however, seem quite clearly to have been 
textually remitted to the states primarily39.8 and the national leg-
islature secondarily.397 Limitations upon state power to restrict 
the franchise have emerged over time chiefly from the process of 
constitutional amendment, 398 implying a national understanding 
that only by" way of amendment of this sort was state power 
!imitable. Under this textual analysis, Harper seems a less defen-
sible result than Roe; the framers were silent about abortion, but 
rather vocal about the source of authority to regulate distribution 
of the franchise. 
Inferences of the inappropriateness of judicial intervention in 
support of these interests are not, however, the only ones that 
might be drawn from this pattern. The search for "deeply embed-
ded values" is not limited to extra-textual analysis of history and 
contemporary values. Concentration on extra-textual sources of 
393. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See generally Karst, Equality as a 
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975). See also Kusper 
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). 
394. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See generally Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article 
IV, Section 4: A Study of Congressional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962). 
395. Of course, one need not limit one's view to the text of the Constitution in order 
to reach a conclusion of this simplicity. See generally Ely, 37 Mn. L. REv. 451, supra note 
9, at 456-69. 
396. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, amend. XVII. See Barrett, supra note 377, at 112. See 
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123-25 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.). 
397. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 121-24 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (relying 
on U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, for the proposition that Congress is thereby authorized to 
prescribe voter qualifications in congressional, but not state, elections). 
398. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
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fundamental rights tends to obscure a basic point - in constitu-
tional law, the text itself is the best, although not the exclusive, 
source of "deeply embedded values." The 1789 Constitution, 
taken together with the series of enfranchising amendments, m 
evinces a commitment to political participation values. The right 
of the "people" to elect representatives and senators is secured 
by article I, section 1, and the seventeenth amendment, respec-
tively. 400 History has obviously validated the movement to popu-
lar election of presidential electors.401 More fundamentally, and 
with particular reference to state and local elections, the guaranty 
clause may serve as an appropriate source of political participa-
tion values. 
Although the Court has held that whether a particular form 
of state government is "republican" or not is a nonjusticiable 
question, 402 subsequent decisions have weakened the reasoning 
which underlies that holding.403 Indeed, the "one person, one 
399. The 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments explicitly refer to "the right of the 
citizens of the United States .•. to vote." Curiously, each amendment speaks as if it were 
conferring some sort of preexisting federal right to vote upon a group of citizens previously 
without the franchise. Yet there is no explicit right to vote in the 1789 Constitution. 
However, a right of political participation may perhaps be structurally inferred from the 
guaranty clause, coupled with the overtones of representative democracy present in the 
presidential and congressional election provisions of articles I and II and the electoral 
traditions that have emanated from them, see notes 400-08 infra and accompanying text. 
400. To be sure, neither art. I, § 2, nor the 17th amendment, by themselves, are 
capable of supporting the political participation doctrines, because the original under-
standing points too clearly to broad state autonomy in choosing which of "the people" 
possessed the franchise, and in choosing the method of legislative apportionment. 
401. Presidential electors have been selected by popular election in the states for 
nearly two centuries. Surely, then, the right to vote in presidential elections meets the 
tradition-consensus test of fundamental values set forth above. See text at notes 304-24 
supra. 
402. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). In Pacific States, 
the guaranty clause was used to attack the constitutionality of a voter initiative as con• 
trary to republican form of government. Thus, even though the case is often described as 
a barrier to judicial protection of voters' rights through the guaranty clause, the case might 
just as easily be interpreted as a decision upholding a state's use of the initiative in the 
law-making process. In any event, the narrow holding of the case probably should not be 
that "all questions arising under the guarantee clause . . . [are] nonjusticiable," see 
Bonfield, supra note 394, at 554-56. 
403. Even though the Court gave lip service to the Paci{ ic States holding in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the result of that decision in many respects undermined the 
view that the guaranty clause is nonjusticiable. First of all, Justice Brennan's majority 
opinion, while explicitly disclaiming reliance upon the guaranty clause, nevertheless man-
aged to at least partially dispel the notion that the guaranty clause and the political 
question doctrine were precisely congruent, see W. WtECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE 
U.S. CoNsTJTUTJON 279, 281, 292 (1972). Justice Brennan's reasoning appeared to suggest 
that the nature of the legal issue involved - not whether it is framed in the form of a 
guaranty clause claim - determined whether a political question existed, See Bonfield, 
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vote" principle may be nothing more than "a Guaranty Clause 
claim masquerading" in equal protection garb.404 To the extent 
that the guaranty claims are justiciable,405 moreover, the four-
teenth amendment is the appropriate and necessary vehicle for 
imposing values of political participation upon the states. The 
guaranty clause creates no individual rights; rather, it describes 
a relationship between the United States and the states, placing 
upon the federal government a duty to maintain certain condi-
tions of stability within each state, among them· a republican 
form of government. 406 This underlying concern of the clause with 
the rights of the people in the several states to a republican form 
of government justifies the creation of derivative individual 
Baker v. Carr: New Light an the Constitutional Guarantee af Republican Government, 
50 CALIF. L. REv. 245, 252 (1962). Furthermore, none of the six famous tests for political 
questions enunciated in Baker necessarily bars guaranty clause claims, see W, WIECEK, 
supra; at 287-89. Finally, many commentators have persuasively argued that Baker v. 
Carr and its "one person one vote" progeny are really guaranty clause decisions which the 
Court has refused to label as such because of its unnecessarily broad interpretation of 
Pacific States, see notes 400 & 402 supra. · 
404. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Due to the 
nature of the state electoral processes assessed, reliance upon the fourteenth amendment 
in reapportionment cases must be tied implicitly to the guaranty clause: 
Regardless of whether one concludes that numerical equality of representation is 
or is not one of the fundamental values of our system, that determination must 
revolve about an interpretation of the leading constitutional evidence of our values 
with respect to the form of state governments, article IV, section 4, of the Constitu-
tion, which guarantees to the states a "republican" form of government. It is in the 
light of the requirement of "republican" form of government that the essentiality 
of per capita equality ofrepresentation must be judged. If reasoned, non-population 
bases for apportioning state legislatures are considered "irrational,'' it is only be-
cause. the concept of republican form of government, possibly as supplemented by ' 
historical practice and other parts of the Constitution, requires a representative 
democracy based upon complete political equality of the individual . . .. It is this 
argument and oply this argument which will justify a standard of "practical equal-
ity" of representation or practical equality with some "rational deviations" as the 
standard for judging the constitutionality of legislative apportionment. 
Israel, On Charting A Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future a/Baker 
v. Carr, 61 M1cH. L. REv. 107, 135-36 (1962). Thus a citizen's right to equality ofrepresen-
tation under the fourteenth amendment assumes that the Constitution requires state 
governments to be representative democracies. The guaranty clause would seem to be the 
only plausible source for such an assumption. AB Justice Douglas observed in his concur-
ring opinion in Baker: "[T)he right to vote is inherent in the republican form of govern-
ment envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution . . .. A 'republican form' of 
government is guaranteed each State by Article IV, Section 4 .... " 369 U.S. at 242. 
405. See note 403 supra and text at notes 409-10 infra. 
406. The clause reads: 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence. · 
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rights,· enforceable by way of the fourteenth amendment. Other-
wise, the clause bestows a wortliless promise: individual citizens 
of a state with an "unrepublican" form of government - and not 
the unrepublican government itself - are the only parties likely 
to hold the federal government to its guarantee.407 
Moreover, once the due process clause is viewed as having 
any substantive content, that clause may appropriately be the 
source - independent of the guaranty clause - of political par-
ticipation rights. 408 The basic premise of such a view is that a 
substantive content to the clause implies judicial authority to 
oversee the "process" responsible for that content. Put differ-
ently, judicial concerns with legislative output justifies some con-
cern with the process of input. Such judicial intervention is de-
signed to enhance the openness and integrity of the political pro-
cess, and to reduce (hopefully) the necessity for judicial invalida-
tion of legislative outcome. It is an "investment model" of judi-
cial activism - the bench may interfere once to avoid multiple 
subsequent interferences. 409 So viewed, the judicial elaboration of 
rights in political participation is activism employed in a healthy 
search for restraint. 
Just as the conventional judicial task when the clause's pro-
cedural dimensions are invoked is to scrutinize administrative 
and judicial processes for adequacy and meaningfulness of the 
hearing opportunity, so an appropriate task is to study those 
issues of adequacy of political process which are subject to princi-
pled resolution. The day-to-day doings of legislative or executive 
business - lobbying, horse-trading, information-acquisition -
407. This approach is also consistent with the trend of modern Bill of Rights incorpo-
ration doctrine, even though, of course, it is not identical in analytic derivation to tradi-
tional Bill of Rights incorporation. Incorporation of those amendments takes the form of 
creating state duties to match federal duties, with respect to various individual rights 
claims. The guaranty clause "incorporation" starts from federal duties to states (not 
individuals), and transposes them into state duties to individuals. 
408. When political participation rights are channeled through the equal protection 
clause, in contrast, they are inevitably plagued by the same shortcomings of substantive 
equal protection elaborated earlier. See text at notes 93-97, 144-47, 177. 79, & 364-69 supra. 
Furthermore, despite the preponderance of equal protection rhetoric in reapportion-
ment decisions, the right to political participation possesses definite due process attri-
butes, see L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-1 at 737; Neal, Baker u. Carr: Politics in Search 
of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 252, 285. In fact, the right has attained "preferred" status: 
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the 
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, they must live. 
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
409. See Wilkinson, Three Faces, supra note 358. 
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are probably not so subject. But the formal structure of represen-
tation is subject to "judicially manageable" standards, and it is 
precisely that structure which is the target of the reapportion-
ment and franchise distribution cases. Those cases demand a 
minimally fair structure of input into the political process. No-
tions of equality may play a part in the determination of what is 
minimally fair; the cases protecting criminal appeal access for 
indigents stand as clear evidence of that. At bottom, however, the 
Court has taught that minimally fair electoral processes mean 
one vote for each voter and the required distribution of the fran-
chise to all resident adults whose interests may be substantially 
affected by an election. The due process clause, of course, does 
not mandate that a citizen has a right to vote on all governmental 
decisions or for all governmental officials. Rather, the clause pro-
tects the right to vote in those elections - federal, state, or local 
- necessary to insure minimally fair citizen representation. 
The substitution of a "minimum fairness'~ due process clause 
theory of political participation for an equal protection centered 
theory410 is more than mere rhetorical flourish: In part, the theory 
is a formalized recollection of the origins of judicial concern with 
political input - the Carolene Products footnote, it may be re-
called, was appended to a fifth amendment due process clause 
opinion and made no mention of the equal protection clause. The 
proposed theory also preserves and buttresses current applica-
tions of the political participation concept, and does both to salu-
tary ends. The preservation flows from the recognition of the 
input-output relationship described above. Aggressive constitu-
tional protection of the input rights is designed to safeguard, with 
minimum judicial interference, the general civil rights and inter-
ests of the citizenry,411 whether equality-related or not. The but-
tressing stems from the Court's repeated rejection of any general 
410. The minimum fairness theory needs a good deal more development before it can 
be viewed as comprehensive, either descriptively or normatively. In particular, the 
interest-balancing approach used in the procedural due process cases to work out the 
"process due" upon certain deprivations might serve as a more useful model than the 
"strict scrutiny" equal protection model presently employed. Professor Wilkinson, while 
preferring an equality-centered model, has said as much, Wilkinson, Three Faces, supra 
note 358, at 976. Professor Barrett has also suggested the rejection of an equality-centered 
approach. See Barrett, supra note 377, at 115-16. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-1 
at 737 (rights of political participation, despite their doctrinal link to equal protection, 
are rights "Poised Between Procedural Due Process and the Freedoms of Expression and 
Association"). 
411. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. ofE!ections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533: 562 (1964). 
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principle of absolute political equality on all issues and all mat-
ters. 412 Instead of theories of blanket political equality, the Court 
has adopted the principle that political processes provide mini-
mally fair "opportunities to be heard," a notion appropriately 
flowing from the due process clause.413 
C. The Consequences of Untangling -A Broad Look 
It is virtually impossible to anticipate every analytic twist 
that might follow from consistent adherence to this Article's 
model of fourteenth amendment adjudication. The consequences 
of such adherence include reformulation of some existing doc-
trines, and the constriction and confinement of others. For the 
most part, ·adoption of such a model would produce no severe 
dislocations in decisional trends; untangling frequently will result 
in changes only at the edges of some established categories of 
judicial activism. Although some specific alterations have al-
ready been mentioned, it seems more fruitful here to speculate on 
the broader consequences of untangling - the forces, pressures, 
and influences such a development might unleash. 
I have presented a framework derived from the untangling 
that comprises several distinct elements, including continued 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights guarantees, recognition of 
rights derived from structure, protection of a select group of other 
"preferred liberties", a somewhat canalized version of equal pro-
tection, and a doctrine of formal threshold political access. Al-
though some of those elements are, in one sense, open-ended (the 
content of each element is subject to change by interpretation 
and socio-political evolution), the overarching framework is not. 
Thus, the greatest pressure to abandon or distort it will come 
from claims of important individual interests that are intuitively 
appealing but do not qualify for special constitutional protection 
under any of the components of the framework. Conceivably, the 
doctrinal- order could buckle, and through tendentious, mis-
412. The Court's approval of extraordinary majority requirements in Gordon v, 
Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), special referenda requirements for low-income housing in Jomes 
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), exclusion from the municipal franchise of a group of only 
"partially interested" persons in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 99 S.Ct. 383 
(1978), and huge government subsidies for presidential campaigning by, in essence, only 
the two major parties in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), appear to signal n rejection 
of an overarching theory of blanket political equality. 
413. For related attempts to link due process notions to scrutiny of political processes 
generally, see Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake 
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1411-18 (1978); Linde, supra note 
230. 
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guided, or inconsistent application, might soon resemble today's 
"doctrinal disorder."414 To that extent, the framework, like all of 
the principles and rules of law of which it is ultimately composed, 
is only as durable as the judges who administer it. But that objec-
tion can be directed at any attempt to reorganize a vast body of 
judge-made law, particularly that of the constitutional variety. It 
cannot be a sufficient argument against what is otherwise a bene-
ficial structure of decision to contend that the pressures to breach 
it will overwhelm. The doctrine can only be the engine; the judge 
is the engineer. A faulty engine is a menace no matter who drives 
the train; it is hardly prudent to avoid repairs on the grounds that 
the engineer may be less than perfect. 
On the positive side, strand separation offers significant ben-
efits. It may help clear up the disarray and uncertainty that 
presently engulf fourteenth amendment standards of review. In 
particular, eliminating the substantive dimension of the equal 
protection clause might clear the battleground on which the pro-
cess imperative and the moral imperative compete. And once the 
Supreme Court chooses a champion in that competition, it will 
be on the brink of endorsing a single principle of equality - a true 
core principle of equal protection. Hard cases will remain, what-
ever shape the core principle ultimately assumes, but equal pro-
tection standards would be far more straightforward and predict-
able in a system of separate strands than they are under today's 
tangle. 
The impact of strand separation upon due process clause 
review standards is more difficult to assess. Shifting all concern 
for substantive· values out of the equal protection clause and into 
the due process clause will accomplish little if it simply preserves 
an uncertain methodology under a new name. For the ·proposed 
realignment to affect cases meaningfully, the me.thods of reconcil-
ing state interests with claims of preferred liberty must differ 
significantly from those under tangled strands. The new.approach 
might spring from the principles that already govern claims tradi-
tionally recognized as libertarian rather than egalitarian. 
In particular, doctrines protecting liberty of expression may 
serve as an abundant source of analogy. Over the years, the Court 
has used a battery of principles to protect this freedom, including 
a set of per se rules defining the content of protected expression, 415 
414. See Monaghan, supra note 98. 
415. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (three-part obscenity test); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (constitutional line of privilege for speech 
inciting to crime). 
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heightened demands for specificity and fair warning,416 require-
ments of precision in the regulation of conduct closely connected 
with free expression, 417 and insistence on adequate procedural 
safeguards in maintaining the liberty system. 418 Although nontex-
tual liberties will not produce a set of principles as comprehensive 
as those generated by the first amendment,419 one can surely 
transplant the ideal of protecting a liberty system with a core of 
principles that is responsive to the purpose of that system and 
sensitive to the foreseeable threats to it. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 
for example, the majority's recognition that less drastic alterna-
tives to a marriage bar were available for enforcing child support 
obligations420 exhibits relevant and appropriate libertarian analy-
sis; the Court's reflections on the "underinclusiveness" of the 
scheme - it failed to prohibit the incurrence of new long-term 
debts by the support obligor421 - seem irrelevant and unneces-
sary. Furthermore, if the Zablocki Court had assessed the Wis-
consin statute by analogy to the libertarian principles governing 
free expression, it would have discovered a significant threat to 
preferred liberty: the delegation to judges of power to authorize 
the marriage under the highly discretionary standard "that such 
children are ... not likely thereafter to become public charges." 
Once the liberty to marry is recognized as fundamental, doctrines 
requiring clear and imminent danger to legitimate state inter-
ests422 and confining the discretion to make that determination423 
should play as criti~al a role as they traditionally do in speech 
cases. 
Similarly, the substantive due process clause holding of 
416. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); see generally i.. TRIBE, supra 
note 1, at 718-20. 
417. See L. TruaE, supra note 1, at 682-93. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
418. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see generally Monaghan, 
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970). 
419. In particular, the government's active expenditure role in social programs keyed 
to family relationships complicates the analogy. Government may spend its money in 
ways that may discourage (unintentionally) the creation of certain family ties, although 
comparable consequences would be intolerable in the system of free expression. Compare 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), with Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). That 
the values of the expressive liberty system may at times require different sensitivities than 
the values of other preferred liberty systems does not, of course, demand wholesale rejec-
tion of the analogy. It does demand thoughtfulness in drawing upon it. 
420. 434 U.S. at 389-90. 
421. 434 U.S. at 390. 
422. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
423. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
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Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur424 can be compared 
with first amendment doctrines that address state regulation of 
the time, place, and manner of street demonstrations. 
"Reasonable" regulation of such demonstrations has a special-
ized meaning: regulations are reasonable only if they are sensitive 
to both the need for the street as an occasional forum and the 
risks of censorial application of such regulations. 425 Mandatory 
pregnancy leave provisions must, after LaFleur, overcome a simi-
lar burden. Although the Court has recognized a school board's 
interest in continuity of instruction (just as it has recognized 
municipal interests in peaceful and orderly thoroughfares), it has 
also demanded that regulations be drawn with sensitivity to pro-
creative freedom. 426 
In the same vein, separation of the strands promises to re-
duce at least some of the confusion about the respective roles of 
"purpose" and "impact" in fourteenth amendment adjudica-
tion. 427 Cases presenting issues of forbidden classifications - true 
equality cases - have made clear that discriminatory purpose is 
a necessary element of a constitutional violation. 428 Dispropor~ 
tionate impact upon a suspect class, while potentially relevant to 
the issue of purpose, is not itself a violation. Since many truly 
neutral and socially valuable governmental decisions dispropor-
tionately harm particular groups, an impact test would unreason-
ably impede governmental functions and create unpleasant pres-
sures toward race-consciousness. Furthermore, only direct and 
intentional government involvement in· forbidden discrimination 
violates the moral imperative.and weakens the social forces that 
oppose discrimination. 
In contrast, evaluation of governmental purpose is less criti-
cal, though by no means irrelevant, to protecting a system of 
liberty. Results are what count in the protection of liberty:429 a 
424. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
425. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 537, 553-58 (1965). See generally Kalven, 
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1. 
426. But cf. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (noncustodial father of illegiti-
mate child may be denied authority to veto adoption of the child by child's stepfather). 
427. The literature here is voluminous, and I can only suggest some possible implica-
tions of the thesis expressed herein. See, e.g., Clark, Legislative Motivation and Funda-
mental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. R.Ev. 953 (1978); Brest, Palmer v. 
Thompson - An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 
SUP. CT. R.Ev. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
428. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
429. See Ely, supra note 161, at 1160-61. 
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statute outlawing the distribution of leaflets in a public park may 
be concerned wholly with cleanliness of the grounds, but the im-
pact on free communication is too great for the law to be sus-
tained. In a system of liberty, the guiding principle is the maximi-
zation of liberty opportunities subject only to those restraints 
essential to reasonable public order. Thus, in a case like Planned 
Parenthood u. Danforth, 430 the question ofwhether'the legislature 
intended to suppress abortions need never be faced. The Court's 
task instead is to assess carefully the consequences of the enact-
ment; if it unduly or unnecessarily restricts procreative choice, 431 
then it fails to meet fourteenth amendment requirements, no 
matter how laudable its other goals. 
In the equal protection area, the Court has generally been 
faithful to purpose 'analysis when facing traditional classification 
problems and to impact analysis when venturing into the morass 
of substantive equal protection. In Harper u. Virginia Board of 
Elections, 432 for example, the Court struck down the Virginia poll 
tax for restricting the voting interests of the impecunious; the 
Court properly never reached questions of whether the legislature 
acted with the invidious purpose of disenfranchising poor (and 
black) voters. In other cases arriving at the Court in a posture of 
tangled strands, however, the distinction between purpose and 
impact may be significant yet unperceived. A hypothetical de-
rived from Zablocki illustrates the point. If the challenged Wis-
consin statute had not denied a marriage license to one whose full 
support payments failed to remove his dependents from the wel-
fare rolls, it would have created no absolute bar to remarriage for 
the indigent. Discriminatory purpose would have been much less 
evident, and the issue would have become one of effect on the 
marriage opportunities of those behind in their support pay-
ments, a group whose indigent and nonwhite membership might 
turn out to be disproportionately high. A methodology that main-
tained distinct strands could ignore the demographics of the im-
pact and evaluate only the gravity of the law's effects on the 
marriage liberty. Candid acknowledgment that substantive due 
process theories were at work would liberate the Court from the 
potentially intrusive search for unconstitutional motivation and 
430. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating spousal and parental consent requirements for 
abortions). 
431. I assume here that there will be no turning back from the mistake in Roe v. 
Wade. 
432. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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from the problematic inquiry433 into whether legislative excision 
of the "bad" purpose would alter the constitutional outcome. 
Finally, separation of the strands may have salutary conse-
quences for the Court's struggles with the "equal protection com-
ponent" of the fifth amendment due process clause. 434 Something 
about the doctrine has always seemed mildly discomforting, even 
discordant. As the strands of the fourteenth amendment grew 
progressively more tangled and egalitarian activism gained favor 
over libertarian activism, pressure increased for lawyers and 
judges to recast fifth amendment claims against the federal gov-
ernment as equality claims.435 Paradoxically, the more substan-
tive "equality rights" that the fifth amendment due process 
clause absorbs, the more textually superfluous the equal protec-
tion clause appears. Reduction of the content of "equal protec-
tion" to a unitary concern with forbidden classifications would 
accordingly reduce the "equal protection component" of the fifth 
amendment, since the latter is defined by the former. Claims of 
nontextual substantive right, then, would always be due process 
clause claims, regardless of which level of government is responsi-
ble for the challenged action, 436 and the Court would face fewer 
"reverse incorporation" claims437 against the federal government. 
V. SEPARATE STRANDS - SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The revival of substantive due process signifies more than a 
new label for old methodology and results. It demands clearly 
articulated standards for identifying rights. Moreover, it requires 
candid appreciation of the libertarian values that distinguish it 
from equal protection review. Foremost, it demands a profound 
sense of restraint. In the hands of a Justice determined to write 
his preferences into the fourteenth amendment, substantive due 
process is a dangerous weapon. But the last two decades have 
revealed that the equal protection clause is at least as easily 
abused as its companion. Its relative infancy as an activist tool 
433. The inquiry is required by Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252 (1977). See note 350 supra. 
434. See generally Karst, supra note 78. 
435. See, e.g., Community-Service Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (portion of the Communications Act that requires noncommercial broadcast 
media receiving federal funds to retain, for 60 days, audio tapes of all broadcasts "in which 
any issue of public importance is discussed," but does not impose similar requirements 
on commercial stations, violates fifth amendment's equality component). 
436. Professor Ely would solve the problem of equality claims against the federal 
government by invoking the ninth amendment. See Ely, supra note 247, at 444-45 n.158. 
437. See text at note 79 supra. 
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and its textual invitation to excess in the name of equality have 
combined to overwhelm the forces of restraint. At the very least, 
strand separation has the virtue of demanding that diamonds not 
be palmed off as hearts, that the Court justify each and eve~y 
choice of preferred liberty in its own name, rather than in the 
name of overall equality. In that sense, the substantive due pro-
cess revival, particularly if limited by the standards suggested in 
this Article, promises to be more candid and more restrained than 
the egalitarian revolution ever was. 
A substantive due process revival coupled with genuine 
strand disentanglement also promises to be more principled than 
equal protection activism. The ghost of Lochner will always 
haunt the due process clause. The history of conceded abuse may 
operate as a force to channel substantive due process activism 
into the most principled confines. Shapiro u. Thompson has yet 
to spawn a kindred specter for the equal protection clause. In-
deed, Justice Marshall, a leading proponent of aggressive judicial 
defense of equality, has argued that his "sliding scale" is desira-
. ble precisely because it is not subject to the rigid confines of 
principle.438 Members of the Court would most likely be very hesi-
tant to present a comparable argument concerning substantive 
due process adjudication. 
Furthermore, separation of strands might reduce the overall 
frequency of judicial intervention into governmental choices via 
the fourteenth amendment. An equal protection methodology 
that examines substantive interests as well as classification bases 
invites substantial intervention with its attendant potential for 
abuse and unpredictability. Elusive and ever-changing review 
standards have been the byproduct of entanglement. Disentan-
glement, as proposed here, would limit the 'Court's equal protec-
tion intervention to suspect classifications, and its substantive 
due process activism to liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, 
reasonable inferences from constitutional structure, and the sur-
vivors of a stringent two-pronged test of deeply embedded values. 
Although such a channeling is not completely unresponsive to 
claims for protection of new groups or rights, it does not permit 
the fourteenth amendment to be the dynamic organ of societal 
reform that some Justices and commentators have hoped it might 
be. 
Disentanglement will no doubt accelerate some trends in the 
values that the Supreme Court protects by way of the fourteenth 
438. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 461 n.6 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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amendment. Protection of Bill of Rights freedoms and full recog-
nition of the "antidiscrimination principle" would be unaf-
fected, 439 but disentanglement would reinforce the Court's unwill-
ingness to unleash further the sweeping possibilities of substan-
tive equal protection. Similarly, naked substantive due process 
adjudication would be reduced to a more conservative role. This 
is as it should be. Our society has undergone deep, rapid and 
extraordinary transformations of political and social conscious-
ness in the past quarter-century. The parallel growth of technol-
ogy and turmoil throughout the world suggests that the rate of 
change is not likely to decrease. Those great changes may further 
aggravate the tension between socio-political ideals and socio-
political reality. The Court undermines its legitimacy if it at-
tempts to impose on a society in flux any dynamic, sweeping 
extra-constitutional vision of social and political justice. 
The phenomenon of community evolution underscores the 
need for the Supreme Court to perform its traditional and vital 
task of preserving constitutional values against the erosions that 
change - and fear of change - can produce. For the most part, 
only those values demonstrably inferable from the constitutional 
text and structure merit such preservation. I have suggested that 
substantive due process, protective of values drawn from outside 
the text, also has a useful, though limited, place in our con~titu-
tional jurisprudence. Its survival as an idea, despite the backlash 
against Lochnerism, testifies convincingly to its endurance and 
appeal. While substantive due process cannot and should not be 
employed to stifle change or shield us from all our worst impulses, 
it can preserve a few time-honored elements of freedom deeply 
cherished in modern America. Beyond these, the cultivation of 
ideals of community, human respect, and liberty is in the hands 
of the gardener we chose when we bravely opted to govern our-
selves. 
439. This past Term offered hints that disentanglement will allow, but does not 
demand, full recognition of virtually any principle at all. Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 
99 S.Ct. 1760 (1979) (equal protection clause prohibits gender classification in scheme of 
parental consent to adoption of illegitimate child), with Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 
1742 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit gender classification in scheme 
authorizing parental suit for wrongful death of illegitimate child). 
